**Chapter 11 WAR & MEDIA 10-6-2015**

 Ch 11 WAR AND MEDIA

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This chapter provides accounts of the rhetoric used to justify the post-9/11, U.S.-led-invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan and, in the summer of 2014, Israel’s war on Palestinians living in Gaza. Each such case involved rapidly escalated clashes of interest and ideology (Deutsch, 1969; Gergen, 1985) in which the self-satisfying binary discourses of good and evil, hero and villain, oppressor and victim (etc.) stood in the way of conflict resolution. These and other such oppositions may appear to detached observers as “mere rhetoric,” but to those caught up in the struggles they are every bit as real as the ground beneath their feet. Chapter Two’s case studies on the social construction of child abuse provides an analogous instance of how “out-there” realities are internalized and objectified (made real) by way of *sociocultural processes of communal interchange.*(Berger, 1966; see also Simons, 1990). The “trick” in every case is to appear as reluctant warriors. The power of language as regards Gaza was such as to shift the onus of guilt for invading from Israel to Gaza for its weapons and tunnels.

Drawing upon news accounts of the conflict in Gaza in summer, 2014, the chapter concludes with commentary on the language of power and the power of language in the social construction of that war. Here another set of concepts should prove useful, those used in analysis of the Mobil ad in Chapter Two on how shared systems of belief (i.e. Ideologies) are socially constructed. “Truth,” in that sense, is a function of shared beliefs about what leads to what (and follows what), what stands above what (and below what), what’s linked with what (and opposed to what), what *causes* what (and is caused by what), what’s good, bad or indifferent. Sociologist William Gamson (date?) characterized as *packages* the “god “words and “devil” words we affix when labeling and describing, contextualizing and decontextualizing, the frames (and reframes) we employ when explaining and arguing, and the stories we tell in piecing together the fragments of our accounts, drawing together comparisons and contrasts while embedding analogies, guiding metaphors and memorable phrases or aphorisms in the process.

**The Post-9/11 Bombings**

For most Americans the 9/11/2001 bombings were a tragedy; for neoconservatives bent on invading Iraq they were also an opportunity. The administration’s crisis rhetoric fueled and channeled the fury already aroused by the attacks themselves. It was not unlike the rhetoric of past presidents responding to past crises. (Bacevich, A.J., 2010; Bostdorff, 1994; Kinzer, 2006; Rampton and Stauber, 2006)

Former president George W. Bush was right when he said that 9/11 was a turning point in American history. Given that history, given the shock and severity of the attacks, given America’s distinctive position as the world’s sole surviving superpower, given the political advantages to the president of meeting fire with rhetorical fire, the administration’s vitriolic response was surely understandable. Now, in hindsight, many have concluded that it was also regrettable.

The president’s post-9/11 rhetoric provided the basic binaries in terms of which the “war on terror” was launched and then morphed into the war in Iraq. Its short-term effectiveness conferred enormous power upon the president, which he was able to use not just to persuade, but also to intimidate. Periodic reminders of 9/11 have served as well to trump concerns about usurpations of power by the Bush administration and to override criticisms even by appointed commissions and counterterrorism experts.

In the weeks and months following 9/11, Americans were particularly vulnerable to projections of future threats from Middle East pariahs, however ill-founded the claims. From the outset consideration of invading Iraq occasioned more debate than usual. This debate, said **George Packer** was because it was a war of choice, without any visible evidence of an imminent threat to America or the United Kingdom from Iraq.

In addition to the war of words, there were verbal battles over words about words—disputes over whose words were “mere rhetoric” and whose were credible, over who said what when and with what ulterior motives, over what should have been said but wasn’t, and over meanings of politically sensitive words like *democracy*, *patriotism*, *terrorism*, and *torture*. Along with the words and words about words were the stark and unforgettable television images of violence, themselves powerful influences but also fought over rhetorically as evidence for this or that claim about the war.

Rhetorical analysis serves importantly as a vehicle for understanding propaganda and the strategic considerations giving rise to it. It helps explain why, for example, in the immediate wake of the 9/11 bombings, the Bush administration chose to evade the hard questions of motivation for the attacks and to respond instead with a sanitized, melodramatic framing of the crisis, coupled with the launch of a vaguely defined, seemingly unlimited “war on terror.” It also helps to explain why the press, the Democrats, and the Republicans in Congress deferred to the administration, adding their own exaggerations, evasions, and outright distortions to those of the administration in the aftermath of 9/11, and how the rhetoric of antiterrorism led from the Trade Towers and the Pentagon to the bombings of Baghdad. The troubled occupation of Iraq provides further evidence that what worked rhetorically in the short run has been a source of subsequent difficulties.

The case for invading Iraq was made soon after the Gulf War ended in1991 with Saddam Hussein still in power, but it took a giant leap forward ten years later with the 9/11/2001 attacks. Active discussion took place shortly after the attacks in Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s war council about building a case for removing Saddam Hussein’s regime from power. A major television speech by the President to the Congress on September 20, 2001, was a step in that direction. There he framed the 9/11 attacks as an assault on America’s sacred virtues of freedom and democracy and launched his “war on terror.” In the wake of 9/11, the news media spoke as one in their condemnation of the attacks and in support of the President, helping send his approval ratings from below 50 percent before 9/11 to nearly 90 percent, a record high, after September 20**.**

The 9/11 attacks and the melodramatic crisis rhetoric that followed made the invasion of Iraq politically feasible. No sooner had the President completed his televised “Address to the Congress” on 9/20 then the pundits joined as one in concluding that he had demonstrated extraordinary leadership ability. Threat-induced crisis rhetoric routinely has that effect. Said Denise M. Bostdorff, who has studied the genre. It has enabled American presidents to show leadership, grab headlines, exhibit toughness, and demand unity. (Bostdorff, 1994**)** It also gains them policy support on unrelated issues, increases their party’s electoral power, accrues symbolic reserves, and helps them weather untidy endings. Crisis rhetoric, says Elisabeth Anker, is often melodramatic, presenting conflict in the simplistic terms of pure good versus pure evil.The events of 9/11 in particular seemed to cry out for a hyperbolic, decontextualized account of what had occurred, akin to cowboy westerns and children’s fables.

The two-dimensional characters of fictional melodrama and the use of exaggeration and polarization for dramatic effect find their way into political crisis rhetoric by way of a valorized “us” and a dehumanized or demonized “them.” Victims, villains, and heroes are joined together in a sanitized narrative, shorn of moral complexity. “We” have an urgent mission to perform. We must act, not just out of fear but from a clear sense of moral purpose. Good must triumph, and good will triumph, but victory will not be easy. The enemy is wily, clever, and will stop at nothing. It has already threatened (or victimized) us. By some accounts, this danger may justify borrowing a page from their book while exempting ourselves from moral standards that we impose upon others.After all, God is on our side, Satan (or his equivalent) on theirs.

These narrative components may be cross-cultural and trans-historical; they are by no means confined to contemporary American militarists. Yet the themes run deep in the American psyche,and are daily reinforced in American popular culture. They also fit well with former President Bush’s persona as a religious warrior, a Texas-styled sheriff in a Hollywood western who was called upon by God to make the world a better place.

While the President’s rhetorical response to 9/11 on September 20, 2001, was uniquely adapted to his ends, audiences, and circumstances, his speechwriters were able to craft much of the address before policy was set, merely by adhering to scripture-like formulas

True to form, the Bush narrative presented a stripped-down account of how the 9/11 attacks came to be that left no room for moral ambiguity, or for criticism. Bush constructed America as a nation unified by an attack on nothing less than its sacred virtues of freedom and democracy, said Anker, a country whose victimage therefore entitled it to “enact heroic retribution on the evil forces that caused its injury.” With polar oppositions such as these, the administration rallied the American people and reassured them, while also serving notice to the rest of the world of America’s unmistakable resolve. Doing anything less at the time might well have seemed heretical. And from the Bush administration’s perspective, it’s melodramatic rhetoric also had the virtue of cowing potential critics while equipping its legions of supporters and spokespersons with a simple, easily repeatable message. Introducing complexity was discouraged. Merely inviting discussion of why American foreign policies were widely disliked in the Arab and Muslim worlds became “playing their game.” Yet these same polarities would ultimately be undermined by stubborn realities on the ground in Iraq and by inconsistencies between Bush administration rhetoric and its practices elsewhere in the world.

**IRAQ AS A “BATTLE” IN THE WAR ON TERROR**

Building on its construction of the threat confronting the United States, the Bush administration launched its open-ended, vaguely stated “war on terror.” A chief virtue of its vagaries was its rhetorical adaptability. The anti-terror campaign began with assaults on the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, coupled with swift passage of legislation designed to fortify the military and to increase national security. At this time it was difficult if not impossible to challenge even such draconian measures as unlimited prison detentions of enemy suspects without court hearings. Periodic reminders of 9/11 served to trump concerns about usurpations of power by the Bush administration and to override criticisms even by appointed commissions and counterterrorism experts. The 9/11 attacks and the crisis rhetoric that followed in their wake enabled the administration to gain control over the terms and limits of permissible debate.

Much of the rest of this story is well known, but new light can be shed by retelling it from a rhetorical perspective.19 Emboldened by his success, the President chose in January 2002 to extend the reach of his rhetoric to what he called in his State of the Union message, the “Axis of Evil.” Iraq was earmarked as a possible target of U.S. military might, along with Iran and North Korea.

Months after 9/11 Americans remained highly vulnerable to insinuations of possible connections between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. For millions of Americans innuendo sufficed as a substitute for proof. By August 2002 a full-scale campaign to win support for invading Iraq and deposing Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime had begun. It comported with the long-standing ambitions of a group of influential neoconservatives as part of a larger plan to exert America’s will in the Middle East. The Bush administration chose its public rationales for invasion carefully. In a major speech by the president on October 7, Saddam was said to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to deploy them. It was also suggested that he had secret links to al Qaeda, and may have had something to do with the 9/11 attacks. Later these allegations were to be severely undermined, but not before the Republicans scored heavily in the November 2002 midterm elections. The Bush administration clung stubbornly to these rationales in the face of troubling counter-indicators, even to the point of incurring the wrath of traditional allies when, in March 2003, it declared its intention to intervene militarily in Iraq in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate.

Thus did the administration’s post-9/11 crisis rhetoric morph into its case for war with Iraq. In subsequent speeches Bush would continue to capitalize on the appeal of his antiterrorist rhetoric, finding new enemies and new rationales for aggressive action. Iraq was now but a “battle” in the larger war on terrorism. A flow of resistance fighters into Iraq to lend assistance to its homegrown insurgents lent self-fulfilling evidence that the American-led effort to “liberate” Iraq was truly critical to the larger antiterrorist struggle.

One indication of the president’s increased power was the willingness of the mainstream news media to put aside doubts and help make the administration’s case for war**.** As Congress deliberated on anti-terror legislation, an “echoing press” fell in lock step with the administration. (Coe et al, 2004). Writing in the usually dovish *New Yorker* , columnist Jeffrey Goldberg (Mar 22, 2003) urged readers to join with the Administration in support of its unproven and eventually disproven claims about Iraq’s weapons potential, but at no point did Goldberg weigh in the balance the potentially dire consequences of going to war on specious grounds and then having to manage a prolonged and unwelcome occupation. The mainstream opinion media took credit for expanding consideration of whether the U.S. should invade Iraq largely on its own or gain coalition support after first bringing the question of invasion to the U.N. Security Council, but as too often happens when the opinion media weigh in, the issues were narrowed to a choice between just two alternatives, thus communicating an image of balance while failing to take up other issues(Jacobs and Townsley, 2011; Solomon, 2005) Moreover, the arguments for the second option were cast in PR terms. Said Norman Solomon (2005),

“Washington’s maneuvers at the U.N. have been integral to public relations efforts for domestic and foreign consumption. In practice, one of the key steps toward starting a war is to go through the motions of exploring alternatives to war. Such pantomimes of diplomacy help to make war possible.” (Solomon, 2005, p. 44) In that same spirit, columnist Fareed Zakaria extolled the virtues of *appearing* to prefer alternatives to war. Even if the U.N. sponsored inspections in Iraq “do not produce the perfect crisis…Washington will still be better off for having tried” because it will be *seen* as having attempted to avoid war.” (Zakaria, Sept. 2, 2002 (Newsweek) Wrote NYT Columnist Tom Friedman (Nov 13, 2002), “The Bush team discovered that the best way to legitimate its overwhelming might –in a war of choice—was not by simply imposing it, but by channeling it through the U.N.” When in January, 2003, France signaled plans to deny the U.S. an authorizing resolution for war, the American mainstream news media cried foul, “a betrayal,” “a diplomatic version of an ambush.” The same W*ashington Post* article quoted Secretary of State Colin Powell: “If the United Nations is going to be relevant, it has to take a firm stand.” “Au contraire,” replied the French foreign minister, in refusing to support an authorizing resolution, the Security Council is being uncommonly relevant.

Having urged the Bush administration to take its case for invasion to the U.N., Colin Powell was on the spot when on Feb. 5, 2003, he responded to the skeptics with a vigorous defense. The televised speech won accolades by the mainstream U.S. media but was ridiculed by the liberal Guardian and by other newspapers in the UK. Some critics assailed its logic but rhetorical critic David Zarefsky (2007) found the evidence wanting. Said Norman Solomon (2005, pp. 45-6), Powell “fudged, exaggerated and concocted.” Citing defector Hussein Kamel’s revelation of a pre-war unconventional weapons system, Powell failed to add , according to Kamel, that the weapons had all been destroyed. (Solomon, p.45)

Solomon’s W*ar* *Made Easy* (2005) is an ironic guide to the rhetoric of war-making in the American context. His book is organized around lines of argument for war: for example:

\* America is a fair and noble superpower,

\* Our leaders would never tell us outright lies,

\*This is about human rights,

\* If this war is wrong the media will tell us.

\* The Pentagon fights wars as humanely as possible. (

\* Withdrawal will cripple U.S. credibility.

\* As we all know America went to war in Iraq, as it had done in Afghanistan, with the “coalition of the willing.”

The American media’s subservience to the government continued through to the “liberation” of Iraq in May 2003. During the invasion star reporters were “embedded” with the troops and were thus unlikely to offer criticisms of the invasion. A tragic consequence of that complicity was America’s failure to prepare adequately for the occupation of Iraq. Another was the failure of editorialists, commentators, columnists, and the like to weigh in candidly on possible motives for the U.S.-led intervention or on its long-term consequences. Once the war commenced, Fox News demonstrated beyond doubt to rivals like CNN and MSNBC the pulling power of unabashed jingoism.

The *New York Times* and *Washington Post* eventually apologized for their failure to check out the veracity of claims by their more hawkish reporters but not before being scooped by Jonathan Landay, Warren Strobel, and others at Knight-Ritter (later McClatchy Newspapers) whose watchdog journalism unearthed blatantly specious claims for war planted by utterly unreliable news sources.. (Wemple, E., March 19, 2013) [endnote r needed with quote] The previously hawkish Dan Rather would later lament that the mainstream news media had substituted “jingoism for journalism.” (Sharkey J.E, April 2003, American Journalism Review]. Retrieved June 11, 2014.

In times of crisis, as in the period following the 9/11 attacks, watchdog journalism gave way to lapdog journalism by an “echoing press” (Coe, K., Domke, D. Graham, E.S., John, S.L. & Pickard, V.P.,2004.; ). Few TV commentators or mainstream news reporters dared question the White House. Coe et al (2004) found that news opinion mirrored legislation—of the Patriot Act, for example, and of the Enemy Combatants Act.

The post-9/11 period coincides with significant changes in America’s so-called golden era, a “media regime” where political news and opinion emanated from handfuls of pre-eminent print and television sources, closely linked to political and business elites, and rendered trustworthy because they evidenced adherence to norms of social responsibility, this at a time when news and opinion journalism were still profitable. All this has changed, maintain Bruce Williams and Michael Delli-Carpini (2011), but not necessarily for the worse.

**INVASION AND BEYOND**

U.S. troops went into Baghdad expecting to be greeted as liberators. They soon learned that they were unwelcome occupiers. (PBS documentary on Iraq, Jul. 28, 2014) Yet the administration’s “war on terror” displayed great resilience, the Bush administration demonstrating skill at fending off criticism while repeatedly invoking 9/11 as an emblematic reminder of the need for steadfast vigilance. A stunning example of that resilience was the Bush administration’s ability to survive high-level exposures of pre-9/11 ineptness at preventing the 9/11 attacks.

Yet another indicator of resilience was the administration’s ability to roll with the punches over 9/11-related news from elsewhere in the world, including, for example, the mysterious disappearance from Tora Bora in Afghanistan of Osama bin Laden, and his subsequent appearances on Arab TV. Still another example was the occupation, at human and economic costs to Americans and Iraqis alike, reminiscent of Vietnam. Despite these problems the Bush administration managed in fall 2004 to maintain public support for “staying the course” in Iraq and to triumph over the Democrats in the 2004 elections. Gradually, however, the narrative began to unravel. And while not all of the problems can be laid at the feet of rhetoric, it appears that the Bush administration increasingly fell victim to its own desperate efforts to prop up the case for war, offering, for example, overly optimistic projections for success in Iraq based on spurious statistics, denying high-level authorization for the use of torture while at the same time calling for exemptions to the Geneva Convention’s strictures against torture, and efforts to discredit former acting ambassador to Iraq, Joseph Wilson, who had been a vociferous critic of some of the administration’s earlier intelligence claims.

Increasingly over time the threads in the narrative linking the war on terror to the war in Iraq wore thin. What did Iraq have to do with the bombings of the Trade Towers and the Pentagon, asked Security Council members even before the invasion? Why not go after corrupt and autocratic Saudi Arabia, from which not just the hijackers had come but also the form of jihad that Saudi extremists had helped export to the rest of the Muslim world? Why, asked the Spanish, who had been terrorized by an Al Qaeda–type attack, must we keep troops in Iraq in order to prevent further such attacks on our territory? By remaining in Iraq, aren’t we creating more terrorists than we are killing or imprisoning?

Troublesome questions such as these continued to plague the Bush administration. They included questions of mission in Iraq, of who our friends and enemies were, of why the Sunni Arab world continued to support the Iraqi resistance, and of whether, by turning political power over to the Iraqi Shiites, the United States was playing into the hands of Islamic extremists, including its long-standing enemies in Iran.

Once having invaded and occupied, it was of course impolitic simply to turn back, or to confess wrongdoing. The decision to invade and the decisions made in the course of the occupation created other rhetorical dilemmas, not least tensions between the need to appear consistent and the need for flexibility, the need to appear credible and the need to dissemble. Dilemmas such as these bedevil political leaders. Routinely advised to stay on message, they are also criticized for sticking with failed messages. Damned if they seem evasive, they are ridiculed if their self-disclosures become self-damning. Honesty and openness are regarded as qualifications for office by a trusting public, but political leaders are often obliged to cover over narrow self-interest with the fig leaf of morality and the aura of sincerity. Leadership requires covering over transgressions of moral codes with cover stories. The astute leader plays *double* g*ames: simultaneously wresting advantages from an adversary while pretending to have the adversary’s interests at heart.*

Neither is it always possible to satisfy competing interests simultaneously, or to reconcile conflicting interests. Consider the paradoxes, for example, of “liberating” Iraq by way of a “shock and awe” aerial bombardment, and of ordering its people to become “free” by way of an America-imposed electoral process. Imposing one’s will on a people while also trying to win their hearts and minds has been a perennial problem ever since the United States invaded and occupied Iraq. As of this writing it remains a problem in Afghanistan.

One year after President Bush’s reelection, polls indicated that Americans had become disenchanted with the war—no longer willing to reward its congressional supporters and punish its critics as they did in the 2002 elections; no longer eager to cheer on the president, as they did when he stood aboard the carrier *U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln* to proclaim “Mission accomplished” in Iraq; not sure whether to place much stock in the transfer of political power under way in Iraq; not certain, even, whether American troops should remain in Iraq, with whatever consequences that might entail.

It is too early to know how long the political instability in Iraq will persist. Ten years after Bush’s reelection, Iraq seemed on the verge of imminent collapse. In rapid succession Iraq’s Anbar Province fell to Sunni militants; then Ninevah Province and Salahuddin Province. On June 4th, 2014 a group calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”)seized Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, freeing thousands of prisoners and joining with troops who dropped their weapons, shed their uniforms and blended in with the fleeing masses as they headed south toward Baghdad. Ominously, the takeover of Mosul was the work of Syrian fighters who’d crossed over the lawless border. Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, Iraq’s recently re-elected prime minister, called on friendly governments for help. Maliki had been chastised for sweeps through Sunni areas of Iraq where hundreds of innocent civilians were rounded up.

The two biggest cities in Iraq’s Anbar province fell to Al Qaeda operatives in 2013. There is little doubt but that the Bush administration was unprepared for the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, including the strength of the Sunni Arab resistance and the developing civil war. The United States continued to be incapable of reconciling its ongoing mythic crisis narrative with real-world constraints. Outside the United States its sanitized version of “why they hate us” was generally not believed. Nor was the president credible when he declared (repeatedly) that our aim in Iraq was to stop “terror” in its tracks—before it could return to the United States. Not until after the 2004 elections did the president acknowledge that the Iraq insurgency was mostly homegrown. As the United States attempted to reach out to Arabs and Muslims by way of “public diplomacy” campaigns in the Middle East and declarations of intent to bring peace, freedom, and democracy to that troubled region, its efforts fell afoul of its continuing alliances with Arab dictatorships, its tilt toward Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and its own record of human rights violations in Iraq and Afghanistan, including killings of innocents, illegal detentions of Muslim suspects, and widespread prison abuses.

This is not to say that the Democrats were in a better position to fix in Iraq what the Bush administration had broken. President Bush’s electoral success in 2004 was as much a function of Democrats’ failures, due in large measure to their rhetorical dilemmas. Critics of the war were in the unenviable position of appearing to welcome bad news from Iraq—either that or to mute their opposition by focusing on means rather than ends. The nomination of former Senator John Kerry was regarded initially as an opportunity for the Democrats to adopt a centrist stance on the war, and even to “out-hawk” the Bush administration on a number of issues, such as the alleged failure of the Defense Department to supply U.S. troops with sufficient armor to conduct its rightful mission. But the Republicans managed to reframe that attempted centrism as flip-flopping. In general, the Republicans proved themselves masterful at rendering as treasonable, or at least unpatriotic, any criticisms that cut to the heart of their own overblown rhetoric.

But Kerry’s effort at straddling the middle on the war with a nuanced position began to seem self-contradictory. “First I voted for it,” said Kerry; “then I voted against it.” [check actual quote and get date.] Hence, the Republicans managed without difficulty to reframe Kerry’s attempted centrism as flip-flopping.

From time to time since the occupation began, news of hopeful developments—the transfer of political power to Iraqis, signs of economic redevelopment in Iraq, and the planned replacement of American troops by Iraqi soldiers and police—had seemed to give renewed meaning to the invasion. But the president’s options became increasingly limited. The condition known as quagmire, or situational entrapment, is marked by dilemmas of a sort that seem at once unendurable and unsolvable. A striking example: the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq appeared essential for purposes of preventing civil war but served also to fuel the Iraq insurgency and the larger Jihadist movement.

Looking back on the praise bestowed upon President Bush for his melodramatic framing of the threat to America made manifest on 9/11, it seems that the conventional standards for judging crisis rhetoric of this kind need rethinking. Opinion polls at the time confirmed expert judgments that his speech of September 20, 2001 had been highly effective on its target audiences. But findings such as these provide scant indication of the long-term consequences of an important speech. What works in the short run often fails over the long term. What meets immediate expectations often fails to take into account what in retrospect were the needs of the moment. What persuades targeted audiences may have deleterious effects on unintended audiences, including potential recruits for the Jihadists’ cause. What leads journalists and politicians at the time to pronounce unequivocally favorable judgments may conceal privately held doubts and suspicions. And too, there is the danger that those who craft the important speech may get carried away by their own rhetoric.

**The Political War Over Afghanistan**

 The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan has gone badly. Said Maureen Dowd, “After nine years, more than a thousand troops dead, and hundreds of billions spent that could have been put toward developing new forms of fuel so that all our miseries and all our fun doesn’t derive from oil, we’ve fought our way to a stalemate…. Even our corrupt puppet doesn’t think we can prevail .Hamid Karzai told two former Afghan officials that he had lost faith in the Americans and was trying to strike his own deal with the Taliban and Pakistan.” (Dowd, June 22, 2010)

So American interests may have been undercut by the man installed in Kabul and propped up after a fraudulent election. American officials vacillated between criticizing him openly and making nice. If he succeeded at brokering a deal, it would likely embarrass the administration and sully America’s reputation abroad, but also provide the administration’s excuse for drawing down most of its troops in Afghanistan and narrowing its long-term mission. Getting out of wars is a lot more difficult than getting into them.

When President Obama acceded to pressures for a “troop surge” in Afghanistan, what had been “Bush’s War” became “Obama’s War,” with all the attendant political risks to himself, to his administration and to incumbent Democrats seeking reelection.37. Yet not committing to sending in more troops would have been riskier still: proof positive that a president who had never served in the military lacked the will to fight.

The war was plagued from the start by predictable tensions between the need for military power used to “take out” the enemy and the need to win Afghanis’ hearts and minds. The latter concern prompted the since fired General Stanley McChrystal to order a change inthe rules of engagement with the enemy so as to reduce unintended killings and maiming of innocent civilians. He’d warned his troops about “insurgent math” — for each innocent you kill, you make 10 enemies.

But these altered rules left American and allied troops more vulnerable to attack by the enemy and unclear as to when and how to use firepower. McChrystal’s replacement as Commander in Afghanistan, the highly respected General David Petraeus, vowed to clarify the rules of engagement and to mend fences with Karzai.

But the key dilemmas would remain in place. As in Iraq, “liberation” comes to be seen over time as “occupation.” The fiercely independent Afghanis whom we’d pledged to help became dependent on our largesse at the same time as they wanted to be rid of us. Afghanis are factionalized along ethnic and regional lines but they are as one in seeking to beat back foreign invaders. Our continued presence fuels the Taliban’s call for Jihad against the “infidel” and our untoward actions, such as the killing of innocent civilians, often fulfill their worst prophecies. Recall conflict theorist Thomas Schelling’s (1960) distinction between *moves* and *speech*. Moves, such as errant aerial bombardments, have an evidentiary quality greater than mere expressions of good intentions.

Those, like the Taliban, who wanted us out, were confident that they could outwait us after these many years of stalemate. This has been President Karzai’s argument but it was also voiced by Joseph Biden and by U.S. State Department officials, including former Ambassador Karl Eikenberry at a time when the generals were pressuring the administration to provide more troops.

Maureen Dowd is once again on point: “It’s just another sign of the complete incoherence of Afghan policy. The people in charge are divided against each other. And the policy is divided against itself. We’re fighting a war against an enemy that we’re desperately trying to co-opt and win over in a country where Al Qaeda, which was supposed to be the enemy, is no longer based.” (Dowd, June 22, 2010)

What then could the Obama administration have done to bring a modicum of peace and stability to Afghanistan while promoting the Democrats’ political interests here at home? The first thing it must do, said Conservative Party leader. Rory Stewart, is tone down the inflammatory rhetoric on Afghanistan that Obama began using as a presidential candidate. The second thing it must do is make a credible case for doing less in Afghanistan and with fewer resources but with the likelihood of greater accomplishments over the long haul. Stewart’s efforts to influence policies on Afghanistan in the U.S. and UK exemplify the use of dilemma-centered analysis as a prelude to exercising adaptive leadership.

**Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza: The Language of Power and the Power of Language**

 As against the commonplace view of words as the veridical representation of things, this section of the chapter invites consideration of how the “reality” of war is socially constructed. It takes as the object of its inquiry the asymmetric conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza during the summer of 2014 in which the ratio of Gazans killed to Israelis killed was greater than 10:1)

What labels should be assigned to this fateful conflict? What descriptions should be provided and what stories told? Said Kenneth Burke, each such representation is also a misrepresentation that deflects attention from some features of an object it knowingly reflects. (Burke, 1966.) Much as I might treat as “hard fact” that killings took place, I cannotcomprehend their totality and here must expand the scope or circumference of my inquiry with the help of others.

 It is at this point that “I” and the others become a *we, and that our social* construction *becomes a reality*. What I learn is *internalized and then objectivized—treated as a thing, reified, hypostatized—and then, together with other accounts, is externalized: what Peter Berger called ”the outpouring of human being on to the world.” (See Ch. 2)*

 *That account is mediated, necessarily so, and the filterings provided by my sources and the sources on whom they depend is in the hands of powerful others—network executives, newspaper owners, internet providers, and the like, and it is in this sense that the language of power becomes the power of language.*

*But I mean that in another sense as well.*

*The “we”* on whom we depend need a vocabulary for war, consisting of such “devil” words as oppression and aggression, extremism and terrorism, violence and torture. How these terms are defined and used in the stories we’re told exert a powerful influence on what we’ve come to believe. Just as there is no such thing as a “traitor” for the winning side, so “our” nation never engages in “acts of violence.”

In Gaza as in Iraq, one highly influential source was GOP pollster and speech writer, Frank Luntz, author of *Words that Work: Communicating the Principles of Prevention & Protection in the War on Terror (2008-9). It was intended, said Luntz, to create talking points for explaining* these policies:

1. **“9/11 changed everything.” No speech about homeland security or Iraq should begin without a reference to “9/11.”**
2. **The principles of “prevention” and “protection” still have universal support.**
3. ***Prevention at home can require aggressive action abroad.***
4. ***Terrorism has no boundaries and neither should errors to prevent it.***
5. ***The world is a better place without Saddam Hussein.***

*Luntz’s meaty advice to the Israelis can* be *found in a confidential, well-researched “playbook” for Israeli spokesmen entitled Global Language Dictionary (Dec 2008-Jan 2009). It includes the following:*

***1.The “right of return” [by displaced Palestinian refugees “is a tough issue for Israelis to communicate effectively because so much of Israeli language sounds like “separate but equal” words of the 1950 segregationists and 1980s advocates of Apartheid.” But it does no good to say exactly what that means.***

***2.* Americans agree that Israel has a right to defensible borders.” But it does no good to define exactly what those borders should be. Say “*Palestinians aren’t content with their own land.* Now they’re demanding territory inside Israel.”**

***3.* In bold type and with italics, Luntz says that Israeli spokesmen must never, ever justify “the deliberate slaughter of innocent women and children. The best way, the only way to achieve lasting peace is to achieve mutual respect.”**

***4.* The study admits that the Israeli government does not really want a two-state solution but says this should be masked since 78 percent of Americans do want such a state.**

**5. An “effective Israeli sound bite”: “I particularly want to reach out to Palestinian mothers who have lost their children. No parent should have to bury their children.”**

**6. Israeli spokesmen and political leaders should deplore “the deliberate slaughter of innocent women and children,” and they must aggressively challenge those who accuse Israel of such a crime.**

**7. “The best way, the only way, to achieve lasting peace is to achieve mutual respect. Israel’s desire for peace with the Palestinians should be emphasized at all times. BUT ANY PRESSURE ON Israel to make peace can be reduced by saying “one step at a time, one day at a time.” Photo of Luntz here.**

 **The Issue of Israeli Apartheid.**

 **In late July, 2014, an issue that had lurked in the background came to the fore on MONDOWEISS, a left-leaning online journal of opinion which circulates widely in Israel, Europe, and the U.S.: By its words and actions had Israel been guilty of genocide in its treatment of the Hamas Palestinians?**

**The question touched a raw nerve, evoking memories of Nazi Germany and its extermination during the Holocaust of more than six million Jews.Be forewarned that on-line contributors offered discomfiting comparisons:**

1. **Tombishop’s comment:**

**“America was founded on the genocide of the Native Americans and the enslavement of Africans. Anyone who has not faced that fact will readily accept it is OK to do it again.**

1. **BPM says:**

**Isn’t it bad enough they were slaughtered in the gas chambers? Now Israel defiles their memory to defend Israel against people who had absolutely nothing to do with the Holocaust. Israel is bent on confirming every racial stereotype about Jews. If you are a thinking Jew with a conscience, Israel is your worst enemy.**

 **(3)Mooser comments: Well, what you are saying is that all that “suffering and discrimination (quoted simply to use the same term, not argumentatively) we have been subject to, and which forms the basis of our claim as a country, might be the very thing which makes it not a good idea to have one.**

**Oy Gevalt! Why is life so unfair?**

1. **Qjualtrough says:**

**Jaw-dropping to see the victims of genocide and their descendants calling for the genocide of others. If they feel so strongly about it, why don’t they go to Israel to do some of the dirty work themselves?**

**(4.) Donald comments:**

 **The point is that a lot of bloody-minded people in America and Israel, Jews and non-Jews, have it in their heads that they can support a military operation guaranteed to slaughter massive numbers of civilians and feel their hearts are pure because the enemy is pure evil. That’s the point that matters here, since the US supports Israel and Israel is about to add to the already large death toll because they’re the Good Guys and and America agrees.**

1. **Abierno says:**

**Just a historical note – when the Japanese began their invasion of China,**

**It was on the pretext that the Chinese had captured a Japanese soldier. They then went on to kill millions of people—all in the name of Japanese racial purity.**

1. **Donald’s comment**

 **If Israel is to blame for practicing genocide, why not spread the guilt? The United States has been Israel’s primary benefactor: it’s recipient of billions in aid, military assistance as well as diplomatic support.**

**Summary and Concluding Comments**

Presented here has been a dilemma-centered rhetorical history, beginning with the post-9/11 rhetoric used by the Bush administration to bring America into wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and concluding with the wars of words and wars of images (and wars of words *about* wars of words and images) used in the continuing struggle to come to terms with these two highly problematic undertakings. Each is still immensely expensive in terms of treasure and lives lost and national reputations diminished. As the wars wind down there is little to show for them beyond the lessons of failure, of quagmire, or situational entrapment, at once unendurable and unsolvable in which, for example, the U.S. troop presence has been essential and inflammatory, needed to achieve a modicum of stability but also destabilizing by virtue of its fueling the anger of civilian populations.

In situations of this kind, political leaders risk charges of flip-flopping by shifting positions or criticisms of ineptness for staying on failed messages. Rhetoric that works well in the short run and on target audiences backfires in the long run and has backlash effects on unintended audiences. What seems to be meeting immediate expectations often fails to take into account what in retrospect were the needs of the moment.

Still, inflammatory, crisis rhetoric comports well with the fury of those bringing moral judgment to bear on those who lead America into wars on specious grounds as in Iraq and Afghanistan?

I take up this question in Ch. 12., this in the context of Kenneth Burke’s admonition to refrain from outright moral condemnation out of appreciation for our own foibles, our own foolishness (Burke, 1961). Suffice it to say in this chapter that opinions among U.S. political leaders tended to divide between experiencing mammoth attacks on their nation, such as the 9/11 bombings. However ambiguous it may be, the trope of a “war on terror’ gets the blood boiling and the support flowing to those who speak in its name. Even in the 2004 presidential election it was enough for Republican George W. Bush to defeat the flip-flopping Democratic nominee, Senator John Kerry.

Looking back on the praise bestowed upon President Bush for his melodramatic framing of the threat to America made manifest on 9/11, it seems that the conventional standards for judging crisis rhetoric of this kind need rethinking. So too is it imperative that the news media maintain their independence as watchdogs rather than lapdogs. How in retrospect should we assess those, such as former National Security Chief Condoleeza Rice, Defense Secretary William Rumsfeld and former V.P Richard Cheney who continued to defend the wars, and those like Democratic presidential hopefuls Joe Biden and John Edwards who conceded to having “made a mistake.”

Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen (Nov. 29, 2005 ) addressed the matter thoughtfully:

A line is forming outside the Iraq confessional. It consists of Democratic presidential aspirants -- where's Hillary? -- who voted for the war in Iraq and now concede that they made a "mistake." Former senator John Edwards did that Nov. 13 in a Post op-ed article, and Sen. Joseph Biden uttered the "M" word Sunday on "Meet the Press." "It was a mistake," said Biden. "It was a mistake," wrote Edwards. Yes and yes, says Cohen. “But it is also a mistake to call it a mistake.”
  Both senators have a point, of course. They were told by the president and members of his War Cabinet -- Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld -- that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. In particular, those three emphasized Iraq's purported nuclear weapons program. As late as August 2003, Condoleezza Rice was saying that she was "certain to this day that this regime was a threat, that it was pursuing a nuclear weapon, that it had biological and chemical weapons, that it had used them." To be charitable, she didn't know what she was talking about. As it turned out, neither did Vice President Cheney or Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Cheney said, "Increasingly, we believe that the United States will become the target" of an Iraqi nuclear weapon, and Rumsfeld raised a truly horrible specter: "Imagine a Sept. 11th with weapons of mass destruction" that would kill "tens of thousands of innocent men, women and children." Imagine a defense secretary who thought he was propaganda minister.

Said Cohen “I quote this trio of braying exaggerators -- all of them still in the administration -- because they emphasized the purported nuclear weapons threat. Yet by the time the war began, March 20, 2003, it was quite clear that Iraq had no nuclear weapons program. All the evidence for one -- the aluminum tubes, the uranium from Africa -- had been challenged. What's more, U.N. inspectors in Iraq had found nothing. "We have to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq," said Mohamed ElBaradei of the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency. That was on Feb. 14. The next month, the United States went to war anyway.

“In their respective confessions, neither Edwards nor Biden explains why they were not persuaded by the evidence that Bush & Co. were exaggerating -- concocting is possibly a better word -- Saddam Hussein's nuclear threat. Sept. 11 changed all that. The terrorist attacks, coupled with the still-unexplained deaths of five people from anthrax sent through the mail, unhinged America. Cooler heads in the Bush administration seized the moment to plump for a war they had always wanted while many of the rest of us -- myself included -- got caught up in an emotional frenzy. Even after the passions of the moment cooled -- even after it was clear Iraq was no real imminent threat -- few of us demanded that Bush back down. The best I could do was whisper some doubt. On July 25, 2002, I wrote that the Bush administration would pay dearly if it was going to wage war for specious reasons. "War plans are being drawn up in the Pentagon," I wrote. "But explanations are lacking at the White House.”

“Well, those explanations are still lacking. But so, too, are those from Democrats who say they made a "mistake" in supporting the war. What sort of mistake? It's not a mistake to be misled. But it is a mistake, if that's even the right word, to lack the courage of your convictions, to get swept up in the zeitgeist and dig in your heels even harder -- not as a consequence of hardening conviction but of accumulating doubt. This is a mistake of great consequence, a failure of judgment or political courage, and it needs to be explained.”

“I do not hold the new war critics to a higher standard than those who led us to war or who still think it was a dandy idea. But we will learn nothing from this debacle if the word "mistake" can be used like a blackboard eraser just to wipe the slate clean. This is no different from what Bush is trying to do: The intelligence was bad, not his wretched judgment. To accept this explanation does not -- both for the president and his critics -- undo the mistake. On the contrary, it compounds it .(Cohen, 2005)

Summary

This chapter has provided accounts of the rationales used by the GW Bush administration for invading, then occupying first Afghanistan, then Iraq, and subsequently Israel’s war on Gaza in 2014. These in retrospect have been failed undertakings, now seen as culpable failures in judgment, but in the context of the “9/11” bombings they make political sense

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**Questions for Thought and Discussion**

* 1. **Summarize the many “rules’ for bringing a nation into war and then suggest rules for dis-suading a nation from going to war.**
	2. **Bring what you’ve learned in this chapter about dilemmas of war making to bear upon recent conflicts, such as those between the U.S. and North Korea.**
	3. **Evaluate Frank Luntz’s advice to Israel on how to deal rhetorically with criticisms of its treatments of Gaza and the**

**Palestinians.**

* 1. **Evaluate melodramatic crisis rhetoric as a propaganda tool.**

**What accounts for its staying power?**

**5. Define and illustrate**

1. **Double game**
2. **blogging**
3. **Flip-flopping**
4. **Melodramatic crisis rhetoric**
5. **“war on terror”**
6. **“watchdog vs. lapdog news coverage**
7. **Staying with failed messages**
8. **WMDs**
9. **Situational entrapment**
10. **Dilemma-centered analysis**
11. **“liberation” vs “occupation**
12. My thanks to Marshall Scott Poole, the editorial team at Wiley, and the editorial assistants I’ve been so lucky to have over the years, including Shrobona Karkun, Pranjali Rai,Juliana Peluso, Cath Plourde, and Harmony Tasker.
13. Scott has been generous with his time under difficult circumstances, and an astute advisory editor in support of my efforts at turning what began as a personal statement into a scholarly text.
14. Special thanks to colleagues and former students for supportive readings that buoyed my spirits and to Wiley’s reviewers, consistently astute and accurate in their commentaries.Jack Orr, Ed Appel, and Jeanine Czubaroff have provided constructive readings’ and numerous colleagues, not least Miles Orvell, Michael Roscoe, Allen Scult, “Slim Goodbody” and “Big Al” Soffin have helped me think; my wife Gayle and son Michael have provided useful readings and lent emotional support;. In Maine, where Gayle and I reside in the summer, the Tuesday seminar group which meets weekly to discuss current events has provided a model of informed exchange. So too have I learned from my former students at OLLI, Temple’s Osher Lifelong Learning Institute.
15. Learning Center.
16. This book has also benefitted from conversations with political activists in the countries I visited, not least two Portugese journalists who smuggled their way into danger zones so as to be close to the action, academics at Ankara University who’d organized a conference I keynoted on how to advance the goals of their ongoing Turkish revolution, and Egyptian activists who’d risked imprisonment in seeking to forge a middle way between military rule and Islamist rule. From their audacious actions other activists have taken courage.
17. Herb Simons

Endnotes

[[1]](#endnote-1) For an excellent account of how 9/11 played to the interests of neocons and of others in and close to the Bush administration who had long campaigned for forceful removal of Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime, see George Packer, (2005) *The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux). See also James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet* (New York: Viking Books, 2004). On the horrors perpetrated by Saddam Hussein and his regime, see Con Coughlin, *Saddam: His Rise and Fall* (New York: Harper, 2004).

2. See for example Daniel Okrent (Mar. 6, 2005), “The War of the Words: A Dispatch from the Front Lines,” *New York Times*, March 6, 2005, 12.

3. Robert L. Ivie, *Democracy and the War on Terror* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005).

4 See for example Mark Danner (2006) *The Secret Way to War: The Downing Street Memo and the Iraq War’s Buried History.* New York: New York Review of Books.;Frantzich, S.F. “September 11th and the Bush Presidency: Rally-Round-the-Rubble,” *White House Studies* (Spring 2004): 1-3.

5. See Packer, *The Assassin’s Gate*, 40–41. According to Packer, history began anew for George W. Bush on 9/11, and made him newly receptive to a national security staff already predisposed toward regime change in Iraq. Apparently it was an easy sell.

6. See [*http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/*retrieved](http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/retrieved) 9/21/2011

7. Following the 9/11 attacks, President Bush enjoyed the highest presidential approval ratings in recorded history, upwards of 90 percent. See Stephen F. Frantzich, “September 11th and the Bush Presidency: Rally-Round-the-Rubble,” *White House Studies* (Spring 2004): 1-3.

8. Media reactions were overwhelmingly positive. See Packer, *The Assassin’s Gate*, chap. 2.

9. Denise M. Bostdorff, *The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994).

10. See Elisabeth Anker, “Villains,Victims, and Heroes: Melodrama ,Media, and September 11th,” *Journal of Communication* 55 (2005): 22–37; Elisabeth Anker, “From Politics to Evil: Melodrama and State Politics,” *eScholarship Repository* (Berkeley: Institute of Government Studies, 2005) at *http://repositories.cdlib.org/igs/WP2005–1*. That which is subsumed by Anker under the heading of melodramatic discourse or melodramatic narrative finds expression by other names: e.g., agonistic rhetoric, binary discourse, political fundamentalism, prophetic dualism, crisis rhetoric, or simply domestic war propaganda. See for example). On binary discourse, see Kevin Coe, David Domke, Eric S. Graham, Sue Lockett John, and Victor W. Pickard, “No Shades of Gray: The Binary Discourse of George W. Bush and an Echoing Press,” *Journal of Communication* 54 (2004): 234–52. See Bostdorff, *The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis*, on crisis rhetoric. On prophetic dualism, see Philip Wander, “The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 70 (1984): 339–61. On domestic propaganda and agonistic discourse, see James J. Kimble, “‘Whither Propaganda?’ Agonism and the ‘Engineering of Dissent,’” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 91 (2005): 201–18.

11. See Anker, “From Politics to Evil”; Domke, *God Willing*; Kimble, “‘Whither Propaganda?’”

12. Chris Hedges,*War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003).

13. On American exceptionalism, see Dan Nimmo and James E. Combs, *Subliminal Politics: Myths and Mythmakers in America* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1980)*.* See also Denise M. Bostdorff, “George W. Bush’s Post–September 11 Rhetoric of Covenant Renewal: Upholding the Faith of the Greatest Generation,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 89 (2003); McDougall, W.A. (Oct 12, 2012) **American Exceptionalism...Exposed, e-Notes, FPRI.** Philadelphia: *FPRI.*

14.Eikenberry, k. Taliban can wait us out.

Question: **There are concerns that the Taliban is sitting in the wings, just waiting for the withdrawal of American troops. Are those concerns valid?**

**Response:**I have heard this argument since I first served in Afghanistan in 2002. I don't buy it. By 2016 we'll be in the 15th year of a military mission that began in 2001. Will another 15 years be adequate to prove we can "wait them out?" It is time for the Afghans to take charge of their own destiny. Furthermore, the Taliban are not a cohesive movement; there is not a centralized Taliban command "waiting in the wings." Last, the Taliban are not the primary threat to Afghan stability. The greater challenges are Pakistan's policies towards Afghanistan, Afghanistan national political reconciliation, and massive government corruption.

14. See, for example, Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are*

*Seduced by War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Bostdorff, D., “George W. Bush’s Post-September 11 Rhetoric.”(source?)

15. Several essays in Lee Artz and Yahya R. Kamilipour’s *Bring ’Em On: Media and Politics in the Iraq War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005) speak to this point.

See especially: Tanja Thomas and Fabian Virchow’s “Banal Militarism and the Culture of War.” See also Michael Billig’s *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995) for its astute analysis of how nationalism insinuates itself into British and American culture in subtle, barely noticeable

ways.

16. Gone from modern-day political melodramas are the grandiose gestures and stirring musicthat marked old-fashioned morality plays, but they have been more than adequately replaced by television’s capacity to bring heart-rending documentary footage and diatribe directly into the home.

17. See, for example, D. T.Max’s excellent account of the crafting of the September 20 address: “The Making of the Speech,” *New York Times Magazine*, October 7, 2001.

18. Anker, “From Politics to Evil,” 4.

19. Of particular interest to me as a rhetorician were the Bush administration’s uses of

deception short of outright lying in making the case for war; also its ability to “pre-persuade,” as Pratkanis and Aronson put it, by their influence and/or control of the terms and conditions of debate. This included, for example, gaining widespread acceptance of the assumption that skeptics and naysayers had the burden of proof in showing that Saddam *didn’t* possess hidden weapons of mass destruction. See also A. Pratkanis and E. Aronson, *Age of Propaganda* (New York: Freeman, 2000).Zarefsky (2008.

20. Mark Danner, *The Secret Way to War: The Downing Street Memo and the Iraq War’s Buried History* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2006).

21. See for example Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, *The Best War Ever: Lies, Damned Lies, and the Mess in Iraq* (New York: Tarcher/Penguin, 2006).

22. But see Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber’s *Weapons of Mass Deception* (New York:Tarcher/Penguin, 2003) on Iraqi perceptions of the American-assisted toppling of Saddam’s statue.

23. See Danner, *The Secret Way to War*; also Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Next atttack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a* Strategy *for Getting It Right* (New York: New York *TimesGuardian,* Books, 2005). See also V. Plame and Joseph Wilson (Feb 7, 2013). How the Bush government sold the war and we bought it. Guardian.( retrieved June 5, 2014)

24. See Joseph Nye’s *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs,2004).

25. On war reporting, see Eric Wemple’s encomium to Jonathan Landay and Warren Strobel, two Knight-Ritter reporters “who bucked the U.S. media repetition of the Bush administration’s march-to-Iraq messaging” Said Landay, “We work[ed} for a chain of 30newspapers. Even some of our own newspapers wouldn’t print our own stories, Because they say it wasn’t in the Washington Post, They hadn’t seen it in the New York Times… So it was very lonely. Washington Post.Com, March 19, 2013, Retrieved 6/11/2014.

26.Said Michael X. Delli Carpini & Bruce A. Williams, authors of After Broadcast News: Media Regimes, Democracy, and the New Information Environment (Cambridge University Press, 2011), we explore the implications of changes that have radically reconfigured the mediated public sphere in which we live. In it we argue that these changes have dissolved the assumptions, distinctions, and hierarchies in place during what we call the "Age of Broadcast News." These changes have been regularly noted by scholars and journalists, though almost exclusively from the perspective of this quickly collapsing era. As a result, the crisis of this particular "media regime" is seen as a crisis of democracy itself. Viewed from a broader historical vantage, however, it is the Age of Broadcast News that is exceptional in its attempts to limit politically relevant media to a single genre ("news") and a single authority ("professional journalists"). More significantly, there is little evidence that the Age of Broadcast News did a measurably better job than previous regimes at informing the public, encouraging enlightened democratic dialogue, or - in short - serving the broader interests of a democratic society.

**Psychological warfare over Israel and Gaza**

**Questions for Thought and Discussion**

* 1. **Summarize the many “rules’ for bringing a nation into war and then suggest rules for dis-suading a nation from going to war.**
	2. **Bring what you’ve learned in this chapter about dilemmas of war making to bear upon recent conflicts, such as those between the U.S. and North Korea.**
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**Palestinians.**

* 1. **Evaluate melodramatic crisis rhetoric as a propaganda tool.**

**What accounts for its staying power?**

**Recall case studies in Ch. 2. Cluster analysis, What = what?, leads to what?, etc.**

**Studies**

1. **Don ELLIS ON NEED TO RAISE THE STAKES.**
2. **ARTICLES ON EGYPT AND Israel: Sisi seeing Israel as enemy of his enemy**
3. **Pizzo: Israel is simply wrong this time.**
4. **Blumenthal: Witch Hunt by MSNBC : Suppression of Israel/Palestinian debate**
5. **Imbalances**
6. **Intimidation(Rula Jebreal)**
7. **Jodi Rudoren 7/20, 2014, NYT I Gaza. Epithets fired and euphemism given shelter. (Excellent)**
8. **Fahim, K. Egypt Silent 7/9/14**
9. **S. Tadros, FPRI Egypt a jaded country (good!)**
10. **Albanese, F. 7/22/14 Mondoweiss Deafening silence around Hamas proposal for a 10-year truce (and see exchanges that follow, like play, view from Dolorossa by David Hare.**

**Ch. 12: we need each other**

1. **The Salon**
2. **Safire DC dinner parties – opposing views with civility**

**15 Shenk, JW 7/19/14 The end Of ‘Genius’ NYT**

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 [↑](#endnote-ref-1)