[KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever
Edward C Appel
edwardcappel at frontier.com
Sat Nov 1 16:32:55 EDT 2014
Carrol,
One: I am not Steven Pinker. I'm not a cognitive or personality psychologist, a geneticist, an evolutionary developmental biologist, or a statistician. My post was not centrally about the controversy between the likes of Pinker and, say, Hans J. Eysenck, on the one hand, and Lewontin and, say, Stephen J. Gould, on the other. I have no expertise to justify putting my "oar" into that dialogue, in any way. My post was meant to make the point that Pinker was making about "ideology," as that term is refined and modified Burke-wise and Lindsay-wise, to wit, "psychotically entelechialized ideology" in general, and its manifestly equally deleterious outcomes, as human history has vouchsafed. I think that particuular point was well-taken by Pinker. And it relates to the current discussion: Are there different kinds of "perfected" and exclusionary belief systems a Burkean should look especially askance at, or just one kind, the "religious" variety.
Two: In sum, on the matter of your strongly-worded opinion, or statement of fact, to quote Alec Guinness in "Bridge on the River Quay," "I haven't the foggiest," nor would my view, or Pinker's, whatever it actually is, be relevant to the matter at hand.
Ed
--------------------------------------------
On Sat, 11/1/14, Carrol Cox <cbcox at ilstu.edu> wrote:
Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever
To: kb at kbjournal.org
Date: Saturday, November 1, 2014, 10:42 AM
Again, just a footnote. Pinker's
"Blank Slate" metaphor is more than a distortion of what his
opponents (e.g., Richard Lewontin) believe; it comes close
to be a deliberate lie.
NO "anti-hereditarian" (to use that jargon) believes in a
blank slate.
And on race: There is no such thing. Races do not
exist! And you cannot measure what doesn't exist.
Carrol
-----Original Message-----
From: kb-bounces at kbjournal.org
[mailto:kb-bounces at kbjournal.org]
On Behalf Of Edward C Appel
Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 8:26 AM
To: LeeCerling; wessr at onid.orst.edu
Cc: kb at kbjournal.org
Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever
Greg, Lee, Bob, Stan, Carrol---whom have I missed?---All,
I want to cite another argumentative
turnaround analogous to Lee’s. I think the example
will exhibit something of the “proportionality” Bob
speaks of.
Steven Pinker, the Harvard psychologist,
is a hereditarian. He wrote a book called The Blank
Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (Penguin,
2002/2003). The case Pinker makes in the book is
hereditarian throughout, except for a rhetorically strange
Chapter 8, entitled, “The Fear of Inequality.” In
the chapter, Pinker deals with a subject he is not allowed
to be hereditarian about, or he would risk the same kind of
student protests, picketing, and death threats his
predecessor at Harvard, Richard Herrnstein, experienced in
the 1970s. So, in a parenthetical paragraph in the
chapter, Pinker claims not to be a hereditarian on this
particular topic. There’s not enough evidence in
yet. Maybe we’ll find out “someday.” The
“someday maybe” theme is repeated so often, it’s hard
to count all the variations.
Still, Pinker argues from beginning to
end for the virtue of the hereditarian viewpoint as a MORAL
stance, if handled sensitively in light of American
egalitarian commitment to the worth and dignity of all, no
matter how wrongheaded hereditarians may turn out to be on
this specific issue---when sufficient data come in, by and
by.
Most acutely, Pinker is vexed by what
Burke would call the following “equations”:
Hereditarianism leads to racism; racism leads to fascist,
authoritarian, hyper-exclusionary political and social
policies, based on fraudulent beliefs about “superior”
and “inferior” races; these fascist, authoritarian,
hyper-exclusionary political and social policies lead to
genocide. Proof: In the death camps, Hitler’s
racist, fascist, authoritarian Germany killed Jews by the
millions.
Pinker says no, it’s not
“hereditarianism” that leads to authoritarian,
hyper-exclusionary liquidation of a supposedly inferior
“enemy.” It’s “ideology.” By way of
Stan’s apt locution, we can amend that term to
psychotically entelechialized “ideology.” Case in
point: communist “Lysenkoism.” Lysenko was an
idiologized social scientist, so-called. His notion:
Heredity had little to do with traits in offspring.
Life experiences, social and political environment,
especially the modifying power of the “workers’
paradise” that is Leninist socialism, can, over the
generations, remake man and woman into the collective,
cooperative political beings that will transform human life
on earth. The “enemy” of this categorical and
immanentized belief system was any person or group that
would not “cooperate,” submit supinely and completely to
its rigid demands: farmers in Ukraine, military officers
suspected of disloyalty, even Bukharin, who only
wanted workers on the collective farms to retain a small
portion of their produce for sale at local markets.
Proof: These ideological heretics were killed by the
millions. Hereditarianism had nothing to do with the
slaughter. Quite the opposite.
As Burke reminded me in personal
correspondence, the “motive of perfection” is used in
dramatism “ironically,” as well as “straight.”
One suspects more “ironically” than
“straight.” That motive tempts, cajoles, and
pressures us in all sorts of ways. Be on the lookout
for its allure not only in transcendentalized texts, but
also in those that dogmatically prescind the Divine from any
consideration, as well.
Richard Dawkins, in The God Delusion,
and, I think, Sam Harris , in The End of Faith, try to pin
the secular genocides of the 20th century on “religious
faith” of the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim kind. It
doesn’t work. To employ Greg’s metaphor, genocidal
“ideology” can grow to full, noxious bloom in all kinds
of “soils,” including those as far from conventional
religion as you can get.
Thanks for your visit to the parlor,
all.
Ed
--------------------------------------------
On Fri, 10/31/14, wessr at onid.orst.edu
<wessr at onid.orst.edu>
wrote:
Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever
To: "Cerling, Lee" <cerling at marshall.usc.edu>
Cc: "kb at kbjournal.org"
<kb at kbjournal.org>
Date: Friday, October 31, 2014, 8:29 PM
Hi all, thanks for an interesting
series of posts.
Let me offer a Burke distinction to sort out some of
the issues, as least as I understand them. The
distinction is between
"essentializing" and "proportionalizing." Texts
discussing the distinction explicitly include
the Freud essay in PLF and the dialectic of
constitutions in GM. But it is really a motif
that appears frequently in Burke. This distinction is
operating every time Burke speaks of a
motivational "recipe" or some comparable metaphor.
Greg, as I understand him, is interested in finding
the motivation of authoritarianism and locates
it in the belief that text X is divinely
inspired. This is "essentializing." Whether Greg thinks
this belief and authoritarianism always go
hand-in-hand, such that when you find one you
always find the other, isn't altogether clear.
Probably not.
His essentializing may not be that pure, but the main
drift of his argument seems to be in this
essentializing direction, as least as I
understand it.
Burke rejects "essentializing" in the name of
"proportionalizing." Belief that text X is divinely
inspired can be a motivational "ingredient" in
different "recipes," some good, some bad.
Lee's last
post gives clear examples of some good ones. There must
be others; I can't help thinking some people
have lived saintly lives based on the belief
that text X is divinely inspired. Greg may be able to
pursue the connection that interests him more
profitably by reframing it within a proportional
framework.
PROPORTIONALIZING TODAY: The news out of the Middle
East understandably makes us look for links between
religion and violence. But Burke cautions us to
look for proportionalizing complications. An
eye-opener for me came a few months ago from Reza Aslan,
a religious studies scholar who happens to be
Muslim (he was on Book TV's monthly "In Depth"
program). He said that while it has been common in the
West to link the Muslim victory over the USSR in
Afghanistan to the rise of bin Laden, the West
tends not to understand the full significance of
that victory for many in the Muslim world. What
happened there is that Muslims from DIFFERENT
NATIONS came together to fight an enemy, and
they WON. They not only won, they beat a SUPERPOWER.
That event revitalized the idea of the
Caliphate, that is, one ruler over all Muslims
in one state, and beyond that, over a world consisting
only of Muslims--the Caliphate is the solution. ISIS
evidently has declared itself the new Caliphate,
so its ambitions appear boundless. "Terrorism"
doesn't begin to cover all that they are evidently
after.
No doubt in the "recipe" of ISIS's motivation, belief
that text X is divinely inspired is an
"ingredient." But obviously one can also see the
appeal of overcoming national boundaries draw up by
the West. There are a bundle of "ingredients"
here that no doubt energize one another to
produce a terrifying authoritarian "recipe."
Aslan, by the
way, sees no alternative to destroying ISIS. He
urges, instead, that we learn to distinguish
Muslim groups with Caliphate ambitions from
groups that are factions within nations with an agenda
of issues local to their nation. These two kinds
of groups are "apples" and "oranges." Confusing
them just confuses us, so Aslan contends.
Bob
Quoting "Cerling, Lee" <cerling at marshall.usc.edu>:
> Many thanks, Clarke, for your gracious intervention
on my behalf! > And thanks to Ed and Stan for
their comments as well. I'm going to >
focus on Greg's comments below, and hopefully touch on
things > relevant to Ed and Stan's comments in the
course of my answer.
>
> Greg, your response is quite illuminating as to the
nub of the > issue, I think. I had felt
that I was missing an important central >
point of this discussion, and your response is very
helpful in > putting the argumentative train back
on the rails, so to speak.
>
> Here is what makes me nervous in your comments
below: I think the
> real dragon you wish to slay is "authoritarianism,"
and you believe > that you have found the
path or route to the dragon's lair through >
this thing called "religion," specifically "religious
texts whose > adherents claim divine inspiration or
authority." Your worry, as I > understand it,
is that these texts play an authorizing or >
legitimating role for all kinds of behaviors,
including social > control, that we (i.e.,
the academic community?) find maddening and >
intolerable. You wish (or so it appears to me)
to criticize, to > de-legitimate, these
specific religious texts, as a means of >
fighting against the dragon "Authoritarianism."
>
> My problem with all of this is that I think that
the dragon > Authoritarianism doesn't live
there. Or to change the metaphor, I >
think that Authoritarianism can grow up quite
naturally in many, > many different soils,
including, but certainly not limited to, >
communities of people formed by belief in a divinely
inspired text.
>
> Put baldly, I think that human beings love Power;
and they love > consolidating their own
power, concentrating it, and (to use a >
biblical phrase) lording it over other people. And I
think humans > are ingenious in the ways they go
about this; and that one of the > ways they
do this is through the use of religious texts.
No doubt > about it. And to understand how
texts believed to be divinely > inspired by
their adherents are used to nefarious ends is a
worthy > and important academic study--your
project, I believe.
>
> My worry is the way you seem to locate the problem
as residing > specifically in purportedly
"divinely inspired texts." Because I >
want to locate Resistance to Power in those same
texts. That is, it > is possible to read the
Bible, from the stories of Moses, Esther, >
Daniel, the prophets, and through to Jesus and the
apostles, as a > continuing story whereby
individuals and groups of individuals are >
empowered, precisely because of their adherence to
Divine > Communications, to resist
Authoritarianism. The stories of Daniel
> and his three friends are archetypal here:
"O King, we do not have > to answer you in
this matter. Our God is able to deliver us
from > the fiery furnace. But know
this: even if he does not deliver us, >
we still will not bow down and worship you."
>
> It is stories like this, together with what from
our standpoint > might look like an
Authoritarian approach to religion, that >
presumably enabled, say, the Maccabees to fiercely
resist what was > by any measure an overwhelming
Authoritarian rule.
>
> So I wonder: in your approach to these
religious texts that you > believe authorize
Authoritarianism, is there room to acknowledge
the > ways in which they may, in actual historical
practice, provide the > means to resist and
de-legitimize Authoritarianism?
>
> Best regards,
>
> Lee
>
> PS -- One quick note re my interview at Iowa with
KB: Clarke can
> correct me here, but I believe that in his *Rhetoric
of
Religion,*
> KB argued that Christ the sacrifice was
effectively "required" by > the rhetorical
structure of the OT. I asked him why, then,
was > Jesus not more readily accepted by the
religious leaders of the day, > if they had
been as well prepared rhetorically as he asserted
in > RoR. His response, as I recall, was that he
thought that a good > question that he would
have to think about, and that he would need >
to revise his argument to accommodate that fact. I
don't remember, > though, what kind of revision he
actually made, or where he made it, > though
I have a very vague notion that he did address it
again more > fully somewhere in those interviews
that we conducted at Iowa. But > Clarke
would know the details far better than I have
recounted here; > and what I have recounted is
clouded by nearly 30 years of not > having
thought much about it!
>
>
>
> Sent from my iPad
>
>> On Oct 31, 2014, at 10:16 AM, Gregory Desilet
>> <info at gregorydesilet.com>
wrote:
>>
>> Thanks to Lee for your comments. I agree
with everything you say >> about the
sacred and sacredness. But then I step back and place
it >> in the context of lines of thought about
religion that I’ve been >> pursuing and
something does not feel right. So I’ve been
thinking >> about that and trying to get a fix
on this vague feeling and what >> it is
about. Here’s what I’ve been coming up with.
>>
>> While like many, I’ve had general training in
the field of >> communication, my more
precise focus of interest has always been
>> argumentation. Frankly, I love to argue. And
by that I don’t mean I >> love to
disagree for the sake of disagreeing. I mean
argumentation >> as the term is used in this
field. I love to attempt making a case >>
for a particular view. And that also means providing a
reason or >> reasons why that point of view
might be more useful or appropriate, >> or
in some cases more “accurate," than competing points
of view.
>>
>> So in this instance I’m making a case for the
following:
>>
>> That it is worthwhile to consider narrowing
the term “religion” to >> include only
those beliefs and practices centered around
texts >> considered to be inspired or revealed
through a divine source.
>>
>> On quick glance this may seem like a very
small-minded thing to >> want to make a case
for. Obviously, the term “religion” is
commonly >> used in a much broader sense. As
several have pointed out, many >> faiths
of the past century have adopted approaches to their
central >> texts as texts that are understood to
be “sacred” in the sense Lee >> has
indicated. That view of “sacred” is certainly
defensible.
>>
>> For purposes of my argument, however, it was
necessary to find a >> term to refer to a
particular attitude toward texts—the attitude
>> that a text is inspired or revealed through a
divine source. In >> other words, the text is
not really of human origin. And I think >>
that it is possible for all of us to agree that a
significant >> difference exists between a text
considered to be the word of a god >> and
a text considered to be of strictly human origin. So I
needed a >> word to refer to this difference and
chose the word “sacred.” And >> there
is some etymological support for that choice, although
there >> may be a better choice out there of
which I’m not aware (I >> acknowledge
not always being very good at making the best
choice >> when so much hinges on a particular
word choice).
>>
>> So when Lee makes the point that there may
be another sense of the >> sacred more in
touch with how texts are actually approached in
many >> religious communities, this is not
really speaking to the line of >>
argument. I wasn’t originally trying to make a case
for narrowing >> the use of the word
“sacred.” I was only attempting, for the
>> purposes of communicating an argument, to find
a word to refer to a >> particular
attitude towards texts—texts considered to be of
divine >> origin by those who use them. For that
purpose, I chose the term >> “sacred”
and defined how I was using it in this line of
argument.
>>
>> Having said that, I am, however, trying to make
a case for >> narrowing the term
“religion” and now I see that the same case
can >> be made for narrowing the term
“sacred.”
(I’ll summarize again
>> below my reason for wanting to narrow the use
of these terms).
>>
>> But knowing what we know in the field of
communication and Burke >> studies about the
nature of language argues powerfully for the
>> notion that the use of these terms cannot be
artificially narrowed >> in the sense I am
suggesting. For example, people are not going to
>> stop saying things like: “You make a religion
of your workout >> routine” and “Any
baseball signed by Mickey Mantle is
sacred”—and >> many other uses all over the
map, including those related to faith >>
practices.
>>
>> Nevertheless, I still argue for the use of
the terms “religion” and >>
“sacred” in a more technical sense by those who
are writing and >> discoursing on themes
relevant to these terms in academic and >>
journalistic contexts.
>>
>> As already stated, my reason for wanting to
narrow the term >> religion in these
situations relates to the notion that the term
>> “religion” carries a lot of baggage with it
of the sort related to >> authoritarian
practices and attitudes toward texts which
regard >> them as either self-evident and
dictatorial or dictatorial and in >> need
of “correct” interpretation by inspired readers
who come from >> a small circle of elect and
highly gifted persons closely connected >>
to God.
>>
>> Needless to say, these authoritarian practices
and attitudes have >> proven to be very
dangerous in human history and anything we can
do >> to undermine and separate human
communities from this “baggage” is, >>
I argue, beneficial. Using the term “philosophy”
rather than >> “religion” to refer to the
beliefs and practices of certain >>
community groups to distinguish them from more
authoritarian groups >> will, therefore,
potentially carry a beneficial message into the
>> general public. For example, people may ask,
“Why did that >> journalist just
describe those Unitarians as practicing a
>> philosophy instead of a religion?”
Encouraging the use of the term >>
“philosophy” in these contexts could gain useful
traction and >> facilitate distinguishing
between authoritarian (and quasi-fascist)
>> groups from other community groups.
>>
>> Having said all this, one may still take
issue directly with my >>
argument—perhaps by claiming that the term
“religion” does not >> carry the baggage I
assume it does and that I am being very >>
narrow-minded and perhaps bigoted to suppose it does.
But the mere >> fact that this issue is
debatable (and I think I could make a good
>> debate of it) argues for the substitution of
the term “philosophy” >> as I have
argued. It is safer to say the term “philosophy”
does not >> carry the potential for a misleading
authoritarian message that the >> term
“religion” does. It’s just a better word choice
all around for >> those faith practices that
regard their texts as clearly NOT >>
divinely derived.
>>
>> Greg
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Oct 31, 2014, at 9:22 AM, Edward C
Appel >>> <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
wrote:
>>>
>>> Lee, Stan, Greg, and Carrol,
>>>
>>> Great contributions all around. I take
to heart Lee's point that >>> we create
the "sacredness" of texts to various degrees.
Most of >>> us are not yet ready to "die" for
Burke's treasure trove of >>>
pronouncements, but we will, triennially, travel a
thousand miles >>> in votive service to its
enduring worth.
>>>
>>> I also like Stan's point about how the
assumed "limitless" gets >>> embodied
in the necessarily "limitedness" that characterizes
any >>> particular language, of necessity in
need of the "discount."
>>>
>>> Greg's point about "philosophy" reminds me
of the identifying >>> properties of
Paul Tillich, when he taught at Union
>>> Seminary in New York (or was it when he was at
Harvard?):
>>> Professor of Philosophical Theology.
>>>
>>> On "psychotic entelechy" transcendentalized:
Thirty-five years
>>> ago, Jim Chesebro spoke of the church's
"profound use of the >>> negative." I
mention several of those negatively-induced
>>> "perfections" in Evangelical Protestantism
in the Primer (on >>> Falwell in
Chapter 10) Let me here cite an additional
>>> "perfection" extant today even in
relatively "comedic" Mainline >>>
Protestantism, as well as in
still-more-entelechialized >>>
Catholicism. I speak of the "til death do us
part" proviso in the >>> marriage vow.
(When I broached this issue with Daughter Beth,
a >>> Presbyterian preacher who has performed
many marriages in her >>> ministry, she
corrected me with, "as long as you both shall
live." >>> There's no difference, I
admonished.) The church requires this
>>> categorical promise before the altar of
God from even teenagers >>> and
early-20-somethings. For cryin' out loud, the
human brain >>> isn't even fully developed
until age 25, and then it takes a >>>
couple of years more until somebody >>>
begins to get a good handle on who he or she actually
is. Just >>> think through the
implications of "as long as you both shall
>>> live." What is the church saying,
other than it's more righteous >>> to
blow your brains out than divorce the person you
married at a >>> tender age?
>>>
>>> I could go on in respect to this
profound proscription, but I >>> sense
I may have already offended some subscribers to this
list.
>>>
>>> Again, peace be with you, however pale
and evanescent.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Ed
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------------
>>> On Thu, 10/30/14, Cerling, Lee <cerling at marshall.usc.edu>
wrote:
>>>
>>> Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke
Part Whatever >>> To: "Gregory Desilet"
<info at gregorydesilet.com>
>>> Cc: "Ed Appel" <edwardcappel at frontier.com>,
"kb at kbjournal.org"
>>> <kb at kbjournal.org>
>>> Date: Thursday, October 30, 2014, 11:55
PM >>> >>> Hi, all--
>>> >>> I have lurked on this list
for >>> a long time without contributing, and
I think maybe none of >>> you know me
except Clarke Rountree, who was my colleague at
>>> Iowa back in the day. But this has
been an intriguing >>> discussion, and
I would like to offer some friendly >>>
resistance to the flow of argument, to see how the
argument >>> plays out. Whether it is a
Burkean resistance or not, I >>> don't
know; you all know Burke much better than me,
and >>> you can judge.
>>>
>>> That said, I
>>> want to gently probe the concept of "sacred"
texts
>>> as it has developed in this thread. It seems
to me that a >>> "sacred" text is a
text that has won or earned >>> "sacredness"
by virtue of its constitutive >>> power--that
is, it functions as "sacred" to the >>>
extent that some community is self-consciously shaped
and >>> formed by it. So "inspiration"
or source of >>> inspiration is not the
key inflection point, but >>>
accreditation by a community. In this
view, >>> "sacredness" is a matter of degree,
and a text is >>> more or less sacred
depending on the degree to which some
>>> living community (or communities) are in
some definable >>> sense "constituted"
by it. By that standard, the >>>
Bible is an exceptionally sacred text in that
innumerable >>> communities past and present
have been constituted by it; >>> the
Declaration of Independence is also sacred, but
less >>> so. And the writings of
Kenneth Burke are only very weakly >>>
sacred, in that this small community is very loosely
formed >>> by it; but not in the sense of its
members being willing >>> (for example)
to suffer death for it, as is the case with
>>> more strongly sacred texts, such as the
Declaration of >>> Independence or the Bible
or the Koran.
>>>
>>> And in this way of thinking,
>>> texts can lose their sacredness: this
has certainly been >>> the pattern in
Christianity, where the Bible may become less
>>> and less normative to successive
generations, until it is >>>
effectively "desacralized"--no longer normative
>>> for a given community; no longer
constitutive of that >>>
community. (I am thinking of the movement from
Puritanism >>> to Unitarianism). So for
that community, it is no longer >>>
sacred; whereas for another Christian community (say,
the >>> Amish) its sacredness may be
re-affirmed and even >>> strengthened
over time.
>>>
>>> My point is this: I do think that
texts which >>> are significantly
constitutive in nature, texts to which
>>> human beings have committed themselves,
and especially those >>> texts for
which human beings have voluntarily undergone
>>> torture and death, are entitled to a
special kind of respect >>> and
reverence in the academy and elsewhere.
>>>
>>> That said, I agree with what I
>>> take Greg to be saying below, that no
text, regardless of >>> its sacred
status, is thereby exempt from criticism.
And >>> in fact, precisely because of the
extraordinary power that >>> these
sacred texts exercise over human beings, it may
well >>> behoove us to give them much more
than an ordinary amount of >>> critical
attention. (That is certainly what Augustine
does >>> in the first half of City of
God--lavish devastating >>> critical
attention on the primary pagan sacred texts of
his >>> day.) >>>
>>> And one last >>> caveat: I
do think that criticism of a
(sacred) text
>>> should focus less on "what it contains"
than on >>> "how it has been
read." So that I am not >>> persuaded
(at least, not yet) that the New Testament is
>>> anti-semitic; I am persuaded, however, that
a strong and >>> long and honored
tradition of reading the New Testament,
>>> from Chrysostom to Luther (and beyond, in both
directions)
>>> was deeply and repugnantly anti-semitic.
And in my view, >>> at least, it is not the
New Testament texts themselves that >>>
are to be censured, but that tradition of reading
the >>> text.
>>>
>>> All for now. My
>>> apologies if this line of thought is too
much at odds with >>> the tenor of what
has been a most interesting exchange.
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>>
>>> Lee Cerling
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Sent from my
>>> iPad
>>>
>>>> On Oct 30, 2014, at
>>> 2:44 PM, Gregory Desilet <info at gregorydesilet.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Yes, Ed,
>>> “metaphysical philosophy” isn’t a
bad option, though >>> it might be
confused with “spiritual >>>
metaphysics”—which has been co-opted by New
Age >>> philosophy, where at
“metaphysical bookstores” you will
>>> find all manner of occult and
parapsychological writings >>> (such as
“Seth Speaks” etc.). As for those you
reference >>> as “untraditional mainline
Protestants” and the >>> potential
problem of their belief in God, I don’t see a
>>> problem there in placing their approach in
the philosophy >>> category, since many
philosophers also express a belief in
>>> God—sans any kind of sacred text.
Though perhaps those in >>> this group
could be in a sub-category called >>>
“philosophical theism.”
>>>>
>>>> At any rate, the important thing from
my >>> point of view is advocating the notion
that “all texts are >>> created
equal” just as all persons are created equal.
And, >>> just as this does not entail that
all persons are of equal >>> influence,
it does not entail that all texts are of equal
>>> influence. The primary thing is that no text
be seen as >>> inherently superior and
unquestionable by virtue of a divine
>>> birthright or source. The merit of every
text ought to be >>> weighed by what it
contains rather than by who wrote or
>>> inspired it. Currently across the world
there are far too >>> many people who
believe in the inherent superiority of
>>> certain texts, regardless of what they
actually say, and in >>> many cases not
even reading or fully understanding what is
>>> said in them. This is a state of affairs
every >>> communication, language, and
rhetorical scholar should >>> bemoan.
>>>>
>>>> Greg
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Oct 30, 2014,
>>> at 9:55 AM, Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
>>> wrote:
>>> OK, Greg, howabout if we call the
blanched, etiolated >>> Christianity of
the very liberal side of the Mainline
>>> Protestant Church "metaphysical philosophy"?
>>> Burke calls metaphysical philosophy "coy
>>> theology." Maybe we can find a measure
of common >>> ground with that
linguistic accommodation.
>>>>>
>>>>> The only
>>> problem there is, such untraditional
Mainline Protestants >>> openly profess
belief in a Power that can rightfully be
>>> called "God." They're not
particularly >>> "coy" about their theistic
bent.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'll
>>> mull over your demurrers some more and
maybe get back.
>>>>> '
>>>>> What I
>>> want mainly to do here is address Stan's
term >>> "psychotic entelechy." I like
it. Maybe owing >>> more to my dour,
"morbid" Scaninavian personality, >>>
I've long since thought that Burke's dramatism,
and >>> what I've observed going on around
me, had best be >>> described as half
insane. I.e., the "glory" and >>>
the "sickness" of the "symbol-using >>>
animal" (Burke), the "symbolizing animal"
>>> (Condit), or the "symbolic species"
(Deacon) can >>> legitimately be
described as half amazingly wonderful and
>>> half bonkers. I'm talking about the
"normal"
>>> human race. People give evidence of
being nuts whether >>> that "entelechy"
is being immanentized or >>>
transcendentalized.
>>>>>
>>>>> Whithout going into detail, how
long >>> do you think it will take this
rapidly expanding species of >>> animal
life to despoil this planet's ecosystems
>>> irreparably, render this "Garden of Eden"
half a >>> wasteland, devoid of so
very, very much of its rich >>>
biodiversity, and who knows what else? Humans, in
their >>> entelechial quest for more and
more "properties,"
>>> both tangible and symbolic, evince, in
the large, no thought >>> of the vast
expanses of geologic time and their import.
In >>> a mere ten thousand years since
the end of the last ice >>> age and
beginnings of urban living, homo sapiens
>>> (there's a joke for you) has already
altered that brief >>> Holocene Epoch
into what earth scientists are now saying
>>> should be labeled the "Anthropocene,"
things are >>> already getting that
bad. What are the chances of a
>>> turn-around? What are things likely
to look like in >>> another mere one
million eight-hundred-thousand years, the
>>> brief span so far of this, the eleventh
period of the >>>>> Phanerozoic
Eon, the Quaternary?
>>>>> '
>>>>> Listen
>>> to Fox News, read the Wall Street
Journal, watch China built >>> another
goal-driven power plant each week, read letters
to >>> your local newspaper or posts by the
vox populi on the >>> internet, pay
even cursory attention to the campaign
>>> rhetoric now reaching a crescendo, and
weep. I see next to >>> no chance,
until things get so bad we're suffocating in
>>> our own effluvia.
>>>>>
>>>>> On the transcendental craziness,
more >>> later, if I can screw up the courage
to risk offending some >>> subcribers
to this list. You know, the "free
>>> speech"/don't-"hurt"-the-feelings-of-others
>>> quandary.
>>> "Psychotic entelechy"? Well, I guess.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ed
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Ed
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> -----
>>> ---------------------------------------
>>>>> On Thu, 10/30/14, Gregory
Desilet >>> <info at gregorydesilet.com>
>>> wrote:
>>> Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing
Burke Part >>> Whatever
>>>>> To: "Ed Appel"
>>> <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
>>>>> Cc: "Stan Lindsay" <slindsa at yahoo.com>,
>>> "kb at kbjournal.org"
>>> <kb at kbjournal.org>
>>>>> Date: Thursday, October 30, 2014,
3:40 >>> AM >>>>>
>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>> >>>>> Many good
points have been made by >>>>>
several >>> persons, so there is much to
respond to and if I do not >>>>>
touch on someone’s >>>>> point here
that will be because of my >>> limits as a
mere human >>>>> and not
>>> because I >>>>> view a
particular point >>> as not meriting a
response. Turning >>> to Ed’s
comments >>>>> first, he points
>>> out that his definition of “religion”
>>>>> is different from mine.
>>>>> But I think this kind of response
gets >>> off on the wrong foot
>>>>> with regard >>> to
the >>>>> thrust of what I’m
>>> attempting to say. Granted, it is
>>> perfectly sensible and
>>>>> legitimate >>> in a
discussion of religion to say, “this is
>>>>> what I mean by
>>>>> religion.” But when Ed says
“Greg >>> means something
>>>>> different,” I >>>
believe more >>>>> than that is going
on.
>>> True, we can each have our different
>>>>> definitions of
>>>>> religion and go our separate ways,
but >>> what I’m attempting
>>>>> to do is >>> argue
>>>>> (persuade) others that the
>>> term “religion” ought not to
>>>>> be >>> applied in
certain >>>>> ways due to the
>>> circumstance that it thereby loses much
of >>>>> its usefulness as a
>>>>> term. For example, if we call
every >>> bright light in the sky
>>>>> a >>> “star,”
that’s >>>>> okay but there
>>> is benefit to be gained by refining our
>>>>> distinctions to separate
>>>>> out stars, planets, comets,
galaxies, >>> etc.Ed has seemingly accepted
my >>> challenge to distinguish
>>>>> religions >>> that
abandon the sacred text notion from
>>>>> philosophical study and
>>>>> inquiry by offering the
following:I >>> regard its [religion’s]
primary >>> reference as
>>>>> characteristic of one
>>> who believes in an Originary Power we
>>>>> can rightfully call
>>>>> "God." For me, as a
>>> Burkean, I would reductively
>>>>> define >>> that
>>>>> Power as the "Great >>>
Potential."In other words, divinity or God
>>>>> becomes the >>> “Great
Potential.” All such reasoning is well and
>>> good, >>>>> but what
becomes of the >>>>> status of what
have been called >>> religious texts by way
of >>>>> such a >>> view
of >>>>> religion? Are these
texts >>> in some way the “voice” of
the >>> “Great Potential”? Or
>>>>> as Stan >>> says, are
they wholly inspired, substantially
>>>>> inspired, or only
>>>>> partially inspired by the Great
>>> Potential? And what makes
>>>>> these >>> religious
texts >>>>> substantially
>>> different from other texts such as those
>>>>> written by Plato, Aristotle,
>>>>> Descartes, Spinoza, etc? Are not
these >>> latter texts also
>>>>> inspired by the >>>
“Great >>>>> Potential”? In fact,
is >>> not EVERYTHING inspired by the
>>> “Great Potential”?When we humans
sever, cloud, or >>>>> muddy the
link >>>>> between a text and a divine
source of >>> that text, we in
>>>>> effect place that >>>
text >>>>> alongside all other
texts >>> composed by human hands. Who is
to >>> say, for example,
>>>>> that Oscar >>> Wilde’s
“De Profundis” is not as much or
>>>>> more divinely inspired than
>>>>> any text of the Bible—if the
>>> divinity is regarded as the >>>
“Great Potential”? The >>>>>
problem >>> is that deciding if texts are
religious in nature >>>>> and in
inspiration >>>>> becomes a very
arbitrary issue. From >>> within this view,
we >>>>> may as well >>>
call every such text “religious” or
>>>>> every such text “secular”
because >>> there is no longer a
>>>>> distinction >>> between
the two >>>>> that can be
>>> convincingly defended. At least I am not
>>>>> convinced and I hope I
>>>>> have convinced others not to be
>>> convinced.As soon as we no longer have a
very >>>>> direct and
>>> clear link to a divine source (a higher
being), >>> manifested
>>>>> decisively in some
>>>>> texts and not in others, we have
a >>> situation where every
>>>>> text >>> discussing
the >>>>> nature of “life”
>>> effectively reduces to the category of
>>>>> philosophy. Some of
>>>>> these texts may be valued more
than >>> others by particular
>>>>> individuals >>> but
none >>>>> of these texts any
longer >>> have a source or origin
>>> unquestionably superior to
>>>>> any >>> other. The
benefits of each text must be constantly
>>>>> ARGUED and not assumed.
>>>>> This attitude toward texts makes a
big >>> difference in how
>>>>> texts are >>>
approached >>>>> and in how they
are >>> valued. I believe the use of the
term >>>>> “philosophy” to
>>>>> describe such texts and
associated >>> practices is better than
>>> “religious” because
>>>>> it reduces >>> the
chances for conveying an authoritarian
>>>>> quality in the text—the
>>>>> quality traditionally associated
with >>> so-called religious
>>>>> texts.
>>>>> Greg
>>>
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