[KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever

[Gregory Desilet]

Bob—okay, I take your point about religion and philosophy and I think you do have a point there. Religion does deal with the big issues of life and how to live. In fact, I think philosophy, in university departments, in the last half of the 20th century up until now has strayed too far from confronting the big issues and has spent too much energy on analytical language philosophy (at least in Britain and the U.S.). Though I admit some of this has been interesting to me. One of the great things about Burke was his ability to confront issues of language and interpretation and blend these seamlessly with the big issues of life and world—through dramatism and logology. 

I always thought the medieval period was from the 5th century to the 15th century and that this “middle period” was also called the “dark ages” as a contrast with the periods of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment in the centuries that followed. Did I have a bad high school history teacher?

As for my USGA handicap, Bob, right now my index is at 8.6. I hit a low of 6.3 during the summer but it went up again when I started working on some swing changes to increase distance. I was just hitting a groove with these changes and now the weather is going south, er, coming south—too far. But taking my new swing into the new season next spring, I plan on being able to become a scratch golfer. Okay, how’s that for “hope springs eternal”? Are you a golfer and, if so, what’s your handicap? And if you can putt, I’m open to a tip or two on putting, though perhaps we can take that off-line, unless you can find a way to relate golf to Burke studies. Come to think of it . . .   I won’t go there right now but speaking of Burke and golf gives me an idea for that golf book I’ve always wanted to write.

Ed—Thanks for the info on Schweitzer’s book and on Reimarus. Since Schweitzer’s effort it seems there has been a growing interest in finding the “real” Jesus through archeological digs and deciphering relics like the Gnostic gospels. Some of the faithful seem eager to have scientific support for their faith, which is an interesting confrontation of world views. Speaking of science, you mention relativity and Einstein. Apparently in the new movie “Interstellar” there is significant discussion of the effects of relativity in space and time as well as stunning visual representations of these. Neil DeGrasse Tyson said some favorable things on Twitter about how the movie handled the science on all this, which was good to hear. Then I read a review by a film critic who called the characters wooden, the dialogue numbing, the plot nonsensical, and the soundtrack overblown and deafening. I was about ready to charge out to a theater after Tyson’s comments but perhaps I’ll wait for the DVD.

Greg




On Nov 13, 2014, at 10:23 AM, wessr at onid.orst.edu wrote:

> Stan, thanks for the Burke references, and to everyone, thanks for the responses.
> 
> By noting the relative historical belatedness of philosophy, I was stressing that the philosophical level is difficult to get to. Typically, you have to push to get there. With respect to religion, I wasn’t suggesting that religious people are typically anxious to get to philosophy (like Greg, I’m not a fan of religion). I was suggesting, rather, that religion speaks directly about ultimate questions, so that its subject matter makes it easier to push to the philosophical level if you're so inclined. You might encounter resistance, but that is a different issue. Medieval philosophers were exceptional in being both religious and ready to push religious questions to a philosophical level.
> 
> Medieval philosophy comes centuries after the Dark Ages. It brings Greek ideas, especially Aristotle's, back into the tradition of western philosophizing (e.g., Aquinas). But in any case, my point was not that we need to go back to medieval philosophy but that medieval philosophy gives you good examples of pushing religious questions to a philosophical level. That’s all.
> 
> Yes, the pentad is a good place to go to use Burke in this connection. Personally, I’d start at GM 71: did (1) God will “the good because it is good”? or (2) is “the good good because God willed it”? Burke translates a religious question about God into a philosophical one by explaining that (1) privileges “scene,” while (2) privileges “agent,” each with a different logic.
> 
> Burke's point about monotheism, which I referenced last time, is that monotheism was IMPLICIT AND PRIOR in polytheism, but unrecognized; Burke adds that with monotheism, polytheism is transformed into differences of interpretation based in part on differences in situation.
> 
> More later, specifically on Greg's "difference and change," mainly to use his discussion to illustrate addressing questions of ULTIMATE PRIORITY with argumentative rigor, which is what is most characteristic of philosophy, at least for me.
> 
> In the mean time: Greg, what is your USGA handicap? I'll understand if you don't want to answer that question.
> 
> Bob
> 
> Quoting Gregory Desilet <info at gregorydesilet.com>:
> 
>> Bob—as I sit under the covers, wrapped in a blanket (and, yes, the heat is also on) and the temperature outside is 6 degrees with a wind chill taking it to -3 degrees, and I was just last weekend playing golf in shirtsleeves, I find myself feisty, resentful, oppressed by cabin fever, and in peak argumentative form. So please forgive me for taking stubborn but amicable issue with you on a point or two you make in your recent post. It may just be a symptom of weather induced orneriness.
>> 
>> I agree that philosophy is more fundamental than religion. But I would argue that most religions, as practiced in their institutionally codified and highly influential forms, do NOT get to the philosophical issues more quickly. In fact, I would argue the reverse. Such religions are among the primary obstacles to getting at core philosophical issues because they very effectively block open philosophical inquiry by an overly narrow disposition toward what counts as evidence justifying belief. The medieval period of “philosophy” was not called the “dark ages” for nothing. Human inquiry effectively stalled for over a 1000 years and many valuable insights gained during the Hellenic period were lost or buried under mountains of dogma and authoritarian induced ignorance.
>> 
>> As for monotheism, I don’t believe it is philosophically more coherent or defensible, nor is the more philosophically abstract position of monism. Instead, these positions are overly reductive and consequently become incoherent with respect to addressing issues of essential difference.
>> 
>> These points are, of course, debatable. So I offer an excerpt from some recent relevant musings of mine, which also provide a definition of metaphysics and postmodernism that may be of use to some participants in this forum. Sorry for the length of this post, but you can also blame that on the weather. So if this post seems wearisome, please pray for better weather in Colorado and elsewhere.
>> 
>> Definition of Postmodernism
>> 
>> Postmodernism presents a significant break from traditional and modern metaphysics.
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>> Definition of Metaphysics
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>> Metaphysics is the philosophy of the nature of being through which every speculation about the nature of being involves a grounding assumption about the primary structure of oppositional relations. Technically speaking, there can be no monistic metaphysics because the job of metaphysics is to explain the phenomena of difference and change, which always requires at the bare minimum schism or the existence of two. If there were but ONE, there could be only stasis and nothing could HAPPEN; there could be no EVENTS and there could be nothing like CONSCIOUSNESS. In this sense every coherent metaphysics amounts to a metaphysics of the nature of being as becoming.
>> 
>> 
>> In pre-modern or traditional metaphysics the primary structure of oppositional relation consists of the view that one side of the pairing is accidental, inessential, illusion, or contamination (for example, Platonic metaphysics of being/time where being is pure, stable, and unchanging and is then contaminated by time, which introduces impurity, instability, and change and is fundamentally inessential to the nature of being). Call this metaphysics: antagonism, describing a tension permanently erosive of a fundamental essence.
>> 
>> 
>> In modern metaphysics the primary oppositional structure posits one side as essential to the pairing but always subordinate to the other (for example, Cartesian and Kantian subject/object relations where the object is subordinate to the subject by virtue of the act of cognition wherein the subject effectively appropriates the object). Call this metaphysics: subagonism, describing a tension of permanent dominance of one side between different essences.
>> 
>> 
>> In postmodern metaphysics the primary oppositional structure consists of an understanding of oppositional relations whereby each side is essential to the other and one side cannot be reduced to the other (for example, the particle/wave relation in physics where particles cannot be reduced to waves and waves cannot be reduced to particles and even when one manifests itself without the other, the other exists alongside it in superposition). Call this metaphysics: synagonism, describing a tension of interaction, alternation, and exchange among sides equal but not mutually erosive in essence; one side may dominate the other in changing contexts but neither is essentially dominant.
>> 
>> 
>> Thus, postmodernism, as a philosophically distinct orientation, may be defined as the adoption of a metaphysics applying synagonal structure to key oppositions or displacing key oppositions with new synagonal oppositions.
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>> 
>> Greg
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