[KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever

[Edward C Appel]

Greg,

Thanks for the link.  I'll give the interview a listen and get back.

Two things:

First, Deacon is not one of the plagiarizers of Burke's thought.  He has told me he knows nothing about Burke, and I believe him.  Deacon is, after all, in two fields not noted for Burkean connections, anthropology and neuroscience.  I've been forwarding to Deacon my kb posts.  After the most recent one, he got back to me with near assurance he wants to start reading Burke.  It's actually more confirming, I believe, that these similaries in theory, philosophy, and conclusions from research appear independently---especially from a significant source in a hard science.

Second, as I read it, the connection Burke makes between Hitler's fascistic rants and religion in "Hitler's 'Battle'" is offered to the detriment of Hitler, not religion.  Burke calls what Hitler has done a "bastardization" of religious rhetoric, meaning, in Burke's typically elliptical way, an illigitimate use of the motive of perfection, a taking-to-the-end-of-the-line his depiction of this arbitrary and quite earth-bound, untranscendent scapegoat, whose demise will supposedly '' +"cure" the ills of the German people.

This harks back to what Burke says in ATH about "heroic," tragic-frame rhetoric approaching "coxcombry" when employed for nonreligious reasons.  God and the devil are "perfected" conceptions, or can be so idealized.

Now, this does not mean given expressions of religion, like Islam today in various formulations---in terms of its fanatical quest to make its earthly environment confirm exactly to its extreme, and one can say I think, socially and historically backward standards---are not facistic.  Nor is it to say that fundamentalist religion of any kind, even when thoroughly transcendentalized, isn't to be "discounted" for language as a source of conceptual excess.  "Perfection" of whatever variety, when grimly pursued in respect to the here-and-now or the graat beyond, is to be taken  with salt and viewed with suspicion, Burke surely hints at, if not in each case clearly proclaims.

Religion in general is not the customary "enemy" in Burke's writings.  More frequently, it's the immanent expressions of that "theological" motive in the "quest for empire" in this world that earns Burke's strongest disdain.

That's my sermon for today.  As the Stage Manager isn Our Town said, "Twan't much."




Ed

              
--------------------------------------------
On Mon, 10/27/14, Gregory Desilet <info at gregorydesilet.com> wrote:

 Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part Whatever
 To: "Ed Appel" <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
 Cc: kb at kbjournal.org
 Date: Monday, October 27, 2014, 3:08 PM
 
 You make a good case, Ed, for
 Deacon’s debt to Burke. Hopefully he will eventually have
 something more to say about that. 
 
 Speaking of unacknowledged “debt” to Burke, I came
 across a YouTube video recently in which Hamed Abdel Samad
 is interviewed. It seems he wrote a controversial book on
 what he calls “Islamism.” In the interview he explains
 the connection he makes between religion and fascism—a
 connection Burke also makes in his 1938 review of Hitler’s
 Mein Kampf. Exploring this connection is indeed
 controversial but Samad makes an interesting case of it.
 And, Ed, in doing so, he seems to follow certain aspects of
 our line of argument about conflict management in our
 Rhetoric of the Enemy article. Here is a link to the video:
 
 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jCfp48c31u0
 
 Greg
 
 
 On Oct 21, 2014, at 3:36 PM, Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
 wrote:
 
 > Burkophiles,
 > 
 >     I want to summarize what I see as
 fifteen or so points of intersection between Burke’s
 dramatism/logology and Terrence W. Deacon’s semiotic
 theory.  I do so in no particular order.  I’m
 basing my assessments on Deacon’s most recent book,
 Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter, and three
 of his academic articles or book chapters: “The Symbol
 Concept,” “The Emergent Process of Thinking as Reflected
 in Language Processing,” and “Beyond the Symbolic
 Species.”  Seven times so far, I’ve posted here on
 Deacon at some length.  I’ll make reference to the
 dates of those postings, or a few of them, where you might
 find further treatment, when appropriate.
 > 
 > 1.    Deacon’s notion of an
 “absential feature” in human symbolic action, as 
 > well as in whatever we want to call the nonsymbolic
 activity of the “lower animals,” echoes Burke’s
 primary emphasis on the “negative” as author and
 motivator of the human drama.  This “absential
 feature,” as extant in the “Creatura,” but not in the
 “Pleroma” (Deacon here borrows language from the ancient
 Gnostics by way of his mentor Gregory Bateson), is the
 elephant in the living room scientistic theorists
 recurrently ignore in their efforts to reduce anthropology
 to biology, biology to chemistry, chemistry to physics.
 8/7/14.
 > 
 > 2.    From this absential feature at the
 core of the “entelechy” that 
 > characterizes beings in the Creatura (yes, Deacon
 references Aristotle and the Four Causes), a list of
 ancillary features built around “purpose” and reflective
 of Burke’s pentad emerges.  See Deacon’s analogous
 idea of “teleodynamics.”  8/7/14, 8/9/14.
 > 
 > 3.     Deacon, like Burke,
 claims that action, so to speak, cannot be reduced 
 > to motion, phrasing the concept somewhat differently
 from Burke.  For Deacon, it’s the absential feature
 itself that eludes the scientistic rationale.  “There
 are no components to what is absent,” he emphasizes.
 8/7/14.
 > 
 > 4.    Deacon’s definition of what a
 symbol is and is not appears to mirror 
 > well enough Burke’s conception.  I say seems to
 mirror “well enough” because Burke does not as carefully
 exclude, or even much refer to, mathematical, signal- or
 code-like, computational-type “symbols.”  Deacon
 argues convincingly that math-type “symbols” do not
 possess the airy abstractiveness, web-like relatedness to
 and embeddedness in, a whole lexicon of terms none of which
 can be “mapped” in relation to objects in the real
 world, a “system-internal web of relationships”
 requiring “an associated indexical operation  . . .
 in order to point outside this system.”  Neither
 Melia’s book chapter “Scientism and Dramatism: Some
 Quasi-Mathematical Motifs in the Work of Kenneth Burke”
 (The Legacy of Kenneth Burke), nor Burke’s references to
 the “statistical” in PLF, seem to undercut this claim.
 > 
 >     To put the matter simply: In the
 lingo of dramatism, numerals in themselves do not exude
 “drama” (make exception for the indirect, the
 derivative), whereas the words, phrases, and sentences of
 the world’s conventional, arbitrary languages do. 
 That’s the implicit lesson Deacon’s semiotics would tend
 to highlight. 9/16/14.
 > 
 > 5.    Deacon’s conception of the
 origins of language sounds a lot like Burke’s 
 > speculations in those QJS articles (1952/1953),
 reprinted in LASA (pp. 419-79).  Deacon speaks of “an
 undifferentiated starting condition.”  “We must
 ask: What’s the form of a thought”---or “the idea that
 a sentence conveys”---“before it is put into words,”
 the “’mental images’ not quite formed or desires and
 intentions to achieve some imagined goal only vaguely
 formulated?”  These “embryos of a speech act”
 would be “focused on aiming for and achieving expressive
 goals.
 > ”
 >     For Burke, those “expressive
 goals”---“connotative,” “suggestive,”
 “loaded,” “fraught . . . with significance”; I’m
 deep into Roget’s here---might stem from a
 “’pre-negative’ . . . tonal gesture,” “calling
 attention-to “ “danger” with “sound[s] . . .
 hav[ing] a deterrent or pejorative meaning” (LASA, pp.
 423-24).  Deacon’s “lexicality,” a pre-linguistic
 “pointing to” would serve as basis for this transition
 into morally-tinged negation of the kind that
 “dramatically” invests the danger or opportunity in
 question with quasi-theological import.  The negative
 as “engine of intentionality” with its now-infinite
 vistas (indeed, now “rotten with perfection”), would
 begin to indict as well as beckon, accuse as well as
 highlight, come upon its denizens with an aura of spiritual
 hazard, as well as material consequence. 9/16/14.
 > 
 >     Deacon does refine his description
 of this likely lengthy transition with: “I see this
 particular near universal [the “oral-vocal”] to be a
 relatively late emerging biological adaptation for symbolic
 communication.”  The “gestural embodiment”
 probably came first, since our primate ancestors were not
 good at vocality.  The vocal came to predominate
 because of its greater potential for myriad “sign
 vehicles.”
 > 
 > 6.    Which brings us to Burke’s
 hexadic acknowledgement of “attititude” as 
 > an ingredient in the symbolic mix, language primarily
 expressing an attitude, creating an orientation toward
 certain pathways of action, giving cues to action and a
 command to follow those cues.  For Deacon, that
 attitudinal, “expressive” dimension is denominated a
 “mood.”  In respect to symbolic origins, “Within
 this frame of social communicative arousal,” he maintains,
 “what might be described as the ‘mood’ of the speech
 or interpretive act is differentiated.”  “This
 ‘mood’ needs to be maintained.”  It’s “a
 focused readiness and expectation with respect to social
 interaction.”
 > 
 > 7.     Burke famously defines
 humans as the “symbol-using animal.” 
 > Deacon’s “symbolic species” functions as a
 virtual synonym.  “In my work,” Deacon says, “I
 use the phrase symbolic species, quite literally, to argue
 that symbols have literally changed the kind of biological
 organism we are.”
 > 
 >     “Indeed, there is ample evidence
 to suggest that language is both well-integrated into almost
 every aspect of our cognitive and social lives, that it
 utilizes a significant fraction of the forebrain, and is
 acquired robustly under even quite difficult social
 circumstances and neurological impairment.  It is far
 from fragile.”
 > 
 >     “So rather than merely intelligent
 or wise (sapient) creatures, we are creatures whose social
 and mental capacities have been quite literally shaped by
 the special demands of communicating with symbols.  And
 this doesn’t just mean that we are adapted for language
 use, but also for all the many ancillary mental biases that
 support reliable access and use of this social resource.”
 > 
 >     This defining human trait or
 attribute gets locked in globally via “the near universal
 regularities of human language.”
 > 
 > 8.    “Drama”---or, to put it more
 logologically, “theological drama”---as 
 > master “screen,” through which even the
 “positives of nature are seen through the eyes of moral
 negativity”?  Howabout Deacon’s approximation:
 “We are ‘symbolic savants,’ unable to suppress the
 many predispositions evolved to aid in symbol acquisition,
 use, and transmission . . . . We almost certainly have
 evolved a predisposition to see things as symbols, whether
 they are or not.”  E.g., “the make-believe of
 children,”  “find[ing] meaning in coincidental
 events,” seeing “faces in the clouds,” “run[ning]
 our lives with respect to dictates presumed to originate
 from an invisible spiritual world.”  “Our special
 adaptation is the lens through which we see the world. 
 With it comes an irrepressible predisposition to seek for a
 cryptic meaning hiding beneath the surface of
 appearances.”
 > 
 >     An approximation?  Sounds more
 like a paraphrase.  Always take note of “our special
 adaptation” and factor it into our interpretations of
 “reality.”
 > 
 >     More later, I hope, by way of
 additional intersections between Burke and Deacon.
 > 
 > 
 >     Ed
 > 
 > 
 > 
 > 
 > --------------------------------------------
 > On Thu, 10/9/14, Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
 wrote:
 > 
 > Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part
 Whatever
 > To: kb at kbjournal.org
 > Date: Thursday, October 9, 2014, 5:05 PM
 > 
 > Burkophiles,
 > 
 >     Let me reiterate, clarify,
 emphasize:
 > It’s the dyadic grammatical pairing of subject and
 > predicate that Deacon says is not “innate” in the
 human
 > mind and human discourse, as in Chomsky’s universal
 > generative conception, not the “symbolic” faculty
 > itself.  No evolutionary, genomic, or
 neurological
 > evidence exists for Chomsky’s view.  It’s
 mostly
 > implicit in these shorter works by Deacon, but
 strongly
 > implicit, that symbolization itself does come naturally
 to
 > the Symbolic Species.  That is, you’ll recall,
 the
 > title of his earlier book.
 > 
 >     You may wonder, too, at the
 claim that
 > children pick up on their own a facility for indexical
 and
 > combinatorial modes of symbolic reference, rather than
 learn
 > that culminative syntax from the structures of the
 > conventional language into which they’re socialized.
 
 > The fact is, Deacon asserts, “The infant already
 > ‘knows’ the logic of these ‘rules’ of
 > indexicality,” which bring noun subject and verbal
 > predicate together.  Those necessary regularities
 are
 > well absorbed the first year and a half by way of
 experience
 > itself.
 >    
 >     Also, as he or she reads him, a
 Burkean
 > might be taken aback by Deacon’s occasional reference
 to
 > the “predicate frame” (the “comment” on the
 > “subject” or “topic” that requires the careful
 > “indexing”) as the “symbolic” part of a
 > “complete” sentence or iteration.  This does
 not
 > mean, for Deacon, that the noun subject and object, or
 > referential parts, of the fully-formed utterance
 hasn’t
 > been symbolically transformed by the symbolizing
 > species.  Even proper names, which, unlike common
 > nouns, can be indexically “mapped” a la Saussure,
 are
 > still embedded a culturally conventional,
 artifactualized
 > linguistic system.  What Deacon seems to be
 suggesting
 > here is that distinctive symbolization “emerges”
 from
 > nonsymbolic indexicality—the “pointing” gestures
 and
 > vocalizations of lower animals that indicate some
 recognized
 > “icon” that poses danger, potentially satisfies
 > appetite, requires territorial markings or
 >  signals of aggression or subservience,
 etc.---distinctive
 > symbolization emerges especially via an
 “expressive,”
 > “mood”-generating, “sense”-making, meaningful,
 > ultimately abstractive vocalization that characterizes
 how
 > to conceive of, proceed toward, exploit, or retreat
 from the
 > object or being so referenced.  As Burke has
 said,
 > “The true locus of assertion is not in the DISEASE,
 but in
 > the STRUCTURAL POWERS by which the poet encompasses
 it”
 > (PLF, p. 18, emphasis not added), a redemptive
 > “act”-centered predication.
 > 
 >     So, there seems to be an
 underlay of the
 > presymbolic in the indexical not so present in the
 > nonindexical.
 > 
 >     Constraining indexicality
 Deacon
 > anatomizes into four aspects, only one of which I’ll
 > mention here, the most basic, what he calls
 “semiotic
 > constraints.”  These manifest themselves in
 > “predication constraints (symbols must be bound in
 order
 > to refer)”; “transitivity and embedding
 constraints
 > (indexicality depends on immediate correlation and
 > contiguity across the transitive)”; and
 “quantification
 > (symbolized indices need re-specification).
 > ” 
 >     In elaboration, Deacon says,
 “To state
 > this hypothesis in semiotic terms: a symbol must be
 > contiguous with the index that grounds its reference
 (either
 > to the world or to the immediate agreeing textual
 context,
 > which is otherwise grounded), or else its reference
 > fails.  Contiguity thus has a doubly indexical
 role to
 > play.  Its contiguity (textually or pragmatically)
 with
 > the symbolizing sign vehicle [see paragraph 3 above]
 points
 > to this symbol, and their contiguity in turn points to
 > something else.  This is an expression of one
 further
 > feature of indexicality: transitivity of reference.”
 
 > Or, more “simply stated, a pointer pointing to
 another
 > pointer pointing to some object effectively enables
 the
 > first pointer to also point to that object.”
 > 
 >     Ultimate grounding in the real
 world
 > seems vital to Deacon for complete and satisfying
 > predication.
 >    
 >     Being the neuroscientist that
 he is,
 > Deacon asks, by way of “transitivity” as he calls
 it,
 > “How does this interaction between phases of
 sentence
 > differentiation produce anything?  What sort of
 signals
 > are being sent in each direction” from one area of
 the
 > human brain to another?  To simplify, what’s
 > happening is “counter-current information
 processing”
 > that generally proceeds from “lower” to
 “higher”
 > structures of the brain, and from back to front---from
 > limbic, peri-limbic, and peripheral, to
 “specialized”
 > cortical regions; from “posterior
 (attention-sensory)
 > cortical systems” to “anterior (intention-action)
 > cortical systems”; i.e., from reptilian brain
 structures
 > like the thalamus, hippocampus, and amygdala, to the
 > advanced cerebral components of mammalian, primate,
 and
 > early hominid ancestry.  And, of equal importance,
 back
 > again, from “higher” to “lower,” etc., as
 > well.  These “counter-current”
 >  electro-chemical operations afford a kind of
 monitoring,
 > provide checks and balances, generate
 “equilibrium.”
 > 
 >     Whether we’re neurologically
 examining
 > sensory, or motor, or cognitive, or linguistic
 operations,
 > they all look pretty much the same, I interpret. 
 They
 > each exhibit similarly “emergent” characteristics,
 in
 > terms of evolutionary origins and current sequential
 > functioning.
 > 
 >     What remains to be dealt with
 is a
 > summary of the complementary intersections between
 Burke’s
 > dramatism/logology and Deacon’s semiotics, and also
 the
 > challenge Deacon possibly poses to Burke’s
 action/motion
 > dichotomy.
 > 
 >     At a later date.
 > 
 >     And a P.S.  If you object
 to my use
 > of the singular form of the verb “to be” in the
 “what
 > remains” sentence, do read the Fowler-Nicholson
 > “Dictionary of American-English Usage,” pp.
 > 374-75.  Fowler and Nicholson don’t explain it
 well,
 > but they do get it right, unlike billions of
 publications
 > I’ve read, including the New York Times.  I’m
 still
 > a grammarian of a kind at heart, even after the
 > Deacon-struction.
 > 
 > 
 >     Ed     
    
 >          
 > 
 > --------------------------------------------
 > On Mon, 10/6/14, Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
 > wrote:
 > 
 >  Subject: Re: [KB] "Deacon"-structing Burke Part
 Whatever
 >  To: kb at kbjournal.org
 >  Date: Monday, October 6, 2014, 3:34 PM
 > 
 >  Burkophiles,
 > 
 >      I’ve already said
 >  that Terrence W. Deacon’s semiotic theory
 partly
 > supports,
 >  partly enhances, and partly challenges Burke’s
 >  dramatism/logology, in my view.  Burke
 surely, we would
 >  maintain, enhances Deacon, as well.  Before
 I get to the
 >  “challenge”---as the song goes, “Don’t
 know where,
 >  don’t know when”---let me add to the themes
 of support
 >  and enhancement.  Here I’ll be
 referencing, in
 >  particular, two of Deacon’s shorter works, the
 journal
 >  article, “The Emergent Process of Thinking as
 Reflected
 > in
 >  Language Processing,” and Deacon’s book 
 chapter,
 >  “Beyond the Symbolic Species,” The Symbolic
 Species
 >  being the title of the
 anthropologist/neuroscientist’s
 >  tome that preceded Incomplete Nature: How Mind
 Emerged
 > from
 >  Matter, about which I previously bloviated.
 > 
 > 
 >      I would judge Deacon’s
 explanatory
 >  “god-term”/”rome-term” to be
 “emergent,” as
 > per
 >  the title of the here-featured treatise. 
 The word
 >  “emerge” plays a similar role, I think, in
 “Beyond
 > the
 >  Symbolic Species.”  All roads seem to lead
 from
 >  “emerge”/”emergent” to the two sets of
 dialectical
 >  opposites subsumed below:
 > 
 >      The primary polar matchup term
 >  “emergent” is pitted against, is
 “innate,” as in
 > the
 >  pre-processed, genetically-programmed and
 “engineered”
 >  universal generative grammar of Noam Chomsky and
 his
 >  epigoni.  No evidence of such a special
 facility can be
 >  found in the human genome or in the structures of
 the
 > human
 >  brain, which actually look not that much
 different from
 >  those found in a mouse, let alone a
 chimpanzee.  (I’m
 >  referencing Incomplete Nature as well as
 > “Emergent.”) 
 >  We have here a “process of coming out,” a
 “rising .
 > .
 >  . out of a surrounding medium,” even “an
 effect
 > produced
 >  by a combination of causes but unable to be seen
 as the
 > sum
 >  of their individual effects” (The Shorter OED),
 except
 >  through careful, detailed scrutiny of the natural
 history
 >  and evolution of living organisms, pathways of
 >  electro-chemical discharge in the brain, the
 very
 > neurology
 >  of sensory, motor, thinking, and linguistic
 development
 > and
 >  outcomes,
 >   animal communication generally,
 >  even the listening and reading, as well as the
 speaking
 > and
 >  writing, of symbolizers like us---all these
 operations
 >  recapitulating the same sequential steps. 
 (It’s
 >  appropriate here to note what Susan Greenfield
 and
 > Christof
 >  Koch, both neuroscientists, said in an exchange
 in
 >  Psychology Today: Electrochemical discharges in
 the brain
 >  can occur within time frames of 1/14th of a
 second.)
 > 
 >      From this dialectical
 >  emphasis on “emergent” rather than
 “innate,” there
 >  is derived the contrasting concepts of
 >  “subject/predicate.”  They assume more
 independent
 >  “roles,” if not do “battle” with each
 other,
 >  seemingly asymmetrically, in a way that Chomsky
 would not
 >  likely entertain.  “Subject/predicate”;
 “noun
 >  phrase/verb phrase”; “”topic/comment”;
 > “indexical
 >  support/predicate frame”;
 “’pointing’”/desired
 > or
 >  undesired result; “orientation component”/act
 to
 >  accomplish in respect to that “orientation”;
 >  “function,” as in
 functionary/”argument”;
 >  “reference/sense”; “indexical
 operation/symbolic
 >  operation”; “slots” for “pointing,” or
 >  “addresses”/”operation”; “(embedded)
 bound
 >  indexes/symbolic operation”;
 “disambiguating” the
 >  “indexical”/successful “symbolic” action
 toward a
 >  desired end---these serve as various expressions
 of the
 >  “process” of
 >   “emergence,” left to
 >  right, in communication, part of which, the
 >  “indexical”-founded-on-the-“iconic”
 preliminaries
 >  I’ve already spoken of, homo loquax/dialecticus
 shares
 >  with other living creatures.
 > 
 >      The major point Deacon makes is,
 there
 >  is no built-in genetic-neurological template by
 which the
 >  symbolic species gets from subject to
 predicate.  That
 >  aptitude, that enabling juxtaposition, resides
 not in our
 >  biology, nor in our cultural conditioning. 
 It is a
 > faculty
 >  humans learn in early childhood via the bound and
 required
 >  “logic” of successful symbolization. 
 >  “Disambiguating” indexicality---i.e.,
 “:pointing”
 >  via gestures or indexical words to what it is we
 are
 >  symbolically talking about---is a requirement
 for
 > successful
 >  human communication.  We must put those two
 communicative
 >  elements together somehow to get what we’re
 after, or
 > tell
 >  others more or less accurately what we want them
 to
 > know. 
 >  Nonsymbolic animals have no such indexical
 problem,
 > because
 >  their communication doesn’t get beyond the
 “iconic,”
 >  the “:arousal” to “attention” a
 significant
 >  “form” will evoke for them---and the
 “indexical,”
 >  the gestural or
 >   vocal “pointing” to
 >  that feared or desired object. 
 “Symbolization” via
 >  predication complicates, potentially, actually
 > practically,
 >  interrupts, erects barriers in succession to
 making clear,
 >  what we are talking about, who or what we have in
 mind,
 > what
 >  we want others to “do” in order for our
 interests to
 > be
 >  satisfied.
 >              
 >      How human thinking, sensory and
 motor
 >  skills, and language production get to happen
 involve
 >  similar, if not identical, neural continuities.
 > 
 >      And how all this
 >  dovetails so nicely with Burke’s dramatistic
 philosophy,
 >  yet broaches an issue Burke may not have
 adequately dealt
 >  with, remains.
 >   
 >      Next
 >  time.
 > 
 > 
 >      Ed  
 > 
 > 
 >  --------------------------------------------
 >  On Tue, 9/16/14, Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
 >  wrote:
 > 
 >   Subject: [KB] "The
 >  Symbol Concept"
 >   To: kb at kbjournal.org
 >   Date: Tuesday, September 16, 2014,
 1:08 PM
 >   
 >   Burkophiles,
 >   
 >       Thanks, Bob, for your
 >  response on Burke,
 >   rhetoric, and
 >  “repetition.”  I hope to get back on
 > 
 >  that one later.
 >   
 >       I
 >  posted a few weeks ago on Terrence W.
 > 
 >  Deacon’s book Incomplete Nature: How Mind
 Emerged from
 >   Matter.  I said, in effect, and
 sought to
 >  briefly
 >   summarize how, Deacon’s
 >  philosophy of language part
 >   supports, part
 >  enhances, and part challenges Burke’s
 > 
 >  dramatism/logology.  Ronald Soetaert of
 Ghent U.
 >   seconded that take on Deacon’s
 relevance to
 >  our
 >   enterprise.
 >   
 >       Since then, I’ve been
 in further
 >   dialogue with Professor Deacon. 
 He sent me
 >  three of
 >   his published articles, then
 >  later, a fourth, later still an
 >   essay now
 >  in press.  Two of these pieces have to do
 > 
 >  with his mentor, Gregory Bateson, whose work I
 referred
 >  to
 >   in at least one of my posts as being
 a
 >  clear precursor of
 >   Deacon’s semiotics. 
 >  The other of those first three,
 >   an
 >  encyclopedia chapter entitled “The Symbol
 Concept,”
 >   I’d like to summarize in this post
 and maybe
 >  one or two
 >   more.  The chapter appears in
 >  The Oxford Handbook of
 >   Language Evolution
 >  (Oxford University Press, 2011).  If
 > 
 >  you’re interested, please read on.
 >   
 >       (And as you read, do
 keep in mind
 >  that
 >   Incomplete Nature has made a profound
 >  impact, judging from
 >   multiple reviews
 >  easily accessed on the internet.)
 >      
 >       First, Deacon’s
 confirmation of
 >  Burke,
 >   formerly unbeknownst to Deacon, as I
 >  noted: Deacon’s in
 >   anthropology and
 >  neuroscience, not communication and
 > 
 >  literature, the prime sources of Burkean interest
 and
 >   scholarship.  From the
 perspective of
 >  Incomplete
 >   Nature, I pointed out how
 >  Deacon’s critique of the
 >   commonplace
 >  “scientific lens,” maybe epitomized by
 > 
 >  behaviorism’s notion of the human mind, any
 “mind,”
 >  as
 >   a “black box” we ought to
 prescind
 >  from our motivational
 >   calculations, is
 >  faulty and inadequate.  Input and
 >   output,
 >  neural stimulus and response, reduction of mind
 to
 >   biology, then to chemistry, then to
 physics,
 >  are the
 >   requisite foci for useful data and
 >  explanation, so much of
 >   hard science, at
 >  least, seems to suggest.  Deacon says
 >   no,
 >  we have to factor in, indeed highlight, a
 necessary
 >   “absential feature”(similar to
 Burke’s
 >  negative) that
 >   becomes the basis for human
 >  purpose, trial and error---we
 >   can genuinely
 >  label it all the
 >    aspects of “action,”
 >  expressive of a chosen
 >   “preference,”
 >  that cuts across “spontaneous” causes
 > 
 >  in nature and orients persons toward “work”
 that
 >  limits,
 >   organizes, directs life
 >  outcomes.
 >   
 >       “The
 >  Symbol Concept” further
 >   underscores the
 >  dramatistic relevance of Deacon’s
 > 
 >  thought.  Deacon once again takes issue with
 regnant
 >   scientific/technological terminologies
 that
 >  confuse what a
 >   “symbol” actually is. 
 >  A symbol is not, Deacon
 >   claims, mere
 >  “code,” “sign,” “icon,” or number,
 >   that is, symbols are not mere pointers
 ,
 >  markers, gauges, or
 >   portraits of the kind
 >  so often denominated
 >   “symbols.” 
 >  Actual “symbols” refer, abstractly
 >   and
 >  generally, “irrespective of any natural
 > 
 >  affinities.”  In other words, as per
 Burke, symbols
 >   synthesize, synthetically, disparate
 beings,
 >  entities, or
 >   events for seemingly
 >  pragmatic, culturally-conditioned
 >   purposes
 >  that transcend mere appearance of similarity. 
 >   Contra Saussure (with the exception of
 proper
 >  nouns),
 >   symbolic reference cannot be
 >  “mapped.”  To the
 >   extent that a common
 >  word or symbol “maps” anything, it
 > 
 >  “maps” a position in a given lexicon in
 relation to
 >   other
 >    terminologies in that
 >  symbol system.
 >   
 >       The
 >  airy, diaphanous character of
 >   Burke’s
 >  equivalent notion of symbolic action/reference
 >   finds peak expression in his chapter,
 “What
 >  Are the Signs
 >   of What?---A Theory of
 >  Entitlement.” in LASA.  There
 >   Burke
 >  maintains what he said in the Grammar about how
 common
 >   symbols refer to “nothing” in the
 real
 >  world, only here
 >   he follows up with how
 >  “reference” is reversed, in terms
 >   of
 >  customary suppositions: “Things are the signs
 of
 >   words,” rather than vice
 versa.  In so
 >  “latching
 >   on” to the symbol’s
 >  concept, so to speak, tangible
 >   entities and
 >  “objects” “materialize” the
 > 
 >  “spirit” of the symbol, participate in its
 >   “pageantry” (pp. 361, 379).
 >       
 >       But---and
 >  here’s where Deacon gets into
 >   semiotic
 >  and semiological issues foreign to Burke’s
 >   dramatism, i.e., the “enhancement”
 I
 >   mentioned---“sign”-age,
 >  “signal”-ing,
 >   “code”deciphering,
 >  the whole gamut of concepts related
 >   to
 >  computer algorithms and “encryption,” come to
 bear in
 >   undergirding the higher-order
 cognitive
 >  process we call
 >   human symbolic
 >  communication.  Like love and marriage
 > 
 >  (for the traditionally minded, anyway), you
 can’t have
 >  one
 >   without the other.  The symbols
 of
 >  human language are
 >   fashioned out of sounds
 >  and written or printed characters
 >   the roots
 >  of which are presymbolic, and prehuman, for that
 >   matter.  Such “iconic” and
 >  “indexical” sources
 >   of communication
 >  are evident in the activites of nonsymbolic
 > 
 >  animals, as well as in the “symbolic actions”
 of you
 >  and
 >   me.  Thus, add “iconism” and
 >  “indexicality” to
 >   Deacon’s
 >  “absential feature” and Bateson’s
 > 
 >  “difference that makes a
 >    difference”
 >  (that results from some pre-ethical sense of
 >   negation, and occasions a form of
 “trial and
 >  error” in
 >   the service of a kind of
 >  “preference,” a capacity for
 >   which all
 >  living things show signs of possessing and
 > 
 >  utilizing).
 >   
 >       In
 >  explaining this “hierarchy” of
 >   notions
 >  he uses in explaining how human symbolic action
 >   works, Deacon borrows from the
 philosophy of
 >  Charles Sanders
 >   Peirce.  Peirce coined the
 >  term “legisign” to refer
 >   to iconic,
 >  indexical, and symbolic signs in general. 
 > 
 >  The locution “sinsign” refers to a specific
 instance
 >  of
 >   an iconic or lexical sign (there can
 be
 >  no such thing,
 >   actually, as a “symbolic
 >  sinsign,” as will become clear,
 >   I hope. 
 >  “Natural affinities” characterize
 > 
 >  sinsigns; not so, anything that attains the level
 of
 >   “symbolic,” based on, as Burke and
 Deacon
 >  say,
 >   arbitrary, conventional, culturally
 >  reflective origins of
 >   reference.)  A stick
 >  figure drawing on a restroom door
 >   is an
 >  iconic legisign.  It “portrays” in
 > 
 >  general.  A picture of a famous person is an
 iconic
 >   sinsign.  It portrays in
 particular.  A
 >  smoke
 >   alarm sound is an indexical legisign,
 >  as is the position of
 >   a needle on a
 >  pressure gauge.  They “point” or
 > 
 >  orient
 >    toward an action in the large.  A
 >  particular smell of
 >   smoke is an indexical
 >  sinsign.  Spoken or written
 >   words, in a
 >  syntactical context or not, are symbolic
 > 
 >  legisigns.  The reference is to “a general
 concept or
 >   type of object.”
 >   
 >       Proper names might seem
 to be a bit
 >  like
 >   symbolic sinsigns, but they are not. 
 >  Their reference
 >   can be mapped, one-to-one
 >  Saussure-like, but “the
 >   sign-vehicle is a
 >  conventional form.”  Therefore
 >   Peirce
 >  would call them “indexical legisigns.” 
 >   “Dolphin signature whistles are
 indexical
 >  sinsigns”
 >   (Deacon, e-mail message,
 >  9/9/14).  Symbolic signs of
 >   the most
 >  abstract or merely potential kind of reference
 >   Peirce calls “qualisigns.”
 >   
 >       Symbolic reference,
 >  then, functions like
 >   this: “A written
 >  word [for instance] is first recognized
 >   as
 >  an iconic sinsign (an instance of a familiar
 form), then
 >   an indexical legisign (a type of sign
 vehicle
 >  contiguous
 >   with other related types), and
 >  then as a symbolic legisign
 >   (a conventional
 >  type of sign referring to a conventional
 > 
 >  type of reference).
 >   
 > 
 >      Deacon employs the text message
 “smiley
 >   face” and Aristotle’s take on how
 a
 >  “signet ring”
 >   functions in
 >  communication as examples of this hierarchal
 >   progression in the production of
 meaning for
 >  symbol-users,
 >   one of Deacon’s most
 >  salient points being: This
 >   “dependency of
 >  symbolic reference on indexical reference
 > 
 >  [and iconic reference]” mirrors the dependency
 of human
 >   symbolic action/communication on the
 >  “genetic,” even
 >   “phylogenetic,”
 >  capacities for iconic and indexical
 > 
 >  communication of a sort in “living organisms”
 in
 >   general, a theme of Deacon’s (and
 >  Bateson’s) I
 >   emphasized in my previous
 >  posts on Incomplete Nature.
 >   
 >       So, for further review
 and/or
 >  comment:
 >   
 >       What do
 >  Deacon’s semiotic distinctions,
 >   and
 >  especially unifications, mean for Burke’s
 signature
 >   “(Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic)
 Action”
 >  dichotomy 
 >   (1978/2003)?  Is some sort of
 >  modification in order
 >   along the lines of
 >  Jim Chesebro’s complaint that Burke did
 > 
 >  not pay enough attention to nonsymbolic motive s
 (Burke
 >   panel at the ECA Convention, 1992)?
 >   
 >       Does Deacon’s
 >  critique of Chomsky’s
 >   Universal
 >  Generative Grammar as the innate
 “constraint”
 >   on syntactical linguistic
 relationships in
 >  human
 >   communication, in favor instead of
 >  “indexical”
 >   constraints, tend to
 >  support Burke’s notion of the
 >   negative as
 >  “the engine of intentionality” and the very
 >   dawn of human symbolism
 (1952/1953/1966)?
 >    
 >       Maybe something on
 >  those issues later.
 >   
 >   
 >       Ed
 >       
 >   ”
 >               
 
 >   
 >           
    
 >   
 >   
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