[KB] Deacon's Neo-Aristotelian Complication of Simple Action/Motion
Payne, David
dpayne at usf.edu
Thu Aug 14 15:36:13 EDT 2014
On this general topic, I took note of this review of the re-release of Jared Diamond's The Third Chimpanzee a few months ago:
>From the perspective of genetics, we are clearly the third species of chimpanzee. Our DNA is only 1.6 percent different from that of either chimps or pygmy chimpanzees (today more commonly called bonobos). "The reason why you and I are talking, and we're not locked up in cages—whereas chimpanzees are not talking, and are locked up in cages—all that lies in 2 percent of our DNA," explained Diamond on Inquiring Minds.
In fact, as Diamond emphasizes in his book, we are more genetically similar to chimps than many other closely related species are to one another. Gorillas and chimps, for instance, are 2.3 percent different, which means that chimps are considerably closer to us than to their other nearest primate relatives. Or, consider two very closely related songbird species: the red-eyed and white-eyed vireo. They are 2.9 percent different, notes Diamond.
So what makes humans so seemingly special? Until pretty recently, we weren't. All the way up to 80,000 years ago, we were just "glorified chimpanzees," in Diamond's words. But then, something changed. Diamond calls it the "Great Leap Forward." ........Diamond's hypothesis is that it was the development and perfection of spoken language that catapulted us forward, making possible teamwork, collaboration, planning, long-distance trade, and much more. Whether for lack of vocal capacity, brain development, or some other reason, chimps never made this leap. "A baby chimpanzee that was brought up in the home of a clinical psychologist couple, along with their baby, by age two, the chimpanzee could pronounce only four consonants and vowels, and it never got better," says Diamond. "But if all you can say is, bi, ba, di, do, that doesn't get you Shakespeare, and it also doesn't let you discuss how to construct atomic bombs and bows and arrows."
7 Stories.
In this view, the downstream consequences of language acquisition are, basically, everything that stands out about human civilization. That ranges from the highly beneficial—the dramatic growth in life expectancy—to the mixed: technologies that have significant benefits but also huge costs (like, say, devices to exploit fossil fuels for energy). And most of all, it includes environmental despoilment and resource depletion. "At present, we, humans, are operating worldwide on a nonsustainable economy," Diamond says. "We're exploiting resources, water, energy sources, fisheries, forests at a rate such that most of these resources will get seriously depleted within a few decades.
http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/04/jared-diamond-inquiring-minds-humanity-survival
________________________________________
From: kb-bounces at kbjournal.org <kb-bounces at kbjournal.org> on behalf of de gava <wblakesx at yahoo.com>
Sent: Thursday, August 14, 2014 3:18 PM
To: wessr at onid.orst.edu; Edward C Appel
Cc: kb at kbjournal.org
Subject: Re: [KB] Deacon's Neo-Aristotelian Complication of Simple Action/Motion
Apparently Animal Sybolicum is Cassirer's. Perhaps you are more familiar w/Susan Langer. https://www.google.com/search?num=100&client=opera&hs=2v1&q=renaissance+animal+symbolicum&oq=renaissance+animal+symbolicum&gs_l=serp.12...265909.268950.0.271250.7.7.0.0.0.0.241.889.2j4j1.7.0....0...1c.1.51.serp..7.0.0.8JjXhela5TU . Perhaps you are more familiar w/Susan Langer I'll guess the idea goes back to the renaissance.
He partially relied on Jakob von Uexküll and his concept of Umwelt
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jakob_von_Uexküll
In parallel Hans Selye ('the father of Stress Theory') relied on Claude Bernard ('milieau interior') and Walter Bradford Cannon (Homeostasis). qv
--------------------------------------------
On Thu, 8/14/14, Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com> wrote:
Subject: Re: [KB] Deacon's Neo-Aristotelian Complication of Simple Action/Motion
To: "wessr at onid.orst.edu" <wessr at onid.orst.edu>
Cc: "kb at kbjournal.org" <kb at kbjournal.org>
Date: Thursday, August 14, 2014, 11:07 AM
Another quick point of comparison
between Terrence Deacon and Kenneth Burke (Deacon does,
after all, have another book, entitled The Symbolic
Species):
In Incomplete Nature, Deacon takes issue with both Noam
Chomsky and Steven Pinker in respect to their "universal
grammar" approach to the origins of language. These
theorists reduce language and its origins to a kind of
computer-like algorithm that stints on the
"neuro-behavioral-intentional process" that is its very
essence. A sort of mechanical "mentalese"---Pinker's
term---pre-exists any natural language and gets translated,
so to speak, into that particular argot. "Here,"
Deacon says, "the problem to be explained has found its way
into the explanation," homuncular-style.
Burke's placement of the origin of language in "negative"
intuition, the precise analogue to Deacon's "absential
feature" that infuses and superintends the "intentionality"
and "purpose" that contemporary materialisms try to explain
away, but so often include in their explanations as
unacknowledged "placeholders," reinforces Deachon's take,
and vice versa.
Ed
--------------------------------------------
On Tue, 8/12/14, Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
wrote:
Subject: Re: [KB] Deacon's
Neo-Aristotelian
Complication of
Simple Action/Motion
To: "wessr at onid.orst.edu"
<wessr at onid.orst.edu>
Cc: "kb at kbjournal.org"
<kb at kbjournal.org>
Date: Tuesday, August 12, 2014, 12:09 PM
Burkophiles,
Before I start beating this horse again,
I want to call attention to a new book based on Burke I
just
received in the mail. It’s entitled, The
Continuation War 1941-1944 as a Metanoic Moment: A Burkean
Reading of Finnish Clerical Rhetoric. The study is the
doctoral dissertation of Jouni Tilli, done at a university
in Finland the name of which escapes me. Published by
Peter Lang in Frankfort, it’s a really neat tome. I
read Jouni’s dissertation and made some comments before
he
defended it in front of Clarke Rountree, Jouni’s
examiner
at the oral. Jouni’s handle on Burke was so deft and
broad, I thought surely he had had some mentor along the
way, steeped in Burke . Not so. Jouni had picked
up dramatism on his own, via his wide reading in the
originals and in North American secondary scholarship.
I was impressed, and still am.
Jouni attended the conference in St.
Louis. He and his estimable dissertation/book add to
the ever-widening influence Burke studies are having in
Europe.
Back, I hope briefly, to Deacon, Bateson,
Burke, and action/motion. Burke’s “agent-minus”
serves well enough as an overall bridging term for
nonverbal
biological “organisms” as intermediate between
insensate
physical materials and forces, and us symbolizing gals and
guys. But it is an airy abstraction. How does it
address the action/motion quandary?
No doubt a “blink” is
motion, Burke style. It surely involves a “because
of,” and only a “because of.” We don’t even
realize it’s happening. A “wink,” on the other
hand, is dramatic action. It manifests an “in order
to” that’s not only a raw purpose of some kind. A
wink is an end-seeking act that also places the
“winker,” however marginally or precariously, in a
socially rule-governed context that could bring him a
rebuke
of some kind, a “cold shoulder,” a mild moral
ego-hurtful setback, exiguous “passion” of a sort that
so often results from such “action.”
The operation of “negative
entropy” in nonverbal biological life Bateson talks
about,
the “absential feature” Deacon vouchsafes in respect
even to “simple life forms,” cognizance of a
“difference” that “makes a difference” in respect
to
“trial and error”-type changed behavior that leads to
“teleodynamic” (Deacon) “preference” and
“correctiveness” (Batesaon), looks very much like an
“in order to,” not a mere “because
of.” It’s a nondramatic “in order
to.” No moral aggrandizement beckons, no moral
jeopardy threatens---or motivates---whatsoever.
But that Bateson/Deacon
nonverbal animal “activity” looks very much like an
“in order to,” a raw, morally innocent “in order
to,” but an “in order to” still. And Burke’s
disquisition on the “fish” in P&C would seem to
corroborate.
I just reiterate here.
The question stands as something of a
theoretical probe.
Ed
--------------------------------------------
On Mon, 8/11/14, Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
wrote:
Subject: Re: [KB] Deacon's Neo-Aristotelian
Complication of
Simple Action/Motion
To: "wessr at onid.orst.edu"
<wessr at onid.orst.edu>
Cc: "kb at kbjournal.org"
<kb at kbjournal.org>
Date: Monday, August 11, 2014, 8:11 PM
Thanks a bunch for calling attention
to that passage, Bob. I've got it underlined in my
ancient and tattered copy of GM, but forgot about it
long
since. "Agent-minus" is a very serviceable
descriptive
for the beings that stand between the more
unambiguously
inanimate materials moved by insensate physical
forces,
and
the marginally "free," we think, guilt-obsessed
symbolizers
we are. What's noted by the "minus" is the absence
of
moral drama, "interference" (RM) with more
spontaneous
causes in nature, spontaneous animal impulses,
spontaneous
tendencies and inclinations generic to, say, primates
in
general.
It's an entitlement to build on.
Ed
--------------------------------------------
On Mon, 8/11/14, wessr at onid.orst.edu
<wessr at onid.orst.edu>
wrote:
Subject: Re: [KB] Deacon's Neo-Aristotelian
Complication
of Simple Action/Motion
To: "Edward C Appel" <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
Cc: "Carrol Cox" <cbcox at ilstu.edu>,
"Herbert W. Simons" <hsimons at temple.edu>,
"DavidPayne" <dpayne at usf.edu>,
"kb at kbjournal.org"
<kb at kbjournal.org>
Date: Monday, August 11, 2014, 6:20 PM
Ed, perhaps add another passage to
those under consideration, this one
from the Grammar, page 157:
"In reducing all phenomena to terms of motion,
biology is
as
unambiguously scenic as physics. But as soon as it
encounters the
subject of self-movement, it makes claims upon the
areas
covered by
our term agent. We have improvised a solution, for
our
purposes, by
deciding that the biologist's word, "organism," is
Grammatically the
equivalent of `agent-minus.'"
Bob
Quoting Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>:
> But the question I am asking, David, is not the
one
that has to do
> with what Burke says here in "Terministic
Screens"
concerning the
> difference between "persons" and "things," in
regard
to
possible
> "negative intuition" of some kind. The
question
has to do with the
> difference between us symbolizers and nonverbal
animals, in respect
> to negative intuition of some kind, and the
possible
difference
> between the so-called "motion" of those life
forms
and
that of
> inanimate matter. That's the focal problem, if
we
are to credit
> both Deacon and Bateson---and I would say, too,
the
Burke of the
> opening of P&C---on the subject of
negativity, a
possible "absential
> feature," trial and error, self-correctiveness
of a
sort, can we say
> "purpose"?
>
> And by the way, we don't treat dogs and chimps
and
some
other
> pets/work animals exactly like ocean waves,
electrical
impulses, the
> wind or the rain. I'm surely not saying the
symbolic dislocations
> of 200,000 years ago ware not profound. I'll
reference Chapter 6 in
> my book on the "Anthropology of Dramatic
Action."
I'm asking
> whether Deacon and Bateson are on to something
in
respect to our
> doctrinaire labeling of the "activity" of
animals,
particularly the
> "higher" ones, as "motion" not to be
distinguished
from
the
> "motions" of the cosmos.
>
>
>
> Ed
> --------------------------------------------
> On Mon, 8/11/14, Payne, David <dpayne at usf.edu>
wrote:
>
> Subject: RE: [KB] Deacon's Neo-Aristotelian
Complication
> of Simple
Action/Motion
> To: "Edward C Appel" <edwardcappel at frontier.com>,
"Carrol Cox"
> <cbcox at ilstu.edu>,
"Herbert W. Simons" <hsimons at temple.edu>
> Cc: "kb at kbjournal.org"
<kb at kbjournal.org>
> Date: Monday, August 11, 2014, 2:21 PM
>
> As far as
> "elaboration of its meaning" goes, I submit
> Burke's own explanation in Terministic
Screens
(LAS p.
> 53):
>
> I should make it
> clear: I am not pronouncing on the metaphysics
of
the
> controversy. Maybe we are but things in
motion.
I don’t
> have to haggle about that possibility. I need
but
point out
> that whether or not we are just things in
motion,
we think
> of one another (and especially of those with
whom
we are
> intimate) as persons. And the difference
between
a thing and
> a person is that one moves whereas the other
acts. For the
> sake of the argument, I’m even willing to
grant
that the
> distinction between things moving and persons
acting is but
> an illusion. All I would claim is that,
illusion or not,
> the human race could not get along with itself
on
the basis
> of any other kind of intuition. The human
animal, as we
> know it, emerges into personality by first
mastering
> whatever tribal speech happens to be its
particular symbolic
> environment.
>
> David
> Payne
>
>
> ________________________________________
> From:
> kb-bounces at kbjournal.org
> <kb-bounces at kbjournal.org>
> on behalf of Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
> Sent: Monday, August 11, 2014 1:24 PM
> To: Carrol Cox; Herbert W. Simons
> Cc: kb at kbjournal.org
> Subject: Re: [KB] Deacon's Neo-Aristotelian
> Complication of Simple
Action/Motion
>
> Burkophiles,
>
> Actually, it’s
> not a gloss on the blink and the wink
distinction
that may
> be called for. It’s modification of
Burke’s
> action/motion pair, or a needed elaboration
of
its
> meaning.
>
> So way
> back when, Jim Chesebro criticized Burke’s
stinting on
> nonverbal motivations, and I did not, at the
time, think
> through the full implications of that
caveat.
Deacon’s
> tour de force points up that possible problem
with a sharper
> differentiation between mechanistic causation
and
the
> dynamical dislocations that came with
nonverbal
living
> beings and the possibly teleological,
“absential”
> dimensions of process they introduced to the
ecology of
> planet earth.
>
> I
> label Deacon’s analysis
“Neo-Aristotelian.” As Burke
> emphasizes (Appendix A, Dramatism and
Development, p. 58),
> “Aristotle’s concept of the entelechy . .
.
could be
> applied to any being or ‘substance,’ such
as
an amoeba
> or tree . . . . In these pages . . . we are
concerned
> solely with a ‘logological’ tendency
intrinsic to the
> resources of SYMBOLIC ACTION.”
>
> But can we usefully and uniformly
> conflate the “nonsymbolic motion” of
stars,
planets,
> oceans, and atoms, on the one hand, and
whatever
it is
> living animals in the wild are capable of, on
the
other?
> Are there some attributes these “lower”
creatures share
> with us symbolizers that Burke’s dramatism
deflects
> attention from, terministic screen that it
is,
and that
> Burke acknowledges (PLF, 124; LASA, 44-62).
>
> Burke surely hints
> at a chasmic difference between the
“motions,” if we can
> still call them that, of fish, and the motions
of
stars,
> planets, and moons. He describes fish,
indeed
“All
> Living Things,” as “critics” of their
environment,
> capable of “the changed behavior that goes
with
a new
> meaning” (P&C, p. 5). The “new
meaning” in the
> experience of the fish he talks about is
“’jaw-ripping
> food’” in the form of a fisherman’s
bait.
Fish might
> steer clear of a lure like that after such a
trauma.
> Nonverbal animals can thus learn, can strive,
so
to speak,
> in a different direction than they did in the
past. The
> “absential feature,” Deacon’s term, the
> “difference” in future experience that
“makes a
> difference,” will be some “preferred
state”
which will
> “activate the corrective response,”
namely, a
bite into
> fish food that doesn’t have the hook.
>
> I quote in that last sentence
from
> Steps to an Ecology of Mind, by Gregory
Bateson
(Ballantine,
> 1972, 381). That “difference” that
“makes
a
> difference” in generating
“preference”
is
> “information” derived via “negative
entropy,”
> according to Bateson, “information” an
important term
> for Deacon in respect to the “absential
feature,” or
> absential “functioning.” Bateson’s
“negative
> entropy” results, one presumes, in a
“lack
of
> predictability” of the kind that
characterizes
a
> mechanistic system (see “entropy” in the
Shorter O.E.D.,
> 6th Edition, Vol. 1).
>
>
> “Let me list,” Bateson says,
“what
seem to me to
> be those essential minimal characteristics of
a
system,
> which I will accept as characteristics of
mind”:
> (1) A “system” operating
> “with and upon DIFFERENCES.”
> (2)
> “Closed loops or networks of pathways”
transmitting
> “news of a difference.”
> (3)
> “Many events within the system . . .
energized
by the
> respondent part,” not just the
“triggering
part.”
> (4) The system “showing
> self-correctiveness,” self-correctiveness
implying
> “trial and error” (482).
>
> Borrowing terms from something
Carl
> Jung wrote, who in turn got
> these notions
> from the second-century Gnostic Basilides,
Bateson contrasts
> operations in the “PLEROMA” and those in
the
> “CREATURA.” “The pleroma knows nothing
of
difference
> and distinction,” Bateson avers. “It
contains no
> ‘ideas’ in the sense I am using the
word.” “In the
> creatura, effects are brought about precisely
by
> difference. In fact, this is the same old
dichotomy
> between mind and substance” (456).
>
> Now, if we’re going to credit
> nonverbal animals---let’s soften the blow,
for
the sake of
> argument, by referencing those on an advanced
level of
> development in particular---if we’re going
to
ascribe to
> such nonverbals, activity motivated by a sense
of
a negative
> of some kind, we have to characterize that
negative
> intuition differently. Those denizens of
the
> “creatura” are not “MORALIZED by the
negative”
> (LASA, 9-13, 16). Or, as I’ve put it
(1993a,
1993b,
> 2012), nonverbal animals would have no
conception
of the
> “infinite negative,” the global negative
that
confers
> guilt and shame upon a weak and finite being
that
has nary a
> chance of measuring up to its vision of
“perfection.”
>
> Thus, a second
> “dislocation” of chasmic proportions in
the
evolution of
> beings on planet earth.
>
>
> That’s enough to chew on for now,
except to pose
> this question: Do these ruminations suggest a
need for
> modifying Burke’s perhaps simplistic
action/motion
> dialectic in any way? Is some intermediate
notion called
> for, in respect to the nonverbal
“creatura”?
>
> I forwarded to
> Terrence W. Deacon some of the things I’ve
posted on his
> book. He has answered back. He is
interested
in dialogue
> with us on these matters. I have asked
permission to post
> his reply on kb, and will do so if granted
that
request.
> Professor Deacon is on vacation now, and,
currently, mostly
> away from e-mail.
>
>
> Have a good day, everyone!
>
>
> Ed
>
>
> --------------------------------------------
> On Sat, 8/9/14, Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
> wrote:
>
> Subject: Re: [KB]
> Deacon's Neo-Aristotelian Complication of
Simple
> Action/Motion
> To:
> "Carrol Cox" <cbcox at ilstu.edu>,
> "Herbert W. Simons" <hsimons at temple.edu>
> Cc: kb at kbjournal.org
> Date: Saturday, August 9, 2014, 3:48
PM
>
> Burkophiles,
>
> At a Burke
> panel at
> ECA, Portland Maine, 1992, Jim
> Chesebro raised an objection
> to Burke that
> is possibly pertinent to the basic
>
> action/motion distinction Herb just
reiterated,
and
> surely
> complicated by Terrence
> Deacon. A lacuna in
> dramatism
> is the failure to take cognizance of
nonverbal
> motives, Jim offered. At the time,
I
> surmised that Jim
> meant the classic motion
> of chemical processes of the kind
> Jerome
> Kagan (Harvard social scientist) examined in
his
> book, Galen’s Prophecy: Temperament
in Human
> Nature
> (BasicBooks, 1994, Kagan’s
> research updated in a fairly
> recent NYT
> Magazine piece). Kagan homed in on human
>
> anxiety. It is aggravated by an excess of
> norepinephrine,
> a neurochemical, in the
> baso-lateral area of the amygdala,
> and in
> its projections to cortical and autonomic
targets.
> From such motions of nature derive
inhibition,
> melancholia,
> and neurosis, Kagan
> convincingly argues.
>
>
> I didn’t much credit Jim’s
naysaying
> at the time. Burke was a philosopher
and
> critic of the
> human drama, that aspect of
> observable behavior that, in one
> way or
> other, cannot be reduced to the motions of
nature,
> and will boldly manifest its
uniqueness in
> anthropological
> terms (see Chapter 6 in the
> Primer). Sure, an
> individual’s
> characteristic “drama” will be modified,
> perhaps radically, by those
“chemisms,” to
> use Theodore
> Dreiser’s word. Burke
> gives enough heed to such
> influences,
> thought I, in his description of the way
>
> different folks will react to the same
stimuli,
identical
> scenic pressures and circumstances
(GM). No
> need for
> elaborated neurochemistry, however
> germane in a scientific
> context.
>
> Deacon, I
> believe, challenges this chink in
Burke’s
> thought in the
> sense of how to handle, what
> to call, the kind of
> nonsymbolic
> “motion”---isn’t that what Burke calls
> it?---of what are commonly labeled
the
> “lower”
> animals. In what might be
> denominated Neo-Aristotelian
> fashion,
> Deacon “outline[s] . . . a theory of
emergent
> dynamics that shows how dynamical
processes
> can become
> organized around and with
> respect to possibilities not
> realized.
> This is intended to provide the scaffolding
for
> a conceptual bridge from mechanistic
> relationships to
> end-directed,
> informational, and normative relationships
>
> such as are found in simple life forms [and,
a
fortiori,
> in
> primates and mammals in general!].”
>
> Recall that
> in my first post on his
> book, I emphasized
> Deacon’s insistence on two
>
> “dislocations” in earth’s evolutionary
history, not
> just one. “Natural
> teleology,”
> “teleodynamics” to use
> Deacon’s neologism, would
> certainly
> characterize the putative transition from
>
> prokaryotic bacteria to eukaryotic bacteria
around 2.6
> billion years ago, at the onset of
the
> Proterozoic Eon.
> Something radically new
> came to planet earth:
> nuclei-possessing,
> oxygen-producing, photo-synthesizing
>
> single-celled animals that pumped that oxygen
into the
> oceans and then the atmosphere,
changed the
> color of the
> water and likely the sky,
> generated the life-sustaining
> qualities of
> sea, land, and atmosphere, including the
ozone
> shield, indeed transformed earth into
the
> “miracle”
> planet nothing we’ve
> discovered out there in space likely
> comes
> close to. (I think of have this scenario
roughly
> correct,)
>
>
> Two
> billion years later,
> after the hiatus of “Snowball
> Earth”
> had passed, the “Cambrian Explosion”
could
> begin.
>
>
> The Gaia guru
> Lovelock said
> it was the radically different composition of
> earth’s atmosphere---21 percent
oxygen, 76
> percent
> nitrogen, 3 percent all the other
> stuff, including the
> growing concentration
> of carbon dioxide---that clued him
> into his
> notion of a kind of living planet Earth.
Both
> Venus and Mars? About 97 percent
carbon
> dioxide in both
> cases, albeit with
> strikingly different concentrations.
>
> Back to Herb’s
> blink and one-eyed wink next time,
with,
> perhaps, a gloss
> that Deacon’s Incomplete
> Nature might suggest.
>
>
> Ed
>
>
>
>
> --------------------------------------------
> On Sat, 8/9/14, Herbert W. Simons
<hsimons at temple.edu>
> wrote:
>
>
> Subject: Re: [KB]
> (no subject)
> To: "Carrol Cox"
>
> <cbcox at ilstu.edu>
> Cc: kb at kbjournal.org
> Date: Saturday, August 9, 2014, 10:03 AM
>
> A
>
> theoretical explanation provides an
answer to
> a why
> question
> in a
> thought experiment. Example:
> Gilbert Ryle
> asked the
> question: What's
> the difference between a wink and a
>
> one-eyed blink? His answer
> took him to the mind-brain
> distinction
> and could have taken KB to
> action-motion.
> WINKS
> ARE DONE IN ORDER TO;
> BLINKS TO BECAUSE OF.
>
>
>
> On Fri,
> Aug 8, 2014 at
> 10:46 PM, Carrol Cox
> <cbcox at ilstu.edu>
> wrote:
>
>
> (You
> need to click "Reply All";
> otherwise it goes
> to the post's
> sender
>
> rather than to
> kb.)
>
>
>
> I'm
> interested in your
> somewhat cryptic message because
> on
> another list I am
>
>
> writing on the difference between theory on
>
> the one hand and
> "what needs to
>
> be explained" on
> the
> other. And involved in that is a
>
> differentiation
>
> between
>
> empirical generalization and theoretical
>
> EXPLANATION.
>
>
>
> Carrol
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -----Original
> Message-----
>
> From: kb-bounces at kbjournal.org
> [mailto:kb-bounces at kbjournal.org]
> On Behalf
>
>
> Of de gava
>
> Sent: Friday,
> August 08, 2014 9:34 PM
>
>
> To: kb at kbjournal.org
>
> Subject: [KB] (no
> subject)
>
>
>
> I think I can add to
> this
> discussion. In earlier days I
> replied to
> the
>
> emails I received but
> they went to Ed so to kick off I'd
> like
> to test
>
> kb at kbjournal.org
> as
> an address to the e-list
> and ask if
> anyone has looked
>
> closely
>
> into the nature of 'explanations'. More to
> follow perhaps.
>
>
>
>
>
>
_______________________________________________
>
> KB mailing list
>
> KB at kbjournal.org
>
> http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
_______________________________________________
>
> KB mailing list
>
> KB at kbjournal.org
>
> http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Herbert
> W.
> Simons,
> Ph.D.
> Emeritus
> Professor
> of
> Communication
>
> Dep't of Strategic
>
> Communication,
> Weiss Hall 215
> Temple
>
>
> University, Philadelphia 19122
> Home
> phone:
> 215 844 5969
>
> http://astro.temple.edu/~hsimons
> Academic Fellow, Center for
> Transformative
> Strategic Initiatives
> (CTSI)
>
>
>
>
>
> -----Inline
> Attachment Follows-----
>
>
>
>
_______________________________________________
> KB mailing list
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> http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
>
>
>
>
_______________________________________________
> KB mailing list
> KB at kbjournal.org
> http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
>
>
>
_______________________________________________
> KB mailing list
> KB at kbjournal.org
> http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> KB mailing list
> KB at kbjournal.org
> http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
>
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_______________________________________________
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http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
_______________________________________________
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http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
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