[KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever
Edward C Appel
edwardcappel at frontier.com
Tue Oct 28 20:21:39 EDT 2014
Thanks to Stan for his added insight. I surely agree: You can't paint everybody with a broad brush. In the Mainline Protestant denominations, the fight has been going on for decades now between conservatives and liberals over biblical interpretation, adherence to the "fundamentals" of the traditional creeds, and social and ecclesiastical issues like full inclusion of gays in church life. The Presbyterian Church U.S.A, for instance, has been coming apart at the seams, as congregation after congregation leaves for one of two smaller, evangelical Presbyterian groups.
And the conflict is within, not just between, congregations. Are adherents to the full, traditional Christian drama of salvation "religious," while theistic believers in the Sermon on the Mount, the Golden Rule, and the Kingdom of God that is "within you" mere "philosoophers," convictions based perhaps more on "natural religion" and ethical viability than on revelation?
With a recrudescent Islamic fundamentalism now an unwelcome part of our environment, the "broad brush" beckons for far too many secularists and humanists. Hey, aren't there some things more or less equivalent to execution of apostates, honor killings, genital mutilation of young girls, denial of education and full-body covering for women in general in all religions? Slippery slope, anyone? That very case was made a week or so ago by Dison (?) on the Democratic propaganda network, MSNBC, in respect to our own so-called "fanatics," Evangelical Protestant Christians.
Mayr (spelling) and Harris debated Kristof and Affleck recently on the nature of contemporary Islam in multiple states in the Middle East. Poll results from Pew and Gallop were cited. In various Arab/Muslim nations, upwards of 75 percent came down on the side of executions for apostasy, honor killings, abridgment of women's rights to education, etc., etc. Where are such notions extant in the U.S.A.? If something akin to "fascism" is there, where is it here?
Let's have no broad brush.
Ed
--------------------------------------------
On Tue, 10/28/14, Stan Lindsay <slindsa at yahoo.com> wrote:
Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever
To: "Edward C Appel" <edwardcappel at frontier.com>, "Gregory Desilet" <info at gregorydesilet.com>
Cc: "kb at kbjournal.org" <kb at kbjournal.org>
Date: Tuesday, October 28, 2014, 5:58 PM
I agree with
neither-and-yet-both sides of this issue.As Greg suggests
there are some who believe not only in a sacred text but
also a sacred (inspired) interpretation. I have a Biblical
Scholar friend who was figuratively crucified for offering
an interpretation of a scripture passage that was counter to
the creed of his denomination. There are surely some
religions that hold that the interpretation of the text is
not open to debate. Yet, as Ed demonstrates, there are
other biblical scholars who demonstrate wide openness in
interpretation. I agree with Ed's observation that
language cannot be so clear as to prohibit interpretation.
In my book, Psychotic Entelechy: The Dangers of
Spiritual Gifts Theology, I make the argument that Greg and
Ed both
make--that unflinching interpretation of religious
scriptures (Christian, Jewish, Moslem) often leads to
extreme (psychotic) entelechies, and while there are
certainly Christian sects today that fit the bill, the
leading contenders for the position of worst cases of this
psychotic entelechy, today, have to be Islamists. I
studied in a primarily Arabic department under a Jewish
major professor and taught at both a Catholic university and
protestant schools. You can't paint everyone with a
broad brush. Dr.
Stan A. Lindsay, Ph.D.
Teaching Professor
Professional Communication
College of Applied Studies
Florida State University
slindsay at pc.fsu.edu
http://www.stanlindsay.com
http://www.lindsayDIS.COM
On Tuesday, October 28, 2014 3:35 PM, Edward C
Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com> wrote:
Greg,
A challenging and interesting
post. One quick take in opposition of a sort, though,
pertains to the second-to- last paragraph:
Your notion of a
non-negotiable, not-open-to-interpretation "sacred
text" as a given in a genuine "religion"
seems a bit too either/or. Without such a text, you seem
to be saying, religion desolves into philosophy.
The 250-year
history of biblical criticism, both inside and outside of
liberal Protestantism, and its effect on the very idea of a
"sacred text" not open to various points of view
and multitudes upon multitudes of interpretive schemes, runs
counter to reality---unless we're going to prescind all
thought of metaphysics---i.e., theology, "coy" or
not--from the philosophy you speak of. In other words, you
seem to be requiring a definition of "religion," a
transcendentalization of the "motive of
perfection," that puts it in a straight jacket most
actual religious liberals aren't bound by.
I wouldn't attempt to
summarize this complex,critical, literary and historical
account from Reimaris (1774-1778) to John Dominic Crossan
(radical) and John P. Meier (more mainstream), both Roman
Catholics by the way, both still publishing, and both
treating the distinctively Christian documents in a most
un-sacred way. As even Meier has said, the New Testament
exegete should treat the text as though being judged and
interpreted by a Roman Catholic, a Protestant, A Jewish
scholar, and an atheist, each having an equal vote.
This
"demystification" or partial
"demystification" of the texts of Judaism and
Christianity has been standard fare in Mainline Protestant
seminaries for decades upon decades, and surely has seeped
into preaching and teaching in the Mainline
denominations.
I
wouldn't call them philosophical societies.
Also, by the way, Horace
Bushnell, a Protestant preacher in Rochester, New York,
published a book in 1849 that undercut the very idea of
"language," creedal or biblical or whatever, as a
vehicle for pristinely accurate, incontestable, and entire
"truth." Language just doesn't function that
way, Bushnell claimed and argued. This was about half a
century before Burke was born.
Ed
--------------------------------------------
On Tue, 10/28/14, Gregory Desilet <info at gregorydesilet.com>
wrote:
Subject: Re: [KB]
"Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever
To: "Ed Appel" <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
Cc: kb at kbjournal.org
Date: Tuesday, October 28, 2014, 1:26 PM
Ed—I take your point about
Burke
regarding fascism as a distortion or
perversion of religion.
To recall, he
expresses it this way, “There is nothing in
religion proper that requires a fascist state.
There is much
in religion, when misused,
that does lead to a fascist
state.” In
other words, religion does not lead to fascism
as day leads to night. But I would argue
that the reason
religion can, when
misused, lead to a fascist state derives
from the circumstance that both share the same
metaphysical
core. This metaphysical core
is highly suspect with regard
to its
potential for benefiting human community. I know this
statement will possibly seem outrageous at
face value, but I
make a detailed case for
this view in a paper titled
“Burke,
Heidegger, Derrida, and the Specter of Nazism at
the Origin of Rhetoric” (available online
here: https://www.academia.edu/6400427/Burke_Heidegger_Derrida_and_the_Specter_of_Nazism_at_the_Origin_of_Rhetoric).
Of course, this line of
thinking features Burke’s
sacrificial
logic expressed in his phrase “cult of the
kill” and all that he sees as bound up in
that. The
inevitability of this
“logic”—what I identify as the
metaphysical core—is what I take issue with in the
above
paper. When we start out with the
“cult of the kill”
metaphysical ground
(and the late Burke seems to admit of no
other alternative), we are not necessarily obliged to end
up
with the politics of fascism but we have
necessarily greased
the wheels in that
direction. And human community all too
often inclines in that direction when propelled by this
metaphysical ground—which is in essence a
logic of
oppositional relation much like
YES/NO computer
gatekeeping—only where
the YES/NO dichotomy is at the
origin
hierarchically conceived such that one side is, in
its essence, superior to the other. This
gatekeeping may
work okay when making
certain kinds of choices (though I
would
dispute this as well) but it does not work well when
categorizing humans (leading to what Burke
calls the logic
of the
sacrificial scapegoat). Alternative metaphysical
ground, which Burke does not consider, leads
to an
alternative logic of gatekeeping
whereby the essences on
each side of the
dichotomy are not hierarchically arranged
at the assumptive origin. In this latter alternative
metaphysical orientation, hierarchy among
choices arises
from a contextualized
evaluative process, not a presumption
at
the outset.
This
hierarchical “presumption at the outset” is another
feature of what I regard as the metaphysical
core of
religion. It ties in closely with
the notion of a “sacred
text.” Here a
“sacred" text may be defined as sacred
only if it is divinely inspired or revealed.
As such, it
cannot be challenged or
negotiated with. Most
institutionalized
religions center on sacred texts or texts
that are made to be sacred. This notion of sacred texts
flies in the face of everything
communication scholars have
learned about
the nature of language—namely that it cannot
be made to operate in ways that preclude
interpretation
(which may be seen as a form
of negotiation). On this line
of thought,
any institutionalized religion that does not
center on the notion of a sacred text
effectively strays
from religion into what
may more properly be called
philosophy—an
approach to life where argument and
negotiation prevail over revelation and certainty.
Interestingly, Burke’s
“cult of the kill” thesis is,
therefore, in many ways inconsistent with the more
interpretive view of language he offers in,
for example,
Permanence and Change.
However, Burke seems to be of two
minds
when it comes to his views on the nature of language.
His later work in “Fact, Inference, and
Proof in the
Analysis of Literary
Symbolism,” for example, offers a
view of
language more
consistent with the sacred text notion
of
language (where the notion of “fact” substitutes for
the notion of “sacred text”). I find this
inconsistency
in Burke troubling along with
what I view as his blindness
to the above
mentioned metaphysical alternative orientation.
Greg
On Oct
28, 2014, at 7:55 AM, Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
wrote:
>
Greg,
>
> Thanks
for the link. I'll give the interview a
listen and get back.
>
> Two things:
>
> First, Deacon is not one of the
plagiarizers of Burke's
thought. He
has told me he knows nothing about Burke,
and I believe him. Deacon is, after all, in two fields
not noted for Burkean connections,
anthropology and
neuroscience. I've
been forwarding
to Deacon my kb
posts. After the most
recent one, he got back to me
with near
assurance he wants to start reading Burke.
It's actually more confirming, I believe,
that these
similaries in theory,
philosophy, and conclusions from
research
appear independently---especially from a
significant source in a hard science.
>
> Second, as I read it, the connection
Burke makes
between Hitler's fascistic
rants and religion in "Hitler's
'Battle'" is offered to the detriment of
Hitler, not
religion. Burke calls what
Hitler has done a
"bastardization" of religious rhetoric, meaning,
in Burke's
typically elliptical way, an
illigitimate use of the motive
of
perfection, a taking-to-the-end-of-the-line his depiction
of this arbitrary and quite earth-bound,
untranscendent
scapegoat, whose demise will
supposedly '' +"cure" the ills
of the German people.
>
> This
harks back to what Burke says in ATH about
"heroic," tragic-frame rhetoric approaching
"coxcombry" when
employed for
nonreligious reasons. God and the devil
are "perfected" conceptions, or can be so
idealized.
>
> Now,
this does not mean given expressions of religion,
like Islam today in various formulations---in
terms of its
fanatical quest to make its
earthly environment confirm
exactly to its
extreme, and one can say I think, socially
and historically backward standards---are not
facistic. Nor is it to say that
fundamentalist
religion of any kind, even
when thoroughly
transcendentalized,
isn't to be "discounted" for language as
a source of conceptual excess.
"Perfection" of
whatever variety,
when grimly pursued in respect to the
here-and-now or the graat beyond, is to be taken with
salt and viewed with suspicion, Burke surely
hints at, if
not in each
case clearly proclaims.
>
> Religion in general is not the customary
"enemy" in
Burke's
writings. More frequently, it's the immanent
expressions of that "theological"
motive in the "quest for
empire"
in this world that earns Burke's strongest disdain.
>
> That's my
sermon for today. As the Stage Manager
isn Our Town said, "Twan't much."
>
>
>
>
> Ed
>
>
> --------------------------------------------
> On Mon, 10/27/14, Gregory Desilet <info at gregorydesilet.com>
wrote:
>
> Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke
Part
Whatever
> To:
"Ed Appel" <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
> Cc: kb at kbjournal.org
> Date: Monday, October 27, 2014, 3:08
PM
>
> You make a
good case, Ed, for
> Deacon’s debt to
Burke. Hopefully he will eventually
have
> something more to say about that.
>
> Speaking of
unacknowledged “debt” to Burke, I came
> across a YouTube video recently in which Hamed Abdel
Samad
> is interviewed. It
seems he wrote a controversial book
on
> what he calls “Islamism.” In the
interview he
explains
>
the connection he makes between religion and
fascism—a
> connection
Burke also makes in his 1938 review of
Hitler’s
> Mein Kampf. Exploring this
connection is indeed
> controversial but
Samad makes an interesting case of
it.
> And, Ed, in doing so, he seems to follow
certain
aspects of
>
our line of argument
about conflict management in our
>
Rhetoric of the Enemy article. Here is a link to the
video:
>
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jCfp48c31u0
>
> Greg
>
>
> On Oct 21, 2014, at 3:36 PM, Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Burkophiles,
>>
>> I want to
summarize what I
see as
> fifteen or so points of intersection between
Burke’s
> dramatism/logology and
Terrence W. Deacon’s semiotic
>
theory. I do so in no particular order.
I’m
> basing my assessments on
Deacon’s most recent book,
>
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter, and
three
> of his
academic articles or book chapters: “The
Symbol
> Concept,” “The Emergent
Process of Thinking as
Reflected
> in Language Processing,” and “Beyond
the Symbolic
> Species.” Seven times
so far, I’ve posted
here on
> Deacon at some length. I’ll make
reference to
the
>
dates of those postings, or a few of them, where you
might
> find further
treatment, when appropriate.
>>
>> 1. Deacon’s notion of an
> “absential feature” in human symbolic
action, as
>> well as in whatever we
want to call the
nonsymbolic
> activity of the “lower animals,”
echoes Burke’s
> primary emphasis on
the “negative” as author and
>
motivator of the human drama. This “absential
> feature,” as extant in the
“Creatura,” but not in
the
> “Pleroma” (Deacon here borrows
language from the
ancient
> Gnostics by way of his mentor Gregory Bateson), is
the
> elephant in the living room
scientistic theorists
> recurrently
ignore in their efforts to reduce
anthropology
> to biology, biology to
chemistry, chemistry to
physics.
> 8/7/14.
>>
>> 2. From this absential feature
at the
> core of the “entelechy”
that
>> characterizes beings in the
Creatura (yes, Deacon
> references
Aristotle and the Four Causes), a list of
> ancillary features built around “purpose” and
reflective
> of Burke’s
pentad emerges. See Deacon’s
analogous
> idea of
“teleodynamics.” 8/7/14, 8/9/14.
>>
>> 3. Deacon, like
Burke,
> claims that action, so to
speak, cannot be reduced
>> to
motion, phrasing the concept somewhat
differently
> from Burke. For Deacon,
it’s the absential
feature
> itself that eludes the scientistic
rationale.
“There
>
are no components to what is absent,” he emphasizes.
> 8/7/14.
>>
>> 4. Deacon’s definition of what
a
> symbol is and is not appears to
mirror
>> well enough Burke’s
conception. I say seems
to
> mirror “well enough” because Burke
does not as
carefully
>
exclude, or even much refer to, mathematical, signal-
or
> code-like,
computational-type “symbols.”
Deacon
> argues convincingly that
math-type “symbols” do
not
> possess the airy abstractiveness,
web-like relatedness
to
> and embeddedness in, a whole lexicon of terms none
of
which
> can be
“mapped” in relation to objects in the real
> world, a “system-internal web
of relationships”
> requiring “an
associated indexical operation .
. .
> in order to point outside this
system.”
Neither
>
Melia’s book chapter “Scientism and Dramatism:
Some
> Quasi-Mathematical
Motifs in the Work of Kenneth
Burke”
> (The Legacy of Kenneth Burke), nor
Burke’s references
to
> the “statistical” in PLF, seem to undercut this
claim.
>>
>> To put the matter simply:
In the
> lingo of
dramatism, numerals in themselves do not
exude
> “drama” (make exception for
the indirect, the
> derivative), whereas
the words, phrases, and sentences
of
> the world’s conventional, arbitrary
languages do.
> That’s the implicit
lesson Deacon’s semiotics would
tend
> to highlight. 9/16/14.
>>
>> 5. Deacon’s
conception of
the
> origins of language sounds a lot
like Burke’s
>> speculations in
those QJS articles (1952/1953),
>
reprinted in LASA (pp. 419-79). Deacon speaks of
“an
> undifferentiated
starting condition.” “We
must
> ask: What’s the form of a
thought”---or “the idea
that
> a sentence conveys”---“before it is
put into
words,”
>
the “’mental images’ not quite formed or desires
and
> intentions to
achieve some imagined goal only vaguely
> formulated?” These “embryos of a speech
act”
> would be
“focused on aiming for and achieving
expressive
> goals.
>> ”
>> For Burke,
those
“expressive
>
goals”---“connotative,” “suggestive,”
> “loaded,” “fraught . . . with
significance”;
I’m
> deep into Roget’s here---might
stem from a
> “’pre-negative’ . .
. tonal gesture,”
“calling
> attention-to “ “danger” with
“sound[s] . . .
> hav[ing] a deterrent
or pejorative meaning” (LASA,
pp.
> 423-24). Deacon’s “lexicality,”
a
pre-linguistic
>
“pointing to” would serve as basis for this
transition
> into
morally-tinged negation of the kind that
> “dramatically” invests the danger or opportunity
in
> question with
quasi-theological import. The
negative
> as “engine of intentionality” with
its
now-infinite
>
vistas (indeed, now “rotten with perfection”),
would
> begin to indict as
well as beckon, accuse as well as
>
highlight, come upon its denizens with an aura of
spiritual
> hazard, as
well as material consequence. 9/16/14.
>>
>> Deacon does
refine his
description
> of this likely lengthy
transition with: “I see this
>
particular near universal [the “oral-vocal”] to be
a
> relatively late
emerging biological adaptation for
symbolic
> communication.” The
“gestural embodiment”
> probably
came first, since our primate ancestors were
not
> good at vocality.
The vocal came to predominate
> because
of its greater potential for myriad “sign
> vehicles.”
>>
>> 6. Which brings us to
Burke’s
> hexadic acknowledgement of
“attititude” as
>> an ingredient
in the symbolic mix, language
primarily
> expressing an attitude, creating an
orientation toward
> certain pathways of
action, giving cues to action and
a
> command to follow those cues. For
Deacon, that
> attitudinal,
“expressive” dimension is denominated
a
> “mood.” In respect to symbolic origins,
“Within
> this frame of
social communicative arousal,” he
maintains,
> “what might be described
as the ‘mood’ of the
speech
> or interpretive act is
differentiated.”
“This
> ‘mood’ needs to be maintained.”
It’s
“a
> focused
readiness and expectation with respect to
social
> interaction.”
>>
>> 7.
Burke famously defines
> humans as
the “symbol-using animal.”
>>
Deacon’s “symbolic species” functions as a
> virtual synonym. “In my work,”
Deacon says,
“I
> use
the phrase symbolic species, quite literally, to
argue
> that symbols have
literally changed the kind of
biological
> organism we are.”
>>
>> “Indeed, there
is ample
evidence
> to suggest that language is
both well-integrated into
almost
> every aspect of our cognitive and social
lives, that
it
>
utilizes a significant fraction of the forebrain, and
is
> acquired robustly
under even quite difficult social
>
circumstances and neurological impairment. It is
far
> from fragile.”
>>
>>
“So rather than merely
intelligent
> or wise (sapient)
creatures, we are creatures whose
social
> and mental capacities have been quite
literally shaped
by
>
the special demands of communicating with
symbols. And
> this doesn’t just
mean that we are adapted for
language
> use, but also for all the many ancillary
mental biases
that
>
support reliable access and use of this social
resource.”
>>
>> This
defining human trait
or
> attribute gets locked in globally via “the near
universal
> regularities
of human language.”
>>
>> 8. “Drama”---or, to put it
more
> logologically, “theological
drama”---as
>> master
“screen,” through which even the
>
“positives of nature are seen through the eyes of
moral
> negativity”?
Howabout Deacon’s
approximation:
> “We are ‘symbolic savants,’ unable
to suppress
the
> many
predispositions evolved to aid in symbol
acquisition,
> use, and transmission . .
. . We almost certainly have
> evolved a
predisposition to see things as symbols,
whether
> they are or not.” E.g.,
“the make-believe of
> children,”
“find[ing] meaning in
coincidental
> events,” seeing “faces in the
clouds,”
“run[ning]
> our
lives with respect to dictates presumed to
originate
> from an invisible spiritual
world.” “Our
special
> adaptation is the lens through which we see the
world.
> With it comes
an irrepressible predisposition to seek
for
a
> cryptic meaning hiding beneath the
surface of
> appearances.”
>>
>> An
approximation?
Sounds more
> like a paraphrase. Always take note of
“our
special
>
adaptation” and factor it into our interpretations
of
> “reality.”
>>
>>
More later, I hope, by way
of
> additional intersections between Burke
and Deacon.
>>
>>
>> Ed
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
--------------------------------------------
>> On Thu, 10/9/14,
Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
> wrote:
>>
>> Subject: Re: [KB]
"Deacon"-structing Burke Part
> Whatever
>> To: kb at kbjournal.org
>> Date: Thursday, October 9, 2014, 5:05
PM
>>
>>
Burkophiles,
>>
>> Let me reiterate, clarify,
> emphasize:
>> It’s the dyadic
grammatical pairing of subject
and
>> predicate that Deacon says is not
“innate” in
the
>
human
>> mind and human discourse, as
in Chomsky’s
universal
>> generative conception, not the “symbolic”
faculty
>> itself. No
evolutionary, genomic, or
>
neurological
>> evidence exists for
Chomsky’s
view. It’s
> mostly
>> implicit in these shorter works by
Deacon, but
> strongly
>> implicit, that symbolization itself does come
naturally
> to
>> the Symbolic Species. That is,
you’ll
recall,
>
the
>> title of his earlier book.
>>
>>
You may wonder, too, at the
> claim
that
>> children pick up on their own
a facility for
indexical
> and
>> combinatorial modes of
symbolic reference, rather
than
> learn
>> that
culminative syntax from the structures of the
>> conventional language into which
they’re
socialized.
>
>> The fact is, Deacon asserts,
“The infant already
>> ‘knows’
the logic of these ‘rules’ of
>>
indexicality,” which bring noun subject and
verbal
>> predicate
together.
Those necessary
regularities
> are
>> well
absorbed the first year and a half by way of
> experience
>>
itself.
>>
>> Also, as he or she reads him,
a
> Burkean
>> might be taken aback by Deacon’s
occasional
reference
>
to
>> the “predicate frame” (the
“comment” on
the
>> “subject” or “topic” that requires the
careful
>>
“indexing”) as the “symbolic” part of a
>> “complete” sentence or
iteration. This
does
> not
>> mean, for Deacon, that
the noun subject and object,
or
>> referential parts, of the
fully-formed utterance
> hasn’t
>> been symbolically transformed by the
symbolizing
>> species. Even proper
names, which, unlike
common
>> nouns, can be
indexically “mapped” a la
Saussure,
> are
>> still
embedded a culturally conventional,
>
artifactualized
>> linguistic
system. What Deacon seems to be
>
suggesting
>> here is that
distinctive symbolization
“emerges”
> from
>>
nonsymbolic indexicality—the “pointing”
gestures
> and
>> vocalizations of lower animals that
indicate some
> recognized
>> “icon” that poses danger,
potentially
satisfies
>> appetite, requires territorial markings or
>> signals of aggression or
subservience,
>
etc.---distinctive
>> symbolization
emerges especially via an
>
“expressive,”
>>
“mood”-generating, “sense”-making,
meaningful,
>> ultimately abstractive
vocalization that
characterizes
> how
>> to conceive
of,
proceed toward, exploit, or
retreat
> from the
>> object
or being so referenced. As Burke has
>
said,
>> “The true locus of
assertion is not in the
DISEASE,
> but in
>> the
STRUCTURAL POWERS by which the poet
encompasses
> it”
>> (PLF, p. 18, emphasis not added), a redemptive
>> “act”-centered predication.
>>
>>
So, there seems to be an
> underlay of
the
>> presymbolic in the indexical
not so present in the
>>
nonindexical.
>>
>> Constraining indexicality
> Deacon
>> anatomizes into four
aspects, only one of which
I’ll
>> mention here, the most basic, what he
calls
> “semiotic
>> constraints.” These manifest themselves in
>> “predication constraints (symbols
must be
bound
in
> order
>> to refer)”; “transitivity and
embedding
> constraints
>> (indexicality depends on immediate correlation
and
>> contiguity across the
transitive)”; and
>
“quantification
>> (symbolized
indices need re-specification).
>>
”
>> In elaboration,
Deacon says,
> “To state
>> this hypothesis in semiotic terms: a
symbol must
be
>>
contiguous with the index that grounds its
reference
> (either
>> to the world or to the immediate agreeing
textual
> context,
>> which is otherwise grounded), or else its
reference
>> fails.
Contiguity thus has a doubly
indexical
> role to
>> play.
Its contiguity (textually or
pragmatically)
> with
>> the symbolizing sign vehicle [see paragraph 3
above]
>
points
>> to this symbol, and their
contiguity in turn points
to
>> something else. This is an
expression of one
> further
>> feature of indexicality: transitivity
of
reference.”
>
>> Or, more “simply stated, a pointer
pointing to
> another
>> pointer pointing to some object effectively
enables
> the
>> first pointer to also point to that
object.”
>>
>> Ultimate grounding in the real
> world
>> seems
vital to Deacon for complete and satisfying
>> predication.
>>
>> Being the neuroscientist
that
> he is,
>>
Deacon asks, by way of “transitivity” as he
calls
> it,
>> “How does this interaction between
phases of
> sentence
>> differentiation produce
anything? What sort
of
> signals
>> are being sent in
each direction” from one area
of
> the
>> human brain
to another? To simplify,
what’s
>> happening is “counter-current
information
> processing”
>> that generally proceeds from
“lower” to
> “higher”
>> structures of the brain, and from
back to
front---from
>> limbic, peri-limbic, and peripheral, to
> “specialized”
>> cortical regions; from “posterior
> (attention-sensory)
>> cortical systems” to “anterior
(intention-action)
>> cortical
systems”; i.e., from reptilian brain
>
structures
>> like the thalamus,
hippocampus, and amygdala, to
the
>> advanced cerebral components of
mammalian,
primate,
>
and
>> early hominid ancestry. And,
of equal
importance,
> back
>> again, from “higher” to “lower,” etc.,
as
>> well. These
“counter-current”
>> electro-chemical operations afford
a kind of
> monitoring,
>> provide checks and balances,
generate
> “equilibrium.”
>>
>>
Whether we’re neurologically
>
examining
>> sensory, or motor, or
cognitive, or linguistic
>
operations,
>> they all look pretty
much the same, I interpret.
> They
>> each exhibit similarly
“emergent”
characteristics,
> in
>> terms of
evolutionary origins and current
sequential
>> functioning.
>>
>>
What remains to be dealt with
> is a
>> summary of the complementary
intersections between
> Burke’s
>> dramatism/logology and
Deacon’s semiotics, and
also
> the
>> challenge
Deacon possibly poses to Burke’s
>
action/motion
>> dichotomy.
>>
>> At
a later date.
>>
>> And a P.S. If you object
> to my use
>> of the singular
form of the verb “to be” in
the
> “what
>>
remains” sentence, do read the Fowler-Nicholson
>> “Dictionary of American-English
Usage,” pp.
>> 374-75. Fowler and
Nicholson don’t explain
it
> well,
>> but they
do get it right, unlike billions of
>
publications
>> I’ve read,
including the New York Times.
I’m
> still
>> a
grammarian of a kind at heart, even after the
>> Deacon-struction.
>>
>>
>> Ed
>
>>
>>
>>
--------------------------------------------
>> On Mon, 10/6/14, Edward C Appel
<edwardcappel at frontier.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Subject: Re: [KB]
"Deacon"-structing Burke Part
> Whatever
>> To: kb at kbjournal.org
>> Date: Monday, October 6,
2014,
3:34 PM
>>
>> Burkophiles,
>>
>> I’ve
already said
>> that Terrence W.
Deacon’s
semiotic theory
> partly
>> supports,
>> partly enhances, and partly
challenges Burke’s
>> dramatism/logology, in my
view. Burke
> surely, we would
>> maintain, enhances Deacon, as
well. Before
> I get to
the
>> “challenge”---as the
song
goes, “Don’t
>
know where,
>> don’t know
when”---let me add
to the themes
> of support
>> and enhancement. Here I’ll
be
> referencing, in
>> particular, two of Deacon’s
shorter works, the
>
journal
>> article, “The
Emergent Process
of Thinking as
> Reflected
>> in
>> Language Processing,” and
Deacon’s book
>
chapter,
>> “Beyond the
Symbolic Species,”
The Symbolic
> Species
>> being the title of the
>
anthropologist/neuroscientist’s
>> tome that preceded Incomplete
Nature: How Mind
> Emerged
>> from
>> Matter, about which I previously
bloviated.
>>
>>
>>
I would judge
Deacon’s
> explanatory
>> “god-term”/”rome-term” to
be
> “emergent,” as
>> per
>> the title of the here-featured
treatise.
> The word
>> “emerge” plays a similar
role,
I think, in
>
“Beyond
>> the
>> Symbolic Species.” All
roads seem to lead
> from
>> “emerge”/”emergent” to
the
two sets of
>
dialectical
>> opposites subsumed below:
>>
>> The primary
polar
matchup term
>> “emergent” is pitted against,
is
> “innate,” as
in
>> the
>> pre-processed,
genetically-programmed and
>
“engineered”
>> universal
generative grammar of
Noam Chomsky and
> his
>> epigoni. No evidence of such
a special
> facility can
be
>> found in the human genome
or in
the structures of
> the
>> human
>> brain, which actually look not
that much
> different
from
>> those found in a mouse,
let alone
a
>
chimpanzee. (I’m
>> referencing Incomplete Nature as
well as
>> “Emergent.”)
>> We have here a “process of
coming out,” a
> “rising .
>> .
>> .
out of a surrounding medium,”
even
“an
> effect
>>
produced
>> by a combination of
causes but
unable to be seen
> as the
>> sum
>> of their individual
effects”
(The Shorter OED),
> except
>> through careful, detailed scrutiny
of the natural
>
history
>> and evolution of
living organisms,
pathways of
>> electro-chemical discharge in
the
brain, the
>
very
>> neurology
>> of sensory, motor, thinking, and
linguistic
>
development
>> and
>> outcomes,
>>
animal
communication generally,
>> even the listening and reading, as
well as the
> speaking
>> and
>> writing, of symbolizers like
us---all these
> operations
>> recapitulating the same
sequential
steps.
>
(It’s
>> appropriate here to
note what
Susan Greenfield
> and
>> Christof
>> Koch, both neuroscientists, said
in an exchange
> in
>> Psychology Today:
Electrochemical
discharges in
> the brain
>> can occur within time frames of
1/14th of a
> second.)
>>
>>
From this
dialectical
>> emphasis on “emergent”
rather
than
>
“innate,” there
>> is
derived
the contrasting
concepts of
>> “subject/predicate.”
They assume more
>
independent
>> “roles,” if
not do
“battle” with each
> other,
>> seemingly asymmetrically, in a way
that Chomsky
> would
not
>> likely entertain.
“Subject/predicate”;
>
“noun
>> phrase/verb
phrase”;
“”topic/comment”;
>> “indexical
>> support/predicate frame”;
> “’pointing’”/desired
>>
or
>> undesired result;
“orientation
component”/act
> to
>> accomplish in respect to that
“orientation”;
>> “function,” as in
>
functionary/”argument”;
>> “reference/sense”;
“indexical
> operation/symbolic
>> operation”; “slots” for
“pointing,” or
>> “addresses”/”operation”;
“(embedded)
> bound
>> indexes/symbolic
operation”;
> “disambiguating”
the
>> “indexical”/successful
“symbolic” action
> toward a
>> desired end---these serve as
various expressions
> of
the
>> “process” of
>> “emergence,” left to
>> right, in communication, part
of
which, the
>> “indexical”-founded-on-the-“iconic”
> preliminaries
>> I’ve already spoken of, homo
loquax/dialecticus
>
shares
>> with other living creatures.
>>
>> The major
point
Deacon makes is,
> there
>> is no built-in
genetic-neurological template by
> which the
>> symbolic species gets from subject
to
> predicate. That
>> aptitude, that enabling
juxtaposition, resides
>
not in our
>> biology, nor in
our cultural
conditioning.
> It is a
>>
faculty
>> humans learn in early
childhood
via the bound and
> required
>> “logic” of successful
symbolization.
>> “Disambiguating”
indexicality---i.e.,
>
“:pointing”
>> via gestures
or indexical words to
what it is we
> are
>> symbolically talking about---is a
requirement
> for
>> successful
>> human communication. We must
put those two
>
communicative
>> elements
together somehow to get
what we’re
> after, or
>>
tell
>> others more or less
accurately
what we want them
> to
>> know.
>> Nonsymbolic animals have no
such
indexical
>
problem,
>> because
>> their communication doesn’t get
beyond the
>
“iconic,”
>> the
“:arousal” to
“attention” a
> significant
>> “form” will evoke for
them---and the
> “indexical,”
>> the gestural or
>> vocal “pointing” to
>> that feared or desired object.
> “Symbolization” via
>> predication complicates,
potentially, actually
>>
practically,
>> interrupts,
erects barriers in
succession to
> making clear,
>> what we are talking about, who or
what we have in
> mind,
>> what
>> we want others to “do” in
order for our
> interests to
>> be
>> satisfied.
>>
>>
How human thinking,
sensory and
> motor
>> skills, and language production
get to happen
> involve
>> similar, if not identical,
neural
continuities.
>>
>>
And how all this
>> dovetails so nicely with Burke’s
dramatistic
>
philosophy,
>> yet broaches an
issue Burke may
not have
> adequately dealt
>> with,
remains.
>>
>> Next
>> time.
>>
>>
>>
Ed
>>
>>
>> --------------------------------------------
>> On Tue, 9/16/14, Edward C
Appel
<edwardcappel at frontier.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Subject: [KB] "The
>> Symbol Concept"
>> To: kb at kbjournal.org
>> Date: Tuesday, September 16,
2014,
> 1:08 PM
>>
>>
Burkophiles,
>>
>> Thanks, Bob, for your
>> response on Burke,
>> rhetoric, and
>> “repetition.” I hope to
get back on
>>
>> that one later.
>>
>> I
>> posted a few weeks ago on Terrence
W.
>>
>> Deacon’s book Incomplete Nature:
How Mind
> Emerged from
>> Matter. I said, in effect,
and
> sought to
>> briefly
>>
summarize how,
Deacon’s
>> philosophy of
language part
>> supports,
part
>> enhances, and part
challenges
Burke’s
>>
>> dramatism/logology. Ronald
Soetaert of
> Ghent U.
>> seconded that take on Deacon’s
> relevance to
>> our
>>
enterprise.
>>
>> Since then, I’ve been
> in further
>> dialogue with
Professor Deacon.
> He sent me
>> three of
>> his published articles, then
>> later, a fourth, later still an
>> essay now
>> in press. Two of these
pieces have to do
>>
>> with his
mentor, Gregory Bateson,
whose work I
> referred
>> to
>> in at least
one of my posts as being
> a
>> clear precursor of
>> Deacon’s semiotics.
>> The other of those first
three,
>> an
>> encyclopedia chapter entitled
“The Symbol
> Concept,”
>> I’d like to summarize in this
post
> and maybe
>> one or two
>>
more. The chapter appears in
>> The Oxford Handbook of
>> Language Evolution
>> (Oxford University Press,
2011). If
>>
>> you’re interested, please read
on.
>>
>>
(And as you read, do
> keep in mind
>> that
>>
Incomplete Nature has made a profound
>> impact, judging from
>> multiple reviews
>> easily accessed on the internet.)
>>
>> First, Deacon’s
>
confirmation of
>> Burke,
>> formerly unbeknownst to Deacon,
as I
>> noted: Deacon’s in
>> anthropology and
>> neuroscience, not
communication
and
>>
>> literature, the prime
sources of
Burkean interest
> and
>>
scholarship. From the
> perspective
of
>> Incomplete
>> Nature, I pointed
out how
>> Deacon’s critique
of the
>> commonplace
>> “scientific lens,” maybe
epitomized by
>>
>> behaviorism’s notion of the
human mind, any
>
“mind,”
>> as
>> a “black box” we ought to
> prescind
>> from our motivational
>> calculations, is
>> faulty and inadequate. Input
and
>> output,
>> neural stimulus and response,
reduction of mind
> to
>> biology, then to chemistry, then
to
> physics,
>> are the
>>
requisite foci for useful data and
>> explanation, so much of
>> hard
science, at
>> least, seems to
suggest.
Deacon says
>> no,
>> we have to
factor in, indeed
highlight, a
> necessary
>>
“absential feature”(similar to
>
Burke’s
>> negative) that
>> becomes the basis for human
>> purpose, trial and error---we
>> can genuinely
>> label it all the
>>
aspects of “action,”
>> expressive of a chosen
>> “preference,”
>> that cuts across “spontaneous”
causes
>>
>> in nature and orients persons
toward “work”
>
that
>> limits,
>> organizes, directs
life
>> outcomes.
>>
>>
“The
>> Symbol
Concept” further
>>
underscores the
>> dramatistic
relevance of
Deacon’s
>>
>> thought. Deacon
once again
takes issue with
> regnant
>>
scientific/technological
terminologies
> that
>> confuse what a
>>
“symbol” actually is.
>> A
symbol is not, Deacon
>> claims,
mere
>> “code,”
“sign,”
“icon,” or number,
>> that is, symbols are not mere
pointers
> ,
>> markers, gauges, or
>> portraits of the kind
>> so
often denominated
>>
“symbols.”
>> Actual
“symbols” refer,
abstractly
>> and
>> generally, “irrespective of any
natural
>>
>> affinities.” In other
words, as per
> Burke,
symbols
>> synthesize,
synthetically, disparate
> beings,
>> entities, or
>> events for seemingly
>> pragmatic, culturally-conditioned
>> purposes
>> that transcend mere appearance of
similarity.
>>
Contra Saussure (with the exception
of
> proper
>> nouns),
>>
symbolic reference cannot be
>> “mapped.” To the
>>
extent that a common
>> word or
symbol “maps”
anything, it
>>
>> “maps” a position in a given
lexicon in
> relation
to
>> other
>> terminologies in that
>> symbol system.
>>
>> The
>> airy, diaphanous character of
>> Burke’s
>> equivalent notion of symbolic
action/reference
>> finds peak
expression in his chapter,
> “What
>> Are the Signs
>> of What?---A Theory of
>> Entitlement.” in LASA.
There
>> Burke
>> maintains what he said in the
Grammar about how
>
common
>> symbols refer to
“nothing” in the
> real
>> world, only here
>> he follows up with how
>> “reference” is reversed,
in
terms
>>
of
>> customary suppositions:
“Things
are the signs
> of
>> words,” rather than
vice
> versa. In so
>> “latching
>>
on” to the symbol’s
>> concept, so to speak, tangible
>> entities and
>> “objects” “materialize”
the
>>
>> “spirit” of the symbol,
participate in its
>>
“pageantry” (pp. 361, 379).
>>
>>
But---and
>> here’s where Deacon gets into
>> semiotic
>> and semiological issues foreign to
Burke’s
>>
dramatism, i.e., the
“enhancement”
> I
>>
mentioned---“sign”-age,
>> “signal”-ing,
>>
“code”deciphering,
>> the
whole gamut of concepts
related
>> to
>> computer algorithms and
“encryption,” come to
> bear in
>> undergirding the higher-order
> cognitive
>> process we call
>>
human symbolic
>> communication. Like love and
marriage
>>
>> (for the traditionally
minded,
anyway), you
>
can’t have
>> one
>> without
the other. The symbols
> of
>> human language are
>> fashioned out of sounds
>> and written or printed
characters
>> the roots
>> of which are presymbolic, and
prehuman, for that
>>
matter. Such “iconic” and
>> “indexical” sources
>> of communication
>> are evident in the activites of
nonsymbolic
>>
>> animals, as well as in the
“symbolic actions”
>
of you
>> and
>> me. Thus, add “iconism” and
>> “indexicality” to
>> Deacon’s
>> “absential
feature” and
Bateson’s
>>
>> “difference that makes a
>> difference”
>> (that results from some
pre-ethical sense of
>>
negation, and occasions a form of
>
“trial and
>> error” in
>> the service of a kind of
>> “preference,” a capacity
for
>> which all
>> living things show signs of
possessing and
>>
>> utilizing).
>>
>> In
>> explaining this
“hierarchy”
of
>> notions
>> he uses
in explaining how human
symbolic action
>> works, Deacon borrows from
the
>
philosophy of
>> Charles
Sanders
>> Peirce. Peirce
coined the
>> term
“legisign” to refer
>> to
iconic,
>> indexical, and
symbolic signs in
general.
>>
>> The
locution “sinsign” refers
to a
specific
> instance
>> of
>> an iconic or
lexical sign (there can
> be
>> no such thing,
>> actually, as a “symbolic
>> sinsign,” as will become clear,
>> I hope.
>> “Natural affinities”
characterize
>>
>> sinsigns; not so, anything that
attains the level
> of
>> “symbolic,” based on, as
Burke
and
> Deacon
>> say,
>> arbitrary, conventional,
culturally
>> reflective origins
of
>> reference.) A stick
>> figure drawing on a restroom
door
>> is an
>> iconic legisign. It
“portrays” in
>>
>> general. A picture of a
famous person is an
>
iconic
>> sinsign. It portrays
in
> particular. A
>> smoke
>> alarm
sound is an indexical legisign,
>> as is the position of
>> a needle on a
>> pressure gauge. They
“point” or
>>
>> orient
>>
toward an action in
the
large. A
>> particular smell of
>> smoke is an indexical
>> sinsign. Spoken or written
>> words, in a
>> syntactical context or not, are
symbolic
>>
>> legisigns. The reference is
to “a general
> concept
or
>> type of object.”
>>
>>
Proper names might seem
> to be a
bit
>> like
>> symbolic sinsigns, but they are not.
>> Their reference
>> can be mapped, one-to-one
>> Saussure-like, but “the
>> sign-vehicle is a
>> conventional form.”
Therefore
>>
Peirce
>> would call them
“indexical
legisigns.”
>> “Dolphin signature whistles
are
> indexical
>> sinsigns”
>>
(Deacon, e-mail message,
>> 9/9/14). Symbolic signs of
>> the most
>> abstract or merely potential kind
of reference
>>
Peirce calls “qualisigns.”
>>
>> Symbolic
reference,
>> then, functions
like
>> this: “A written
>> word [for instance] is first
recognized
>>
as
>> an iconic sinsign (an
instance of
a familiar
> form), then
>> an indexical
legisign (a type of sign
> vehicle
>> contiguous
>>
with other related types), and
>> then as a symbolic legisign
>> (a conventional
>> type of sign referring to a
conventional
>>
>> type of reference).
>>
>>
>> Deacon employs the
text
message
> “smiley
>> face” and Aristotle’s take on how
> a
>> “signet ring”
>>
functions in
>> communication
as examples of this
hierarchal
>> progression in the production
of
> meaning for
>> symbol-users,
>>
one of Deacon’s most
>> salient points being: This
>>
“dependency of
>> symbolic
reference on indexical
reference
>>
>> [and
iconic reference]” mirrors
the
dependency
> of human
>> symbolic action/communication on the
>> “genetic,” even
>> “phylogenetic,”
>> capacities for iconic and
indexical
>>
>> communication of a sort in
“living organisms”
>
in
>> general, a theme of
Deacon’s (and
>> Bateson’s)
I
>> emphasized in my
previous
>> posts on Incomplete
Nature.
>>
>> So, for further review
> and/or
>> comment:
>>
>>
What do
>> Deacon’s
semiotic distinctions,
>> and
>> especially unifications, mean
for
Burke’s
>
signature
>> “(Nonsymbolic)
Motion/(Symbolic)
> Action”
>> dichotomy
>> (1978/2003)? Is some sort of
>> modification in order
>> along the lines of
>> Jim Chesebro’s complaint
that
Burke did
>>
>> not pay enough attention
to
nonsymbolic motive s
> (Burke
>> panel at the ECA
Convention, 1992)?
>>
>> Does Deacon’s
>> critique of Chomsky’s
>> Universal
>> Generative
Grammar as the innate
>
“constraint”
>> on
syntactical linguistic
> relationships
in
>> human
>> communication, in favor instead of
>> “indexical”
>> constraints, tend to
>> support Burke’s notion of the
>> negative as
>> “the engine of intentionality”
and the very
>>
dawn of human symbolism
>
(1952/1953/1966)?
>>
>> Maybe something on
>> those issues later.
>>
>>
>> Ed
>>
>> ”
>>
>
>>
>>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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>> http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
>>
>>
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>>
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