[KB] Deacon's Neo-Aristotelian Complication of Simple Action/Motion

wessr at onid.orst.edu wessr at onid.orst.edu
Mon Aug 11 18:20:21 EDT 2014


Ed, perhaps add another passage to those under consideration, this one  
from the Grammar, page 157:

"In reducing all phenomena to terms of motion, biology is as  
unambiguously scenic as physics. But as soon as it encounters the  
subject of self-movement, it makes claims upon the areas covered by  
our term agent. We have improvised a solution, for our purposes, by  
deciding that the biologist's word, "organism," is Grammatically the  
equivalent of `agent-minus.'"

Bob

Quoting Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>:

> But the question I am asking, David, is not the one that has to do  
> with what Burke says here in "Terministic Screens" concerning the  
> difference between "persons" and "things," in regard to possible  
> "negative intuition" of some kind.  The question has to do with the  
> difference between us symbolizers and nonverbal animals, in respect  
> to negative intuition of some kind, and the possible difference  
> between the so-called "motion" of those life forms and that of  
> inanimate matter.  That's the focal problem, if we are to credit  
> both Deacon and Bateson---and I would say, too, the Burke of the  
> opening of P&C---on the subject of negativity, a possible "absential  
> feature," trial and error, self-correctiveness of a sort, can we say  
> "purpose"?
>
> And by the way, we don't treat dogs and chimps and some other  
> pets/work animals exactly like ocean waves, electrical impulses, the  
> wind or the rain.  I'm surely not saying the symbolic dislocations  
> of 200,000 years ago ware not profound.  I'll reference Chapter 6 in  
> my book on the "Anthropology of Dramatic Action."  I'm asking  
> whether Deacon and Bateson are on to something in respect to our  
> doctrinaire labeling of the "activity" of animals, particularly the  
> "higher" ones, as "motion" not to be distinguished from the  
> "motions" of the cosmos.
>
>
>
> Ed
> --------------------------------------------
> On Mon, 8/11/14, Payne, David <dpayne at usf.edu> wrote:
>
>  Subject: RE: [KB] Deacon's Neo-Aristotelian Complication  
> of	Simple	Action/Motion
>  To: "Edward C Appel" <edwardcappel at frontier.com>, "Carrol Cox"  
> <cbcox at ilstu.edu>, "Herbert W. Simons" <hsimons at temple.edu>
>  Cc: "kb at kbjournal.org" <kb at kbjournal.org>
>  Date: Monday, August 11, 2014, 2:21 PM
>
>  As far as
>  "elaboration of its meaning" goes, I submit
>  Burke's own explanation  in Terministic Screens (LAS p.
>  53):
>
>  I should make it
>  clear: I am not pronouncing on the metaphysics of the
>  controversy. Maybe we are but things in motion.  I don’t
>  have to haggle about that possibility. I need but point out
>  that whether or not we are just things in motion, we think
>  of one another (and especially of those with whom we are
>  intimate) as persons. And the difference between a thing and
>  a person is that one moves whereas the other acts.  For the
>  sake of the argument, I’m even willing to grant that the
>  distinction between things moving and persons acting is but
>  an illusion.  All I would claim is that, illusion or not,
>  the human race could not get along with itself on the basis
>  of any other kind of intuition.  The human animal, as we
>  know it, emerges into personality by first mastering
>  whatever tribal speech happens to be its particular symbolic
>  environment.
>
>  David
>  Payne
>
>
>  ________________________________________
>  From:
>  kb-bounces at kbjournal.org
>  <kb-bounces at kbjournal.org>
>  on behalf of Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
>  Sent: Monday, August 11, 2014 1:24 PM
>  To: Carrol Cox; Herbert W. Simons
>  Cc: kb at kbjournal.org
>  Subject: Re: [KB] Deacon's Neo-Aristotelian
>  Complication of     Simple  Action/Motion
>
>  Burkophiles,
>
>          Actually, it’s
>  not a gloss on the blink and the wink distinction that may
>  be called for.  It’s modification of Burke’s
>  action/motion pair, or a needed elaboration of its
>  meaning.
>
>          So way
>  back when, Jim Chesebro criticized Burke’s stinting on
>  nonverbal motivations, and I did not, at the time, think
>  through the full implications of that caveat.  Deacon’s
>  tour de force points up that possible problem with a sharper
>  differentiation between mechanistic causation and the
>  dynamical dislocations that came with nonverbal living
>  beings and the possibly teleological, “absential”
>  dimensions of process they introduced to the ecology of
>  planet earth.
>
>          I
>  label Deacon’s analysis “Neo-Aristotelian.”  As Burke
>  emphasizes (Appendix A, Dramatism and Development, p. 58),
>  “Aristotle’s concept of the entelechy . . . could be
>  applied to any being or ‘substance,’ such as an amoeba
>  or tree . . . .  In these pages . . . we are concerned
>  solely with a ‘logological’ tendency intrinsic to the
>  resources of SYMBOLIC ACTION.”
>
>          But can we usefully and uniformly
>  conflate the “nonsymbolic motion” of stars, planets,
>  oceans, and atoms, on the one hand, and whatever it is
>  living animals in the wild are capable of, on the other? 
>  Are there some attributes these “lower” creatures share
>  with us symbolizers that Burke’s dramatism deflects
>  attention from, terministic screen that it is, and that
>  Burke acknowledges (PLF, 124; LASA, 44-62).
>
>          Burke surely hints
>  at a chasmic difference between the “motions,” if we can
>  still call them that, of fish, and the motions of stars,
>  planets, and moons.  He describes fish, indeed “All
>  Living Things,” as “critics” of their environment,
>  capable of “the changed behavior that goes with a new
>  meaning” (P&C, p. 5).  The “new meaning” in the
>  experience of the fish he talks about is “’jaw-ripping
>  food’” in the form of a fisherman’s bait.  Fish might
>  steer clear of a lure like that after such a trauma. 
>  Nonverbal animals can thus learn, can strive, so to speak,
>  in a different direction than they did in the past.  The
>  “absential feature,” Deacon’s term, the
>  “difference” in future experience that “makes a
>  difference,” will be some “preferred state” which will
>  “activate the corrective response,” namely, a bite into
>  fish food that doesn’t have the hook.
>
>          I quote in that last sentence from
>  Steps to an Ecology of Mind, by Gregory Bateson (Ballantine,
>  1972, 381).  That “difference” that “makes a
>  difference” in generating “preference”  is
>  “information” derived via “negative entropy,”
>  according to Bateson, “information” an important term
>  for Deacon in respect to the “absential feature,” or
>  absential “functioning.”  Bateson’s “negative
>  entropy” results, one presumes, in a “lack of
>  predictability” of the kind that characterizes a
>  mechanistic system (see “entropy” in the Shorter O.E.D.,
>  6th Edition, Vol. 1).
>
>     
>      “Let me list,” Bateson says, “what seem to me to
>  be those essential minimal characteristics of a system,
>  which I will accept as characteristics of mind”:
>  (1)     A “system” operating
>  “with and upon DIFFERENCES.”
>  (2)     
>  “Closed loops or networks of pathways” transmitting
>  “news of a difference.”
>  (3)     
>  “Many events within the system . . . energized by the
>  respondent part,” not just the “triggering part.”
>  (4)      The system “showing
>  self-correctiveness,” self-correctiveness implying
>  “trial and error” (482).
>
>          Borrowing terms from something Carl
>  Jung wrote, who in turn got
>  these notions
>  from the second-century Gnostic Basilides, Bateson contrasts
>  operations in the “PLEROMA” and those in the
>  “CREATURA.”  “The pleroma knows nothing of difference
>  and distinction,” Bateson avers.  “It contains no
>  ‘ideas’ in the sense I am using the word.”  “In the
>  creatura, effects are brought about precisely by
>  difference.  In fact, this is the same old dichotomy
>  between mind and substance” (456).
>
>          Now, if we’re going to credit
>  nonverbal animals---let’s soften the blow, for the sake of
>  argument, by referencing those on an advanced level of
>  development in particular---if we’re going to ascribe to
>  such nonverbals, activity motivated by a sense of a negative
>  of some kind, we have to characterize that negative
>  intuition differently.  Those denizens of the
>  “creatura” are not “MORALIZED by the negative”
>  (LASA, 9-13, 16).  Or, as I’ve put it (1993a, 1993b,
>  2012), nonverbal animals would have no conception of the
>  “infinite negative,” the global negative that confers
>  guilt and shame upon a weak and finite being that has nary a
>  chance of measuring up to its vision of “perfection.”
>
>          Thus, a second
>  “dislocation” of chasmic proportions in the evolution of
>  beings on planet earth.
>
>   
>        That’s enough to chew on for now, except to pose
>  this question: Do these ruminations suggest a need for
>  modifying Burke’s perhaps simplistic action/motion
>  dialectic in any way?  Is some intermediate notion called
>  for, in respect to the nonverbal “creatura”?
>
>          I forwarded to
>  Terrence W. Deacon some of the things I’ve posted on his
>  book.  He has answered back.  He is interested in dialogue
>  with us on these matters.  I have asked permission to post
>  his reply on kb, and will do so if granted that request. 
>  Professor Deacon is on vacation now, and, currently, mostly
>  away from e-mail.
>
>       
>    Have a good day, everyone!
>
>
>          Ed
>
>
>  --------------------------------------------
>  On Sat, 8/9/14, Edward C Appel <edwardcappel at frontier.com>
>  wrote:
>
>   Subject: Re: [KB]
>  Deacon's Neo-Aristotelian Complication of Simple 
>     Action/Motion
>   To:
>  "Carrol Cox" <cbcox at ilstu.edu>,
>  "Herbert W. Simons" <hsimons at temple.edu>
>   Cc: kb at kbjournal.org
>   Date: Saturday, August 9, 2014, 3:48 PM
>
>   Burkophiles,
>
>       At a Burke
>  panel at
>   ECA, Portland Maine, 1992, Jim
>  Chesebro raised an objection
>   to Burke that
>  is possibly pertinent to the basic
>
>  action/motion distinction Herb just reiterated, and
>  surely
>   complicated by Terrence
>  Deacon.   A lacuna in
>   dramatism
>  is the failure to take cognizance of nonverbal
>   motives, Jim offered.  At the time, I
>  surmised that Jim
>   meant the classic motion
>  of chemical processes of the kind
>   Jerome
>  Kagan (Harvard social scientist) examined in his
>   book, Galen’s Prophecy: Temperament in Human
>  Nature
>   (BasicBooks, 1994, Kagan’s
>  research updated in a fairly
>   recent NYT
>  Magazine piece).  Kagan homed in on human
>
>  anxiety.  It is aggravated by an excess of
>  norepinephrine,
>   a neurochemical, in the
>  baso-lateral area of the amygdala,
>   and in
>  its projections to cortical and autonomic targets.
>   From such motions of nature derive inhibition,
>  melancholia,
>   and neurosis, Kagan
>  convincingly argues.
>
>   
>     I didn’t much credit Jim’s naysaying
>   at the time.  Burke was a philosopher and
>  critic of the
>   human drama, that aspect of
>  observable behavior that, in one
>   way or
>  other, cannot be reduced to the motions of nature,
>   and will boldly manifest its uniqueness in
>  anthropological
>   terms (see Chapter 6 in the
>  Primer).  Sure, an
>   individual’s
>  characteristic “drama” will be modified,
>   perhaps radically, by those “chemisms,” to
>  use Theodore
>   Dreiser’s word.  Burke
>  gives enough heed to such
>   influences,
>  thought I, in his description of the way
>
>  different folks will react to the same stimuli, identical
>   scenic pressures and circumstances (GM).  No
>  need for
>   elaborated neurochemistry, however
>  germane in a scientific
>   context.
>
>       Deacon, I
>   believe, challenges this chink in Burke’s
>  thought in the
>   sense of how to handle, what
>  to call, the kind of
>   nonsymbolic
>  “motion”---isn’t that what Burke calls
>   it?---of what are commonly labeled the
>  “lower”
>   animals.  In what might be
>  denominated Neo-Aristotelian
>   fashion,
>  Deacon “outline[s] . . . a theory of emergent
>   dynamics that shows how dynamical processes
>  can become
>   organized around and with
>  respect to possibilities not
>   realized. 
>  This is intended to provide the scaffolding for
>   a conceptual bridge from mechanistic
>  relationships to
>   end-directed,
>  informational, and normative relationships
>
>  such as are found in simple life forms [and, a fortiori,
>  in
>   primates and mammals in general!].”
>
>       Recall that
>  in my first post on his
>   book, I emphasized
>  Deacon’s insistence on two
>
>  “dislocations” in earth’s evolutionary history, not
>   just one.   “Natural
>  teleology,”
>   “teleodynamics” to use
>  Deacon’s neologism, would
>   certainly
>  characterize the putative transition from
>
>  prokaryotic bacteria to eukaryotic bacteria around 2.6
>   billion years ago, at the onset of the
>  Proterozoic Eon.
>   Something radically new
>  came to planet earth:
>   nuclei-possessing,
>  oxygen-producing, photo-synthesizing
>
>  single-celled animals that pumped that oxygen into the
>   oceans and then the atmosphere, changed the
>  color of the
>   water and likely the sky,
>  generated the life-sustaining
>   qualities of
>  sea, land, and atmosphere, including the ozone
>   shield, indeed transformed earth into the
>  “miracle”
>   planet nothing we’ve
>  discovered out there in space likely
>   comes
>  close to.  (I think of have this scenario roughly
>   correct,)
>
>   
>     Two
>   billion years later,
>  after the hiatus of “Snowball
>   Earth”
>  had passed, the “Cambrian Explosion” could
>   begin.
>
>   
>     The Gaia guru
>   Lovelock said
>  it was the radically different composition of
>   earth’s atmosphere---21 percent oxygen, 76
>  percent
>   nitrogen, 3 percent all the other
>  stuff, including the
>   growing concentration
>  of carbon dioxide---that clued him
>   into his
>  notion of a kind of living planet Earth.  Both
>   Venus and Mars?  About 97 percent carbon
>  dioxide in both
>   cases, albeit with
>  strikingly different concentrations.
>
>       Back to Herb’s
>   blink and one-eyed wink next time, with, 
>  perhaps, a gloss
>   that Deacon’s Incomplete
>  Nature might suggest.
>
>
>   Ed
>
>
>
>
>  --------------------------------------------
>   On Sat, 8/9/14, Herbert W. Simons <hsimons at temple.edu>
>   wrote:
>
>   
>  Subject: Re: [KB]
>   (no subject)
>    To: "Carrol Cox"
>
>  <cbcox at ilstu.edu>
>    Cc: kb at kbjournal.org
>    Date: Saturday, August 9, 2014, 10:03 AM
>
>    A
>
>   theoretical explanation provides an answer to
>  a why
>   question
>    in a
>  thought experiment. Example:
>   Gilbert Ryle
>  asked the
>    question: What's
>   the difference between a wink and a
>
>   one-eyed blink? His answer
>  took him to the mind-brain
>    distinction
>  and could have taken KB to
>   action-motion.
>  WINKS
>    ARE DONE IN ORDER TO;
>   BLINKS TO BECAUSE OF.
>
>
>
>    On Fri,
>  Aug 8, 2014 at
>    10:46 PM, Carrol Cox
>  <cbcox at ilstu.edu>
>    wrote:
>
>   
>  (You
>   need to click "Reply All";
>  otherwise it goes
>    to the post's
>  sender
>
>    rather than to
>  kb.)
>
>
>
>    I'm
>   interested in your
>  somewhat cryptic message because
>    on
>  another list I am
>
>   
>  writing on the difference between theory on
>
>  the one hand and
>    "what needs to
>
>    be explained" on
>  the
>   other. And involved in that is a
>
>   differentiation
>
>    between
>
>  empirical generalization and theoretical
>
>   EXPLANATION.
>
>
>
>    Carrol
>
>
>
>
>
>   
>  -----Original
>   Message-----
>
>    From: kb-bounces at kbjournal.org
>    [mailto:kb-bounces at kbjournal.org]
>    On Behalf
>
>
>   Of de gava
>
>    Sent: Friday,
>   August 08, 2014 9:34 PM
>
>
>   To: kb at kbjournal.org
>
>    Subject: [KB] (no
>   subject)
>
>
>
>    I think I can add to
>  this
>   discussion. In earlier days I
>    replied to
>   the
>
>    emails I received but
>   they went to Ed so to kick off I'd
>    like
>   to test
>
>    kb at kbjournal.org
>   as
>    an address to the e-list
>  and ask if
>   anyone has looked
>
>    closely
>
>  into the nature of 'explanations'. More to
>    follow perhaps.
>
>
>
>
>
>  _______________________________________________
>
>    KB mailing list
>
>    KB at kbjournal.org
>
>    http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  _______________________________________________
>
>    KB mailing list
>
>    KB at kbjournal.org
>
>    http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
>
>
>
>
>    --
>   
>  Herbert
>   W.
>    Simons,
>  Ph.D.
>    Emeritus
>   Professor
>  of
>    Communication
>
>   Dep't of  Strategic
>   
>  Communication,
>   Weiss Hall 215
>    Temple
>
>
>  University, Philadelphia 19122
>    Home
>   phone:
>    215 844 5969
>
>    http://astro.temple.edu/~hsimons
>    Academic Fellow, Center for
>  Transformative
>    Strategic Initiatives
>  (CTSI)
>
>
>
>
>
>   -----Inline
>  Attachment Follows-----
>
>
>
>  _______________________________________________
>    KB mailing list
>    KB at kbjournal.org
>    http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
>
>
>
>  _______________________________________________
>   KB mailing list
>   KB at kbjournal.org
>   http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
>
>
>  _______________________________________________
>  KB mailing list
>  KB at kbjournal.org
>  http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> KB mailing list
> KB at kbjournal.org
> http://kbjournal.org/mailman/listinfo/kb_kbjournal.org
>





More information about the KB mailing list