[KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever
Edward C Appel
edwardcappel at frontier.com
Thu Nov 13 20:44:42 EST 2014
Greg,
First, it's not just the "faithful" who are interested in "archeological digs" as sources of scientific support. One of my books authored by John Dominic Crossan is on what those archeological digs tell us about the life of Jesus. Crossan is anything but one of the "faithful."
Second, on "space and time," or the more orthodox "space-time," I follow Freud in my article on Burke and the negative, reproduced in Chapter 4 of the primer. "Time," as I see it, is a human construct, as Norman O. Brown, a disciple of Freud's of a sort, vouchsafes in Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History (1959). I give the thought of Freud and Brown on the matter a dramatistic twist. At accelerations approaching the speed of light, then, what slows down is process. The notion of "time" results for us word-people by way of our deep-seated and inevitable immersion in the sin-guilt-sacrifice-redemption sequence of dramatic stages, as they play out, unfold, via many different alternative terminologies in various venues of life.
I know it takes gall and guts to "correct" Einstein, but perhaps, unlike Garrison Keilor, I don't need the "powdermilk biscuits" that give "shy people" the prompt to "get up and do the things that need to be done."
Ed
--------------------------------------------
On Thu, 11/13/14, Gregory Desilet <info at gregorydesilet.com> wrote:
Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever
To: wessr at onid.orst.edu
Cc: "Ed Appel" <edwardcappel at frontier.com>, "kb at kbjournal.org" <kb at kbjournal.org>
Date: Thursday, November 13, 2014, 5:32 PM
Bob—okay, I take your
point about religion and philosophy and I think you do have
a point there. Religion does deal with the big issues of
life and how to live. In fact, I think philosophy, in
university departments, in the last half of the 20th century
up until now has strayed too far from confronting the big
issues and has spent too much energy on analytical language
philosophy (at least in Britain and the U.S.). Though I
admit some of this has been interesting to me. One of the
great things about Burke was his ability to confront issues
of language and interpretation and blend these seamlessly
with the big issues of life and world—through dramatism
and logology.
I always
thought the medieval period was from the 5th century to the
15th century and that this “middle period” was also
called the “dark ages” as a contrast with the periods of
the Renaissance and the Enlightenment in the centuries that
followed. Did I have a bad high school history teacher?
As for my USGA handicap, Bob,
right now my index is at 8.6. I hit a low of 6.3 during the
summer but it went up again when I started working on some
swing changes to increase distance. I was just hitting a
groove with these changes and now the weather is going
south, er, coming south—too far. But taking my new swing
into the new season next spring, I plan on being able to
become a scratch golfer. Okay, how’s that for “hope
springs eternal”? Are you a golfer and, if so, what’s
your handicap? And if you can putt, I’m open to a tip or
two on putting, though perhaps we can take that off-line,
unless you can find a way to relate golf to Burke studies.
Come to think of it . . . I won’t go there
right now but speaking of Burke and golf gives me an idea
for that golf book I’ve always wanted to write.
Ed—Thanks for the info on
Schweitzer’s book and on Reimarus. Since Schweitzer’s
effort it seems there has been a growing interest in finding
the “real” Jesus through archeological digs and
deciphering relics like the Gnostic gospels. Some of the
faithful seem eager to have scientific support for their
faith, which is an interesting confrontation of world views.
Speaking of science, you mention relativity and Einstein.
Apparently in the new movie “Interstellar” there is
significant discussion of the effects of relativity in space
and time as well as stunning visual representations of
these. Neil DeGrasse Tyson said some favorable things on
Twitter about how the movie handled the science on all this,
which was good to hear. Then I read a review by a film
critic who called the characters wooden, the dialogue
numbing, the plot nonsensical, and the soundtrack overblown
and deafening. I was about ready to charge out to a theater
after Tyson’s comments but perhaps I’ll wait for the
DVD.
Greg
On Nov 13, 2014, at 10:23 AM, wessr at onid.orst.edu
wrote:
> Stan, thanks
for the Burke references, and to everyone, thanks for the
responses.
>
> By
noting the relative historical belatedness of philosophy, I
was stressing that the philosophical level is difficult to
get to. Typically, you have to push to get there. With
respect to religion, I wasn’t suggesting that religious
people are typically anxious to get to philosophy (like
Greg, I’m not a fan of religion). I was suggesting,
rather, that religion speaks directly about ultimate
questions, so that its subject matter makes it easier to
push to the philosophical level if you're so inclined.
You might encounter resistance, but that is a different
issue. Medieval philosophers were exceptional in being both
religious and ready to push religious questions to a
philosophical level.
>
> Medieval philosophy comes centuries after
the Dark Ages. It brings Greek ideas, especially
Aristotle's, back into the tradition of western
philosophizing (e.g., Aquinas). But in any case, my point
was not that we need to go back to medieval philosophy but
that medieval philosophy gives you good examples of pushing
religious questions to a philosophical level. That’s
all.
>
> Yes, the
pentad is a good place to go to use Burke in this
connection. Personally, I’d start at GM 71: did (1) God
will “the good because it is good”? or (2) is “the
good good because God willed it”? Burke translates a
religious question about God into a philosophical one by
explaining that (1) privileges “scene,” while (2)
privileges “agent,” each with a different logic.
>
> Burke's point
about monotheism, which I referenced last time, is that
monotheism was IMPLICIT AND PRIOR in polytheism, but
unrecognized; Burke adds that with monotheism, polytheism is
transformed into differences of interpretation based in part
on differences in situation.
>
> More later, specifically on Greg's
"difference and change," mainly to use his
discussion to illustrate addressing questions of ULTIMATE
PRIORITY with argumentative rigor, which is what is most
characteristic of philosophy, at least for me.
>
> In the mean time:
Greg, what is your USGA handicap? I'll understand if you
don't want to answer that question.
>
> Bob
>
> Quoting Gregory Desilet <info at gregorydesilet.com>:
>
>> Bob—as I sit
under the covers, wrapped in a blanket (and, yes, the heat
is also on) and the temperature outside is 6 degrees with a
wind chill taking it to -3 degrees, and I was just last
weekend playing golf in shirtsleeves, I find myself feisty,
resentful, oppressed by cabin fever, and in peak
argumentative form. So please forgive me for taking stubborn
but amicable issue with you on a point or two you make in
your recent post. It may just be a symptom of weather
induced orneriness.
>>
>> I agree that philosophy is more
fundamental than religion. But I would argue that most
religions, as practiced in their institutionally codified
and highly influential forms, do NOT get to the
philosophical issues more quickly. In fact, I would argue
the reverse. Such religions are among the primary obstacles
to getting at core philosophical issues because they very
effectively block open philosophical inquiry by an overly
narrow disposition toward what counts as evidence justifying
belief. The medieval period of “philosophy” was not
called the “dark ages” for nothing. Human inquiry
effectively stalled for over a 1000 years and many valuable
insights gained during the Hellenic period were lost or
buried under mountains of dogma and authoritarian induced
ignorance.
>>
>> As for monotheism, I don’t believe
it is philosophically more coherent or defensible, nor is
the more philosophically abstract position of monism.
Instead, these positions are overly reductive and
consequently become incoherent with respect to addressing
issues of essential difference.
>>
>> These points are, of course,
debatable. So I offer an excerpt from some recent relevant
musings of mine, which also provide a definition of
metaphysics and postmodernism that may be of use to some
participants in this forum. Sorry for the length of this
post, but you can also blame that on the weather. So if this
post seems wearisome, please pray for better weather in
Colorado and elsewhere.
>>
>> Definition of Postmodernism
>>
>>
Postmodernism presents a significant break from traditional
and modern metaphysics.
>>
>>
>> Definition
of Metaphysics
>>
>>
>> Metaphysics
is the philosophy of the nature of being through which every
speculation about the nature of being involves a grounding
assumption about the primary structure of oppositional
relations. Technically speaking, there can be no monistic
metaphysics because the job of metaphysics is to explain the
phenomena of difference and change, which always requires at
the bare minimum schism or the existence of two. If there
were but ONE, there could be only stasis and nothing could
HAPPEN; there could be no EVENTS and there could be nothing
like CONSCIOUSNESS. In this sense every coherent metaphysics
amounts to a metaphysics of the nature of being as
becoming.
>>
>>
>> In pre-modern or traditional
metaphysics the primary structure of oppositional relation
consists of the view that one side of the pairing is
accidental, inessential, illusion, or contamination (for
example, Platonic metaphysics of being/time where being is
pure, stable, and unchanging and is then contaminated by
time, which introduces impurity, instability, and change and
is fundamentally inessential to the nature of being). Call
this metaphysics: antagonism, describing a tension
permanently erosive of a fundamental essence.
>>
>>
>> In modern metaphysics the primary
oppositional structure posits one side as essential to the
pairing but always subordinate to the other (for example,
Cartesian and Kantian subject/object relations where the
object is subordinate to the subject by virtue of the act of
cognition wherein the subject effectively appropriates the
object). Call this metaphysics: subagonism, describing a
tension of permanent dominance of one side between different
essences.
>>
>>
>> In postmodern metaphysics the
primary oppositional structure consists of an understanding
of oppositional relations whereby each side is essential to
the other and one side cannot be reduced to the other (for
example, the particle/wave relation in physics where
particles cannot be reduced to waves and waves cannot be
reduced to particles and even when one manifests itself
without the other, the other exists alongside it in
superposition). Call this metaphysics: synagonism,
describing a tension of interaction, alternation, and
exchange among sides equal but not mutually erosive in
essence; one side may dominate the other in changing
contexts but neither is essentially dominant.
>>
>>
>> Thus, postmodernism, as a
philosophically distinct orientation, may be defined as the
adoption of a metaphysics applying synagonal structure to
key oppositions or displacing key oppositions with new
synagonal oppositions.
>>
>>
>> Greg
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
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