[KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever

[Carrol Cox]

Again, just a footnote. Pinker's "Blank Slate" metaphor is more than a distortion of what his opponents (e.g., Richard Lewontin) believe; it comes close to be a deliberate lie.

NO "anti-hereditarian" (to use that jargon) believes in a blank slate.

And on race: There is no such thing.  Races do not exist! And you cannot measure what doesn't exist.

Carrol

-----Original Message-----
From: kb-bounces at kbjournal.org [mailto:kb-bounces at kbjournal.org] On Behalf Of Edward C Appel
Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 8:26 AM
To: LeeCerling; wessr at onid.orst.edu
Cc: kb at kbjournal.org
Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever

Greg, Lee, Bob, Stan, Carrol---whom have I missed?---All,

	I want to cite another argumentative turnaround analogous to Lee’s.  I think the example will exhibit something of the “proportionality” Bob speaks of.

	Steven Pinker, the Harvard psychologist, is a hereditarian.  He wrote a book called The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature (Penguin, 2002/2003).  The case Pinker makes in the book is hereditarian throughout, except for a rhetorically strange Chapter 8, entitled, “The Fear of Inequality.”  In the chapter, Pinker deals with a subject he is not allowed to be hereditarian about, or he would risk the same kind of student protests, picketing, and death threats his predecessor at Harvard, Richard Herrnstein, experienced in the 1970s.  So, in a parenthetical paragraph in the chapter, Pinker claims not to be a hereditarian on this particular topic.  There’s not enough evidence in yet.  Maybe we’ll find out “someday.”  The “someday maybe” theme is repeated so often, it’s hard to count all the variations.

	Still, Pinker argues from beginning to end for the virtue of the hereditarian viewpoint as a MORAL stance, if handled sensitively in light of American egalitarian commitment to the worth and dignity of all, no matter how wrongheaded hereditarians may turn out to be on this specific issue---when sufficient data come in, by and by.

	Most acutely, Pinker is vexed by what Burke would  call the following “equations”: Hereditarianism leads to racism; racism leads to fascist, authoritarian, hyper-exclusionary political and social policies, based on fraudulent beliefs about “superior” and “inferior” races; these fascist, authoritarian, hyper-exclusionary political and social policies lead to genocide.  Proof: In the death camps, Hitler’s racist, fascist, authoritarian Germany killed Jews by the millions.

	Pinker says no, it’s not “hereditarianism” that leads to authoritarian, hyper-exclusionary liquidation of a supposedly inferior “enemy.”  It’s “ideology.”  By way of Stan’s apt locution, we can amend that term to psychotically entelechialized “ideology.”  Case in point: communist “Lysenkoism.”  Lysenko was an idiologized social scientist, so-called.  His notion: Heredity had little to do with traits in offspring.  Life experiences, social and political environment, especially the modifying power of the “workers’ paradise” that is Leninist socialism, can, over the generations, remake man and woman into the collective, cooperative political beings that will transform human life on earth.  The “enemy” of this categorical and immanentized belief system was any person or group that would not “cooperate,” submit supinely and completely to its rigid demands: farmers in Ukraine, military officers suspected of disloyalty,  even Bukharin, who only wanted workers on the collective farms to retain a small portion of their produce for sale at local markets.  Proof: These ideological heretics were killed by the millions.  Hereditarianism had nothing to do with the slaughter.  Quite the opposite.

	As Burke reminded me in personal correspondence, the “motive of perfection” is used in dramatism “ironically,” as well as “straight.”  One suspects more “ironically” than “straight.”  That motive tempts, cajoles, and pressures us in all sorts of ways.  Be on the lookout for its allure not only in transcendentalized texts, but also in those that dogmatically prescind the Divine from any consideration, as well.

	Richard Dawkins, in The God Delusion, and, I think, Sam Harris , in The End of Faith, try to pin the secular genocides of the 20th century on “religious faith” of the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim kind.  It doesn’t work.  To employ Greg’s metaphor, genocidal “ideology” can grow to full, noxious bloom in all kinds of “soils,” including those as far from conventional religion as you can get.

	Thanks for your visit to the parlor, all.


	Ed                     

--------------------------------------------
On Fri, 10/31/14, wessr at onid.orst.edu <wessr at onid.orst.edu> wrote:

 Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever
 To: "Cerling, Lee" <cerling at marshall.usc.edu>
 Cc: "kb at kbjournal.org" <kb at kbjournal.org>
 Date: Friday, October 31, 2014, 8:29 PM
 
 Hi all, thanks for an interesting
 series of posts.
 
 Let me offer a Burke distinction to sort out some of the  issues, as  least as I understand them. The distinction is between 
 
 "essentializing" and "proportionalizing." Texts discussing  the  distinction explicitly include the Freud essay in PLF and  the  dialectic of constitutions in GM. But it is really a motif  that  appears frequently in Burke. This distinction is operating  every time  Burke speaks of a motivational "recipe" or some comparable  metaphor.
 
 Greg, as I understand him, is interested in finding the  motivation of  authoritarianism and locates it in the belief that text X is  divinely  inspired. This is "essentializing." Whether Greg thinks this  belief  and authoritarianism always go hand-in-hand, such that when  you find  one you always find the other, isn't altogether clear.
 Probably not.
 His essentializing may not be that pure, but the main drift  of his  argument seems to be in this essentializing direction, as  least as I  understand it.
 
 Burke rejects "essentializing" in the name of  "proportionalizing."  Belief that text X is divinely inspired can be a  motivational  "ingredient" in different "recipes," some good, some bad.
 Lee's last
 post gives clear examples of some good ones. There must be  others; I  can't help thinking some people have lived saintly lives  based on the  belief that text X is divinely inspired. Greg may be able to  pursue  the connection that interests him more profitably by  reframing it  within a proportional framework.
 
 PROPORTIONALIZING TODAY: The news out of the Middle  East  understandably makes us look for links between religion and  violence.  But Burke cautions us to look for proportionalizing  complications. An  eye-opener for me came a few months ago from Reza Aslan, a  religious  studies scholar who happens to be Muslim (he was on Book  TV's monthly  "In Depth" program). He said that while it has been common  in the West  to link the Muslim victory over the USSR in Afghanistan to  the rise of  bin Laden, the West tends not to understand the full  significance of  that victory for many in the Muslim world. What happened  there is that  Muslims from DIFFERENT NATIONS came together to fight an  enemy, and  they WON. They not only won, they beat a SUPERPOWER. That  event  revitalized the idea of the Caliphate, that is, one ruler  over all  Muslims in one state, and beyond that, over a world  consisting only of  Muslims--the Caliphate is the solution. ISIS evidently has  declared  itself the new Caliphate, so its ambitions appear  boundless.  "Terrorism" doesn't begin to cover all that they are  evidently after.
 
 No doubt in the "recipe" of ISIS's motivation, belief that  text X is  divinely inspired is an "ingredient." But obviously one can  also see  the appeal of overcoming national boundaries draw up by the  West.  There are a bundle of "ingredients" here that no doubt  energize one  another to produce a terrifying authoritarian "recipe."
 Aslan, by the
 way, sees no alternative to destroying ISIS. He urges,  instead, that  we learn to distinguish Muslim groups with Caliphate  ambitions from  groups that are factions within nations with an agenda of  issues local  to their nation. These two kinds of groups are "apples" and  "oranges."  Confusing them just confuses us, so Aslan contends.
 
 Bob
 
 Quoting "Cerling, Lee" <cerling at marshall.usc.edu>:
 
 > Many thanks, Clarke, for your gracious intervention on  my behalf!  > And thanks to Ed and Stan for their comments as  well.  I'm going to  > focus on Greg's comments below, and hopefully touch on  things  > relevant to Ed and Stan's comments in the course of my  answer.
 >
 > Greg, your response is quite illuminating as to the nub  of the  > issue, I think.  I had felt that I was missing an  important central  > point of this discussion, and your response is very  helpful in  > putting the argumentative train back on the rails, so  to speak.
 >
 > Here is what makes me nervous in your comments
 below:  I think the
 > real dragon you wish to slay is "authoritarianism," and  you believe  > that you have found the path or route to the dragon's  lair through  > this thing called "religion," specifically "religious  texts whose  > adherents claim divine inspiration or authority."  Your worry, as I  > understand it, is that these texts play an authorizing  or  > legitimating role for all kinds of behaviors, including  social  > control, that we (i.e., the academic community?) find  maddening and  > intolerable.  You wish (or so it appears to me) to  criticize, to  > de-legitimate, these specific religious texts, as a  means of  > fighting against the dragon "Authoritarianism."
 >
 > My problem with all of this is that I think that the  dragon  > Authoritarianism doesn't live there.  Or to change  the metaphor, I  > think that Authoritarianism can grow up quite naturally  in many,  > many different soils, including, but certainly not  limited to,  > communities of people formed by belief in a divinely  inspired text.
 >
 > Put baldly, I think that human beings love Power; and  they love  > consolidating their own power, concentrating it, and  (to use a  > biblical phrase) lording it over other people.  And I think humans  > are ingenious in the ways they go about this; and that  one of the  > ways they do this is through the use of religious  texts.  No doubt  > about it.  And to understand how texts believed to  be divinely  > inspired by their adherents are used to nefarious ends  is a worthy  > and important academic study--your project, I believe.
 >
 > My worry is the way you seem to locate the problem as  residing  > specifically in purportedly "divinely inspired  texts."  Because I  > want to locate Resistance to Power in those same  texts.  That is, it  > is possible to read the Bible, from the stories of  Moses, Esther,  > Daniel, the prophets, and through to Jesus and the  apostles, as a  > continuing story whereby individuals and groups of  individuals are  > empowered, precisely because of their adherence to  Divine  > Communications, to resist Authoritarianism.  The  stories of Daniel  > and his three friends are archetypal here:  "O  King, we do not have  > to answer you in this matter.  Our God is able to  deliver us from  > the fiery furnace.  But know this:  even if  he does not deliver us,  > we still will not bow down and worship you."
 >
 > It is stories like this, together with what from our  standpoint  > might look like an Authoritarian approach to religion,  that  > presumably enabled, say, the Maccabees to fiercely  resist what was  > by any measure an overwhelming Authoritarian rule.
 >
 > So I wonder:  in your approach to these religious  texts that you  > believe authorize Authoritarianism, is there room to  acknowledge the  > ways in which they may, in actual historical practice,  provide the  > means to resist and de-legitimize Authoritarianism?
 >
 > Best regards,
 >
 > Lee
 >
 > PS -- One quick note re my interview at Iowa with
 KB:  Clarke can
 > correct me here, but I believe that in his *Rhetoric of
 Religion,*
 > KB argued that Christ the sacrifice was effectively  "required" by  > the rhetorical structure of the OT.  I asked him  why, then, was  > Jesus not more readily accepted by the religious  leaders of the day,  > if they had been as well prepared rhetorically as he  asserted in  > RoR. His response, as I recall, was that he thought  that a good  > question that he would have to think about, and that he  would need  > to revise his argument to accommodate that fact.  I don't remember,  > though, what kind of revision he actually made, or  where he made it,  > though I have a very vague notion that he did address  it again more  > fully somewhere in those interviews that we conducted  at Iowa.  But  > Clarke would know the details far better than I have  recounted here;  > and what I have recounted is clouded by nearly 30 years  of not  > having thought much about it!
 >
 >
 >
 > Sent from my iPad
 >
 >> On Oct 31, 2014, at 10:16 AM, Gregory Desilet 
 
 >> <info at gregorydesilet.com>
 wrote:
 >>
 >> Thanks to Lee for your comments. I agree with  everything you say  >> about the sacred and sacredness. But then I step  back and place it  >> in the context of lines of thought about religion  that I’ve been  >> pursuing and something does not feel right. So  I’ve been thinking  >> about that and trying to get a fix on this vague  feeling and what  >> it is about. Here’s what I’ve been coming up  with.
 >>
 >> While like many, I’ve had general training in the  field of  >> communication, my more precise focus of interest  has always been  >> argumentation. Frankly, I love to argue. And by  that I don’t mean I  >> love to disagree for the sake of disagreeing. I  mean argumentation  >> as the term is used in this field. I love to  attempt making a case  >> for a particular view. And that also means  providing a reason or  >> reasons why that point of view might be more useful  or appropriate,  >> or in some cases more “accurate," than competing  points of view.
 >>
 >> So in this instance I’m making a case for the
 following:
 >>
 >> That it is worthwhile to consider narrowing the  term “religion” to  >> include only those beliefs and practices centered  around texts  >> considered to be inspired or revealed through a  divine source.
 >>
 >> On quick glance this may seem like a very  small-minded thing to  >> want to make a case for. Obviously, the term  “religion” is commonly  >> used in a much broader sense. As several have  pointed out, many  >> faiths of the past century have adopted approaches  to their central  >> texts as texts that are understood to be  “sacred” in the sense Lee  >> has indicated. That view of “sacred” is  certainly defensible.
 >>
 >> For purposes of my argument, however, it was  necessary to find a  >> term to refer to a particular attitude toward  texts—the attitude  >> that a text is inspired or revealed through a  divine source. In  >> other words, the text is not really of human  origin. And I think  >> that it is possible for all of us to agree that a  significant  >> difference exists between a text considered to be  the word of a god  >> and a text considered to be of strictly human  origin. So I needed a  >> word to refer to this difference and chose the word  “sacred.” And  >> there is some etymological support for that choice,  although there  >> may be a better choice out there of which I’m not  aware (I  >> acknowledge not always being very good at making  the best choice  >> when so much hinges on a particular word choice).
 >>
 >> So when Lee makes the point that there may be  another sense of the  >> sacred more in touch with how texts are actually  approached in many  >> religious communities, this is not really speaking  to the line of  >> argument. I wasn’t originally trying to make a  case for narrowing  >> the use of the word “sacred.” I was only  attempting, for the  >> purposes of communicating an argument, to find a  word to refer to a  >> particular attitude towards texts—texts  considered to be of divine  >> origin by those who use them. For that purpose, I  chose the term  >> “sacred” and defined how I was using it in this  line of argument.
 >>
 >> Having said that, I am, however, trying to make a  case for  >> narrowing the term “religion” and now I see  that the same case can  >> be made for narrowing the term “sacred.”
 (I’ll summarize again
 >> below my reason for wanting to narrow the use of  these terms).
 >>
 >> But knowing what we know in the field of  communication and Burke  >> studies about the nature of language argues  powerfully for the  >> notion that the use of these terms cannot be  artificially narrowed  >> in the sense I am suggesting. For example, people  are not going to  >> stop saying things like: “You make a religion of  your workout  >> routine” and “Any baseball signed by Mickey  Mantle is sacred”—and  >> many other uses all over the map, including those  related to faith  >> practices.
 >>
 >> Nevertheless, I still argue for the use of the  terms “religion” and  >> “sacred” in a more technical sense by those who  are writing and  >> discoursing on themes relevant to these terms in  academic and  >> journalistic contexts.
 >>
 >> As already stated, my reason for wanting to narrow  the term  >> religion in these situations relates to the notion  that the term  >> “religion” carries a lot of baggage with it of  the sort related to  >> authoritarian practices and attitudes toward texts  which regard  >> them as either self-evident and dictatorial or  dictatorial and in  >> need of “correct” interpretation by inspired  readers who come from  >> a small circle of elect and highly gifted persons  closely connected  >> to God.
 >>
 >> Needless to say, these authoritarian practices and  attitudes have  >> proven to be very dangerous in human history and  anything we can do  >> to undermine and separate human communities from  this “baggage” is,  >> I argue, beneficial. Using the term  “philosophy” rather than  >> “religion” to refer to the beliefs and  practices of certain  >> community groups to distinguish them from more  authoritarian groups  >> will, therefore, potentially carry a beneficial  message into the  >> general public. For example, people may ask, “Why  did that  >> journalist just describe those Unitarians as  practicing a  >> philosophy instead of a religion?” Encouraging  the use of the term  >> “philosophy” in these contexts could gain  useful traction and  >> facilitate distinguishing between authoritarian  (and quasi-fascist)  >> groups from other community groups.
 >>
 >> Having said all this, one may still take issue  directly with my  >> argument—perhaps by claiming that the term  “religion” does not  >> carry the baggage I assume it does and that I am  being very  >> narrow-minded and perhaps bigoted to suppose it  does. But the mere  >> fact that this issue is debatable (and I think I  could make a good  >> debate of it) argues for the substitution of the  term “philosophy”  >> as I have argued. It is safer to say the term  “philosophy” does not  >> carry the potential for a misleading authoritarian  message that the  >> term “religion” does. It’s just a better word  choice all around for  >> those faith practices that regard their texts as  clearly NOT  >> divinely derived.
 >>
 >> Greg
 >>
 >>
 >>
 >>
 >>> On Oct 31, 2014, at 9:22 AM, Edward C  Appel  >>> <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
 wrote:
 >>>
 >>> Lee, Stan, Greg, and Carrol,
 >>>
 >>> Great contributions all around.  I take to  heart Lee's point that  >>> we create the "sacredness" of texts to various  degrees.  Most of  >>> us are not yet ready to "die" for Burke's  treasure trove of  >>> pronouncements, but we will, triennially,  travel a thousand miles  >>> in votive service to its enduring worth.
 >>>
 >>> I also like Stan's point about how the assumed  "limitless" gets  >>> embodied in the necessarily "limitedness" that  characterizes any  >>> particular language, of necessity in need of  the "discount."
 >>>
 >>> Greg's point about "philosophy" reminds me of  the identifying  >>> properties of Paul Tillich, when he taught at  Union  >>> Seminary in New York (or was it when he was at
 Harvard?):
 >>> Professor of Philosophical Theology.
 >>>
 >>> On "psychotic entelechy" transcendentalized:
 Thirty-five years
 >>> ago, Jim Chesebro spoke of the church's  "profound use of the  >>> negative."  I mention several of those  negatively-induced  >>> "perfections" in Evangelical Protestantism in  the Primer (on  >>> Falwell in Chapter 10)  Let me here cite  an additional  >>> "perfection" extant today even in relatively  "comedic" Mainline  >>> Protestantism, as well as in  still-more-entelechialized  >>> Catholicism.  I speak of the "til death do  us part" proviso in the  >>> marriage vow.  (When I broached this issue  with Daughter Beth, a  >>> Presbyterian preacher who has performed many  marriages in her  >>> ministry, she corrected me with, "as long as  you both shall live."  >>>  There's no difference, I
 admonished.)  The church requires this  >>> categorical promise before the altar of God  from even teenagers  >>> and early-20-somethings.  For cryin' out  loud, the human brain  >>> isn't even fully developed until age 25, and  then it takes a  >>> couple of years more until somebody  >>> begins to get a good handle on who he or she  actually is.  Just  >>> think through the implications of "as long as  you both shall  >>> live."  What is the church saying, other  than it's more righteous  >>> to blow your brains out than divorce the person  you married at a  >>> tender age?
 >>>
 >>> I could go on in respect to this profound  proscription, but I  >>> sense I may have already offended some  subscribers to this list.
 >>>
 >>> Again, peace be with you, however pale and  evanescent.
 >>>
 >>>
 >>>
 >>> Ed
 >>>
 >>>
 >>>
 >>>
 >>>
 >>> --------------------------------------------
 >>> On Thu, 10/30/14, Cerling, Lee <cerling at marshall.usc.edu>
 wrote:
 >>>
 >>> Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part  Whatever  >>> To: "Gregory Desilet" <info at gregorydesilet.com>  >>> Cc: "Ed Appel" <edwardcappel at frontier.com>,  "kb at kbjournal.org" 
 
 >>> <kb at kbjournal.org>
 >>> Date: Thursday, October 30, 2014, 11:55 PM  >>>  >>> Hi, all--  >>>  >>> I have lurked on this list for  >>> a long time without contributing, and I think  maybe none of  >>> you know me except Clarke Rountree, who was my  colleague at  >>> Iowa back in the day.  But this has been  an intriguing  >>> discussion, and I would like to offer some  friendly  >>> resistance to the flow of argument, to see how  the argument  >>> plays out.  Whether it is a Burkean  resistance or not, I  >>> don't know; you all know Burke much better than  me, and  >>> you can judge.
 >>>
 >>> That said, I
 >>> want to gently probe the concept of "sacred"
 texts
 >>> as it has developed in this thread. It seems to  me that a  >>> "sacred" text is a text that has won or earned  >>> "sacredness" by virtue of its constitutive  >>> power--that is, it functions as "sacred" to  the  >>> extent that some community is self-consciously  shaped and  >>> formed by it.  So "inspiration" or source  of  >>> inspiration is not the key inflection point,  but  >>> accreditation by a community.  In this  view,  >>> "sacredness" is a matter of degree, and a text  is  >>> more or less sacred depending on the degree to  which some  >>> living community (or communities) are in some  definable  >>> sense "constituted" by it.  By that  standard, the  >>> Bible is an exceptionally sacred text in that  innumerable  >>> communities past and present have been  constituted by it;  >>> the Declaration of Independence is also sacred,  but less  >>> so.  And the writings of Kenneth Burke are  only very weakly  >>> sacred, in that this small community is very  loosely formed  >>> by it; but not in the sense of its members  being willing  >>> (for example) to suffer death for it, as is the  case with  >>> more strongly sacred texts, such as the  Declaration of  >>> Independence or the Bible or the Koran.
 >>>
 >>> And in this way of thinking,
 >>> texts can lose their sacredness:  this has  certainly been  >>> the pattern in Christianity, where the Bible  may become less  >>> and less normative to successive generations,  until it is  >>> effectively "desacralized"--no longer  normative  >>> for a given community; no longer constitutive  of that  >>> community.  (I am thinking of the movement  from Puritanism  >>> to Unitarianism).  So for that community,  it is no longer  >>> sacred; whereas for another Christian community  (say, the  >>> Amish) its sacredness may be re-affirmed and  even  >>> strengthened over time.
 >>>
 >>> My point is this:  I do think that texts  which  >>> are significantly constitutive in nature, texts  to which  >>> human beings have committed themselves, and  especially those  >>> texts for which human beings have voluntarily  undergone  >>> torture and death, are entitled to a special  kind of respect  >>> and reverence in the academy and elsewhere.
 >>>
 >>> That said, I agree with what I
 >>> take Greg to be saying below, that no text,  regardless of  >>> its sacred status, is thereby exempt from  criticism.  And  >>> in fact, precisely because of the extraordinary  power that  >>> these sacred texts exercise over human beings,  it may well  >>> behoove us to give them much more than an  ordinary amount of  >>> critical attention.  (That is certainly  what Augustine does  >>> in the first half of City of God--lavish  devastating  >>> critical attention on the primary pagan sacred  texts of his  >>> day.)  >>>  >>> And one last  >>> caveat:  I do think that criticism of a
 (sacred) text
 >>> should focus less on "what it contains" than  on  >>> "how it has been read."  So that I am not  >>> persuaded (at least, not yet) that the New  Testament is  >>> anti-semitic; I am persuaded, however, that a  strong and  >>> long and honored tradition of reading the New  Testament,  >>> from Chrysostom to Luther (and beyond, in both
 directions)
 >>> was deeply and repugnantly anti-semitic.  And in my view,  >>> at least, it is not the New Testament texts  themselves that  >>> are to be censured, but that tradition of  reading the  >>> text.
 >>>
 >>> All for now.  My
 >>> apologies if this line of thought is too much  at odds with  >>> the tenor of what has been a most interesting  exchange.
 >>>
 >>> Best regards,
 >>>
 >>> Lee Cerling
 >>>
 >>>
 >>>
 >>>
 >>>
 >>> Sent from my
 >>> iPad
 >>>
 >>>> On Oct 30, 2014, at
 >>> 2:44 PM, Gregory Desilet <info at gregorydesilet.com>  >>> wrote:
 >>>>
 >>>> Yes, Ed,
 >>> “metaphysical philosophy” isn’t a bad  option, though  >>> it might be confused with “spiritual  >>> metaphysics”—which has been co-opted by New  Age  >>> philosophy, where at “metaphysical  bookstores” you will  >>> find all manner of occult and parapsychological  writings  >>> (such as “Seth Speaks” etc.). As for those  you reference  >>> as “untraditional mainline Protestants” and  the  >>> potential problem of their belief in God, I  don’t see a  >>> problem there in placing their approach in the  philosophy  >>> category, since many philosophers also express  a belief in  >>> God—sans any kind of sacred text. Though  perhaps those in  >>> this group could be in a sub-category called  >>> “philosophical theism.”
 >>>>
 >>>> At any rate, the important thing from my  >>> point of view is advocating the notion that  “all texts are  >>> created equal” just as all persons are  created equal. And,  >>> just as this does not entail that all persons  are of equal  >>> influence, it does not entail that all texts  are of equal  >>> influence. The primary thing is that no text be  seen as  >>> inherently superior and unquestionable by  virtue of a divine  >>> birthright or source. The merit of every text  ought to be  >>> weighed by what it contains rather than by who  wrote or  >>> inspired it. Currently across the world there  are far too  >>> many people who believe in the inherent  superiority of  >>> certain texts, regardless of what they actually  say, and in  >>> many cases not even reading or fully  understanding what is  >>> said in them. This is a state of affairs every  >>> communication, language, and rhetorical scholar  should  >>> bemoan.
 >>>>
 >>>> Greg
 >>>>
 >>>>
 >>>>
 >>>>> On Oct 30, 2014,
 >>> at 9:55 AM, Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>  >>> wrote:
 >>> OK, Greg, howabout if we call the blanched,  etiolated  >>> Christianity of the very liberal side of the  Mainline  >>> Protestant Church "metaphysical philosophy"?
 >>> Burke calls metaphysical philosophy "coy  >>> theology."  Maybe we can find a measure of  common  >>> ground with that linguistic accommodation.
 >>>>>
 >>>>> The only
 >>> problem there is, such untraditional Mainline  Protestants  >>> openly profess belief in a Power that can  rightfully be  >>> called "God."  They're not particularly  >>> "coy" about their theistic bent.
 >>>>>
 >>>>> I'll
 >>> mull over your demurrers some more and maybe  get back.
 >>>>> '
 >>>>> What I
 >>> want mainly to do here is address Stan's term  >>> "psychotic entelechy."  I like it.  Maybe owing  >>> more to my dour, "morbid" Scaninavian  personality,  >>> I've long since thought that Burke's dramatism,  and  >>> what I've observed going on around me, had best  be  >>> described as half insane.  I.e., the  "glory" and  >>> the "sickness" of the "symbol-using  >>> animal" (Burke), the "symbolizing animal"
 >>> (Condit), or the "symbolic species" (Deacon)  can  >>> legitimately be described as half amazingly  wonderful and  >>> half bonkers.  I'm talking about the  "normal"
 >>> human race.  People give evidence of being  nuts whether  >>> that "entelechy" is being immanentized or  >>> transcendentalized.
 >>>>>
 >>>>> Whithout going into detail, how long  >>> do you think it will take this rapidly  expanding species of  >>> animal life to despoil this planet's  ecosystems  >>> irreparably, render this "Garden of Eden" half  a  >>> wasteland, devoid of so very, very much of its  rich  >>> biodiversity, and who knows what else?  Humans, in their  >>> entelechial quest for more and more  "properties,"
 >>> both tangible and symbolic, evince, in the  large, no thought  >>> of the vast expanses of geologic time and their  import.  In  >>> a mere ten thousand years since  the end  of the last ice  >>> age and beginnings of urban living, homo  sapiens  >>> (there's a joke for you) has already altered  that brief  >>> Holocene Epoch into what earth scientists are  now saying  >>> should be labeled the "Anthropocene," things  are  >>> already getting that bad.  What are the  chances of a  >>> turn-around?  What are things likely to  look like in  >>> another mere one million eight-hundred-thousand  years, the  >>> brief span so far of this, the eleventh period  of the  >>>>> Phanerozoic Eon, the Quaternary?
 >>>>> '
 >>>>> Listen
 >>> to Fox News, read the Wall Street Journal,  watch China built  >>> another goal-driven power plant each week, read  letters to  >>> your local newspaper or posts by the vox populi  on the  >>> internet, pay even cursory attention to the  campaign  >>> rhetoric now reaching a crescendo, and  weep.  I see next to  >>> no chance, until things get so bad we're  suffocating in  >>> our own effluvia.
 >>>>>
 >>>>> On the transcendental craziness, more  >>> later, if I can screw up the courage to risk  offending some  >>> subcribers to  this list.  You know,  the "free  >>> speech"/don't-"hurt"-the-feelings-of-others
 >>> quandary.
 >>> "Psychotic entelechy"?  Well, I guess.
 >>>>>
 >>>>>
 >>>>>
 >>>>> Ed
 >>>>>
 >>>>>
 >>>>>
 >>>>> Ed
 >>>>>
 >>>>>
 >>>>> -----
 >>> ---------------------------------------
 >>>>> On Thu, 10/30/14, Gregory Desilet  >>> <info at gregorydesilet.com>  >>> wrote:
 >>> Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke  Part  >>> Whatever  >>>>> To: "Ed Appel"
 >>> <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
 >>>>> Cc: "Stan Lindsay" <slindsa at yahoo.com>,  >>> "kb at kbjournal.org"
 >>> <kb at kbjournal.org>
 >>>>> Date: Thursday, October 30, 2014, 3:40  >>> AM  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>>  >>>>> Many good points have been made by  >>>>> several  >>> persons, so there is much to respond to and if  I do not  >>>>> touch on someone’s  >>>>> point here that will be because of my  >>> limits as a mere human  >>>>> and not  >>> because I  >>>>> view a particular point  >>> as not meriting a response. Turning  >>> to Ed’s comments  >>>>> first, he points  >>> out that his definition of “religion”
 >>>>> is different from mine.
 >>>>> But I think this kind of response gets  >>> off on the wrong foot  >>>>> with regard  >>> to the  >>>>> thrust of what I’m  >>> attempting to say. Granted, it is  >>> perfectly sensible and  >>>>> legitimate  >>> in a discussion of religion to say, “this is  >>>>> what I mean by  >>>>> religion.” But when Ed says “Greg  >>> means something  >>>>> different,” I  >>> believe more  >>>>> than that is going on.
 >>> True, we can each have our different  >>>>> definitions of  >>>>> religion and go our separate ways, but  >>> what I’m attempting  >>>>> to do is  >>> argue  >>>>> (persuade) others that the  >>> term “religion” ought not to  >>>>> be  >>> applied in certain  >>>>> ways due to the  >>> circumstance that it thereby loses much of  >>>>> its usefulness as a  >>>>> term. For example, if we call every  >>> bright light in the sky  >>>>> a  >>> “star,” that’s  >>>>> okay but there  >>> is benefit to be gained by refining our  >>>>> distinctions to separate  >>>>> out stars, planets, comets, galaxies,  >>> etc.Ed has seemingly accepted my  >>> challenge to distinguish  >>>>> religions  >>> that abandon the sacred text notion from  >>>>> philosophical study and  >>>>> inquiry by offering the following:I  >>> regard its [religion’s] primary  >>> reference as  >>>>> characteristic of one  >>> who believes in an Originary Power we  >>>>> can rightfully call  >>>>> "God."  For me, as a  >>> Burkean, I would reductively  >>>>> define  >>> that  >>>>> Power as the "Great  >>> Potential."In other words, divinity or God  >>>>> becomes the  >>> “Great Potential.” All such reasoning is  well and  >>> good,  >>>>> but what becomes of the  >>>>> status of what have been called  >>> religious texts by way of  >>>>> such a  >>> view of  >>>>> religion? Are these texts  >>> in some way the “voice” of the  >>> “Great Potential”? Or  >>>>> as Stan  >>> says, are they wholly inspired, substantially  >>>>> inspired, or only  >>>>> partially inspired by the Great  >>> Potential? And what makes  >>>>> these  >>> religious texts  >>>>> substantially  >>> different from other texts such as those  >>>>> written by Plato, Aristotle,  >>>>> Descartes, Spinoza, etc? Are not these  >>> latter texts also  >>>>> inspired by the  >>> “Great  >>>>> Potential”? In fact, is  >>> not EVERYTHING inspired by the  >>> “Great Potential”?When we humans sever,  cloud, or  >>>>> muddy the link  >>>>> between a text and a divine source of  >>> that text, we in  >>>>> effect place that  >>> text  >>>>> alongside all other texts  >>> composed by human hands. Who is to  >>> say, for example,  >>>>> that Oscar  >>> Wilde’s “De Profundis” is not as much or  >>>>> more divinely inspired than  >>>>> any text of the Bible—if the  >>> divinity is regarded as the  >>> “Great Potential”? The  >>>>> problem  >>> is that deciding if texts are religious in  nature  >>>>> and in inspiration  >>>>> becomes a very arbitrary issue. From  >>> within this view, we  >>>>> may as well  >>> call every such text “religious” or  >>>>> every such text “secular” because  >>> there is no longer a  >>>>> distinction  >>> between the two  >>>>> that can be  >>> convincingly defended. At least I am not  >>>>> convinced and I hope I  >>>>> have convinced others not to be  >>> convinced.As soon as we no longer have a very  >>>>> direct and  >>> clear link to a divine source (a higher  being),  >>> manifested  >>>>> decisively in some  >>>>> texts and not in others, we have a  >>> situation where every  >>>>> text  >>> discussing the  >>>>> nature of “life”
 >>> effectively reduces to the category of  >>>>> philosophy. Some of  >>>>> these texts may be valued more than  >>> others by particular  >>>>> individuals  >>> but none  >>>>> of these texts any longer  >>> have a source or origin  >>> unquestionably superior to  >>>>> any  >>> other. The benefits of each text must be  constantly  >>>>> ARGUED and not assumed.
 >>>>> This attitude toward texts makes a big  >>> difference in how  >>>>> texts are  >>> approached  >>>>> and in how they are  >>> valued. I believe the use of the term  >>>>> “philosophy” to  >>>>> describe such texts and associated  >>> practices is better than  >>> “religious” because  >>>>> it reduces  >>> the chances for conveying an authoritarian  >>>>> quality in the text—the  >>>>> quality traditionally associated with  >>> so-called religious  >>>>> texts.
 >>>>> Greg
 >>>
 _______________________________________________
 >>>> KB mailing list
 >>>> KB at kbjournal.org
 >>>> http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
 >>
 >
 > _______________________________________________
 > KB mailing list
 > KB at kbjournal.org
 > http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
 >
 
 
 _______________________________________________
 KB mailing list
 KB at kbjournal.org
 http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
 

_______________________________________________
KB mailing list
KB at kbjournal.org
http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org