<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body dir="auto"><div>Greg,</div><div><br></div><div>As we've discovered in applying precedents in legal cases (one of my research areas), applying the "rule" of a prior case leads to a new understanding of what the prior case was doing. So I wouldn't draw too sharp a distinction between interpretation and application. </div><div><br></div><div>A better biblical example is Paul in second Corinthians where he says women should be silent in church. Patriarchal church leaders read that as "all women in all churches for all time" (hence no female preachers allowed), while 19th century Americans also read it as no women speaking in public, especially not to men. What Paul meant can't be easily separated from the application here.</div><div><br></div><div>Clarke<br><br>Sent from my iPhone</div><div><br>On Nov 7, 2014, at 9:27 PM, Gregory Desilet <<a href="mailto:info@gregorydesilet.com">info@gregorydesilet.com</a>> wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type="cite"><div><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=windows-1252">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman"">Interesting
comment, Clarke. I find Stanly Fish to be a fascinating guy. Whenever I read
him he always unsettles me in some way. And I’m not saying that’s a bad thing,
though in some cases I’m not sure it’s good thing either. I guess I’m saying I
often find Fish to be a little fishy (sorry for that—it just came out). </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman';font-size:14pt">In
this case you mention, Fish seems to want to point out a difference between
interpreting the law and interpreting sacred texts. In the one case, he bemoans
the consequences of “creative” interpretation and in the other he praises the
consequences. In each case language is not behaving differently; it’s just a
difference in attitude—in this case Fish’s attitude—toward legal and religious
contexts. And I think Fish understands that. But a good case could also be made for the reverse. The potential
for abuse and for benefit exists concerning the interpretation of any text.
Where using and understanding words in language is like following rules,
Wittgenstein identifies the problem: “No course of action could be determined
by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the
rule.”</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman';font-size:14pt">It
may be that certain theologians draw out a multitude of meanings from sacred
texts, but as in the case of the story of the Good Samaritan, this multitude is
more in the area of the application of a rule rather than a multiple reading of
the rule itself. And the applications are largely consistent with each other.
So we could usefully distinguish between the applications of a rule and
interpretations of the rule or “message” itself. Generally, in Biblical texts,
arguments over “message” lead to schisms and different denominations whereas
multiple applications of the “message” lead to something new to say in the
sermons within the same denomination. So I think these factors explain a lot
and still leave intact the notion that most theologians are unwilling to leave
the message of a Biblical passage undecidable or multiple in its denominationally
crucial import.</span></p><div><br></div><div><font size="4">Greg</font></div><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman';font-size:14pt"><br></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman';font-size:14pt"></span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman';font-size:14pt"> </span><span style="font-family:'Times New Roman';font-size:14pt"> </span></p>
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