[KB] Conversation Editing Redux 2

[Edward C Appel]

Burkophiles,


          Themost problematic term for Burke, it seems, was “act,” the key term itself inhis dramatistic/pentadic theory. Language as “symbolic action,” notdisinterested description, narration, or analysis, was and remains central toBurke’s philosophy. Symbolizers “act” on their environment, linguistically andphysically, and then listen or look for a response. (As Abraham Kaplan said,it’s not always clear with Burke whether he’s talking about language per se,Burke’s stated focus, or more tangible action as well, on the “reality outthere.”) There’s something of a dialogue going on between symbolizers and theirsituation (Drew Seminary lecture). A matured “reflection” of reality mayemerge, over time, if the symbolic species pays studied attention to the“recalcitrances” that can fashion that response, by way of adjustment. Those“recalcitrances” can be social and “ethical,” as well as physical (P&C 256). 


          “Act”was most problematic for Burke because, in ultimately defining “act” or “action,”articulating its lineaments in full, he had to reach beyond his other fourpentadic terms to clearly distinguish “action” from “motion,” the other pole inBurke’s basic dialectic opposition (Crusius, Kenneth Burke and the Conversation ater Philosophy 164). “Act” or“action” could not be totally explained in terms of “agent,” or the kind ortype of person doing the acting; or “purpose,” the aim or goal of the action;or “agency,” the means by which that desideratum might be achieved, via tools,coagents, or steps or stages; or “scene,” the context to which the actor, viaaction, would have to adjust strategically. “Act” or “action” had to beexplained in part, even if in very, very small part, in terms of itself.


          Thisquandary becomes most acute, Burke suggested, when we try to explain God’s“act” of Creation, whether merely “in principle,” or not. God, the theologianstell us, didn’t have a context or scene, didn’t have or need agencies or means,was not finite or in need, as the notion of an actor performing an action forsome purpose in an encircling environment of some kind would imply. Hence Burkehighlighted the accommodation the young William James concocted, God being thecontext for His Own Act of Creation (GM).Hence, a “pure act,” one that does not require any outside constraint or“taint” of finitude whatsoever, an “act” without motivation or influenceimpinging on it from a beyond.


          Laterin GM, Burke implied that James’solution, and the “perfections” of historically orthodox Christian theology itadumbrates, generates the embarrassments of “super-drama,”but we’ll let thatmatter go for now.


          Anadded complication to “act” as motivational source, however meager we mayconstrue  that motivation, modernpsychology, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, genetics, what have you, seemto have stripped the notion of “free” act from the vocabulary of today’scognoscente (see the chapter “The Fear of Determinism” in Steven Pinker’s The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of HumanNature). Thus, the plaintive plea from Burke at the tail end of“Terministic Screens” in LASA: Evenif we’re not “free” in any traditional sense, we still have no other way ofrelating to ourselves, except via the illusion of “free will,” if it be anillusion. We can never treat members of the symbolic species the way we reactto nonsymbolic animals. What Burke calls in GM“scenic freedom,” conjured by language itself, can do in a pinch for the nowout-of-fashion boast,  “I am the masterof my fate, the captain of my soul.”


          Bottomline: For Burke, “act” as concept, pentadic term, controlling notion inrhetorical appeal, partakes of the “purity” of God’s Creative Action, howeverpale and attenuated that sliver of “freedom” from outside constraint may be. Burkeclaims the “philosophic school” that best reflects and emphasizes the dramaticactor’s freedom and autonomy from outside forces is “realism.”


          Allthis is preliminary to the claim that it’s “act” as controlling term, and“realism” as illustrative philosophy in general, not “idealism,” that informsthe notion of “conservatives often support[ing] the autonomy of individuals ineconomic situations because they tell [not] agent-act narratives, whereindividuals can pull themselves up by their bootstraps and succeed regardlessof any situations which they might find themselves in,” but rather act-agent oract-scene narratives that so tell that tale. The critique in the current issueof the KBJ that so convincinglyclaims that the campaign rhetoric of candidate Donald Trump illustrated anagent-scene ratio (or, if you will, perhaps an agent-act correspondence, aswell) is a little short of the mark, Burke-wise, in the preliminarycritical-perspective section, as I interpret Burke, anyhow.


          Butwhat about the notion of a “free moral agent,” you may ask. Doesn’t thatcomplicate things? Who says people can’t pick out tools from the Burkeantoolbox and use them the way the way they want?


          Goodquestion. Maybe more later.



 
          Ed 

         

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